Washington v. Marion Cnty. Prosecutor

Decision Date18 August 2017
Docket NumberNo. 1:16–cv–02980–JMS–DML,1:16–cv–02980–JMS–DML
Citation264 F.Supp.3d 957
Parties Leroy WASHINGTON on his own behalf, and on behalf of a Class of those similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MARION COUNTY PROSECUTOR, Mayor of the Consolidated City of Indianapolis/Marion County, Chief of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

Jeffrey R. Cardella, Law Office of Jeff Cardella LLC, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.

Benjamin J. Legge, Office of the Attorney General, Jonathan Paul Nagy, Indiana Attorney General, Pamela G. Schneeman, Office of Corporation Counsel City of Indianapolis, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants.

ORDER

Jane Magnus–Stinson, Chief Judge

This matter involves a challenge to Indiana's civil forfeiture statute, specifically as it applies to the seizure and pre-forfeiture retention of vehicles. Plaintiff Leroy Washington, on behalf of himself and a putative class of plaintiffs, contends that Indiana's statute violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Mr. Washington argues that the statute allows law enforcement officers to seize and hold vehicles based on an officer's probable cause determination for up to six months without judicial oversight and without allowing individuals the opportunity to challenge that seizure and deprivation—in other words without a post-seizure, pre-forfeiture hearing. In his Motion for Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 31 ], Mr. Washington requests a declaratory judgment that the statute is unconstitutional, and a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from enforcing the statute. For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that Indiana Code Section 34–24–1–1(a)(1), as read in conjunction with the statutory provisions of the same chapter, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court therefore permanently enjoins Defendants from enforcing that statutory provision.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts relevant to the pending motions are as follows.1 On September 21, 2016, an officer of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department ("IMPD") stopped a car driven and owned by Mr. Washington. [Filing No. 33–1 at 1.] Mr. Washington was ultimately arrested and charged with, among other offenses, dealing in marijuana. [Filing No. 1 at 6.] The officer had Mr. Washington's car towed and held for forfeiture pursuant to Indiana Code Sections 34–24–1–1(a)(1) and 34–24–1–2(a)(1). [Filing No. 31–1.] On November 1, 2016, Washington made a demand for the return of his property pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34–24–1–3. [Filing No. 1 at 7.] Mr. Washington's car has since been returned to him. [Filing No. 29–1 at 6.]

Mr. Washington filed his Complaint in this Court on November 2, 2016, alleging on behalf of himself and a putative class of plaintiffs that Indiana Code Section 34–24–1–2(a)(1) violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Filing No. 1 at 1.] Mr. Washington's Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that Indiana Code § 34–24–1–2(a)(1), read in conjunction with Indiana Code Sections 34–24–1–1 and 34–24–1–3, violates the Constitution, and he requests a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants the Marion County Prosecutor, the Mayor of the Consolidated City of Indianapolis/Marion County, and the Chief of the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (collectively "Defendants") from seizing vehicles pursuant to that statute. [Filing No. 1 at 7.] Mr. Washington then filed a Motion to Certify a Class, [Filing No. 3 ], and a Motion for Preliminary Injunction, [Filing No. 5 ], which Defendants oppose, [Filing No. 38; Filing No. 39 ]. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss, [Filing No. 24 ], which this Court denied, [Filing No. 34 ]. Mr. Washington filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 31 ], and Defendants cross-moved for summary judgment, [Filing No. 40 ]. This Court ordered Mr. Washington to submit supplemental briefing addressing several issues, and allowed Defendants the opportunity to respond. [Filing No. 56.] That briefing has been submitted in accordance with the Court's order. [Filing No. 57; Filing No. 59; Filing No. 60.]

Therefore, currently pending before the Court are Mr. Washington's Motions for Class Certification, [Filing No. 3 ], Preliminary Injunction, [Filing No. 5 ], and Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 31 ], and Defendants' Cross–Motion for Summary Judgment, [Filing No. 40 ].

II. CHALLENGED STATUTORY SCHEME

Indiana Code Section 34–24–1–1(a)(1) authorizes the seizure of vehicles "if they are used or are intended for use by the person or persons in possession of them to transport or in any manner facilitate the transportation" of a number of controlled substances, including marijuana, for the purposes of dealing in or manufacturing them. Ind. Code § 34–24–1–1(a)(1). That provision authorizes law enforcement officers to seize such vehicles without a warrant if the seizure occurs incident to a lawful arrest or search. Ind. Code § 34–24–1–2(a)(1). The government may then hold the vehicle without taking any action for 180 days, or for 90 days after receiving written notice from the owner demanding the vehicle's return. Ind. Code § 34–24–1–3. At the end of the applicable time period, the government may file a complaint in the circuit or superior court in the jurisdiction where the seizure occurred for the reimbursement of law enforcement costs and forfeiture, or it may return the property to its owner. Ind. Code § 34–24–1–3. While the vehicle is being held, prior to any forfeiture action, the vehicle's owner has no legal ability to challenge the seizure, because replevin is prohibited by the statute. Ind. Code § 34–24–1–2(c) ("Property that is seized under subsection (a) ... is not subject to replevin but is considered to be in the custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure.").

Mr. Washington argues that this statutory scheme is unconstitutional because it allows the government to deprive individuals of their vehicles for potentially lengthy periods of time without any ability to contest the deprivation. He asks this Court to issue a declaratory judgment stating that the seizure and holding of vehicles pursuant to Ind. Code § 34–24–1–2(a)(1) violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and to enter a permanent injunction enjoining Defendants from seizing and holding vehicles pursuant to that provision.2 [Filing No. 1 at 7.] Defendants respond that the requirements of due process are satisfied by the statute and that no hearing or other process is required during the period of deprivation or prior to the forfeiture hearing. [Filing No. 40.]

III. MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION
A. Legal Standard

In deciding whether to certify a class, the Court may not blithely accept as true even the most well-pleaded allegations of the complaint, but must instead "make whatever factual and legal inquiries are necessary under Rule 23" to resolve contested issues. Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2001). Specifically, the Court must find that the putative class satisfies the four prerequisites set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). If the putative class does satisfy these prerequisites, the Court must additionally find that it satisfies the requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b), which vary depending upon which of three different types of classes is proposed.

The four prerequisites under Rule 23(a) are that: "(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). Class certification is not appropriate unless the named plaintiff establishes all four prerequisites. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156, 102 S.Ct. 2364, 72 L.Ed.2d 740 (1982). In addition to meeting the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), the proposed class must satisfy one of the conditions of Rule 23(b). Oshana v. Coca-Cola Co., 472 F.3d 506, 513 (7th Cir. 2006) ; Williams v. Chartwell Fin. Servs., 204 F.3d 748, 760 (7th Cir. 2000). Under Rule 23(b)(2), a class action that satisfies Rule 23(a) may be sustained if "the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole." Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).

B. Whether an Identifiable Class Exists

In addition to the class certification prerequisites specifically enumerated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, it is the plaintiff's burden to prove "that the class is indeed identifiable as a class." Oshana , 472 F.3d at 513. The Court addresses that requirement first.

Mr. Washington proposes the following class definition: "All persons who own vehicles that are being held pursuant to IC § 34–24–1–2(a)(1) by the Marion County Prosecutors [sic] Office or the Consolidated City of Indianapolis/Marion County or the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department or any agent of the aforementioned Defendants." [Filing No. 4 at 3.] Mr. Washington argues that this class is sufficiently identifiable, because all elements of the proposed class definition refer to objective criteria: (1) vehicle owners, (2) whose vehicles have been seized, (3) pursuant to Indiana Code Section 34–24–1–2(a)(1), (4) by the Defendants. [Filing No. 4 at 4.]

Defendants argue that the class is not sufficiently identifiable because "there are too many factual variables that would have to be determined in order to determine whether persons actually belong in the class." [Filing No. 39 at 8.] As possible variables, Defendants...

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