Washington v. Marquis

Decision Date02 January 1912
Docket Number114
Citation82 A. 756,233 Pa. 552
PartiesWashington County v. Marquis, Appellant
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court

Argued October 13, 1911

Appeal, No. 114, Oct. T., 1911, by defendant, from order of C.P. Washington Co., Aug. Term, 1910, No. 138, dismissing appeal from tax settlement in case of Washington County v. W E. Marquis. Affirmed.

Appeal from tax assessment. Before McILVAINE, P.J.

At the hearing the court under objection and exception overruled various offers to prove the general reputation in the locality as to the character, thickness, quality and value of the coal vein under the land assessed. [1-6]

The court entered a decree nisi sustaining the assessment.

The appellant filed various exceptions to the findings of fact. These exceptions were overruled. [7-12]

On exceptions to the conclusions of law of the adjudication McILVAINE, P.J., filed the following opinion:

Exception 1:

The court erred in holding that all property should be valued and assessed for taxation at its actual value, instead of holding that each separate farm of a taxpayer should be assessed at such price as the assessing officers, after due examination and consideration, shall believe it would sell for, if sold singly and separately at a bona fide sale after due public notice.

If the appellant's counsel have interpreted our adjudication to mean that we set up a different standard than that fixed by the act of assembly, then the court has been misunderstood. We hold that all real estate should be valued and assessed for taxation at its actual value (not a proportionate part of its value) and that the best evidence of the actual value of a piece of real estate is what it would sell for if sold singly and separately at a bona fide sale after public notice. This exception, with this explanation, is overruled. [13]

Exception 2:

The court erred in holding, under the constitutional requirement as to uniformity, that the equalization of the valuations of appellants' lands by the county commissioners, was not excessive nor erroneous, for that they did not equalize them at higher valuations than the valuations of lands underlaid with coal in the other parts of the county.

Under the Act of April 19, 1889, P.L. 37, this court in disposing of these appeals was in duty bound, in the language of the act, "to have due regard to the valuation and assessment made of other real estate in the county." The burden was on the appellants to show that their assessments were too high, measured by the way other owners of like property had been assessed. If they have been treated as well as other owners of like property through the county, then they have no just ground of complaint, for it would be an injustice to the others if we should destroy this equality of assessment by reducing that of the appellants and leave the others as they are. This exception is overruled. [14]

Exception 3:

The court erred in holding that the evidence offered by the appellants by the tables of aggregate assessments and of county indebtedness, was not to be considered as proper for the consideration of the county commissioners in making the valuations, in view of what improvements the county possesses for the county expenditures, without finding also that the improvements specified have not yet been paid for by the expenditures, the indebtedness for them being represented by bonds unpaid.

All we meant by what we said as to the matter referred to in this exception was that the county for the bonds it had issued had got value received. It is not true that the improvements specified in our adjudication, such as court house, bridges Flinn roads, etc., have not yet been paid for. They have all been paid for, and that is the reason we owe the debt created by the bonds. This exception is overruled. [15]

Exception 4:

The court erred in holding that the several assessors, in making the valuations for assessment of appellants' property followed the proper method provided by law. This exception is overruled. [16]

Exception 5:

The court erred in not holding that the valuations made by the assessors of appellants' farms, were irregular in form and unauthorized by law, in that they valued and assessed the underlying coal, unsevered and unopened and undeveloped, and entirely unproductive, separately from the surface, and then added the valuation of the coal to the valuation of the surface, as though but one assessment had been made upon the land.

This is not what the assessors did. They valued each of the appellants' farms as a whole, but they took into consideration, as they were bound to in making that value how much if any the presence of the coal in and under each of the farms of the appellants would add to the value of that farm, -- just the same as the presence of a building on a farm would be considered as an element in estimating the value of the farm.

And right here, we may observe in conclusion, is found the only real point of contention in these appeals, as we view it. The appellants claim that as the Pittsburg or River vein of coal underlying their farms is unsevered and unproductive, it should not be taken into consideration by the assessors or board of revision in estimating the value of their farms, notwithstanding the same vein of coal in or under adjoining farms where severed should be assessed; or, in other words, that severed coal when in the hands of coal operators or persons who have purchased it as an investment, should be valued and taxed, but that when the coal is in and under a farm and not severed, it should not be taken into consideration in valuing the farm and be assessed. That is, that a farmer who holds his coal unsevered with a view of getting a higher price for it in the future, ought not to pay any tax upon it because it is unproductive, but that the coal in the hands of another person if severed but held for future developments, ought to be taxed. This position we think is clearly untenable. It is true that where coal has not been severed, it cannot be taxed separate from the surface, but when the farm is taxed both the surface and the unsevered coal can be taken into consideration in fixing the value, and if the unsevered coal is just as valuable as the coal adjoining it which is severed, then the increase in value which would be caused in the farm, where the coal is unsevered by reason of its presence, ought to be taken into consideration in fixing the valuation for the taxation of that farm.

As was remarked in our adjudication, these sixty appellants combined together to take these appeals that the question to which I have just referred might be...

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