Washington v. Nat'l Oilwell Varco, LP
| Decision Date | 07 October 2022 |
| Docket Number | 4:21-cv-871-P |
| Parties | Brittinee Washington, Plaintiff, v. National Oilwell Varco, L.P., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
Before the Court is Defendant National Oilwell Varco, L.P.'s (“NOV”) motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 25. Having reviewed the motion, related docket entries counsel's arguments, and applicable law, the Court GRANTS the motion.
This is an employment discrimination case. In March 2019, NOV hired Plaintiff Brittinee Washington,[1] a black woman, to work in an administrative capacity under project manager Garrett Wojcik. ECF No. 31 at 2, 4. Washington and Wojcik worked well together until June 2019 when NOV downsized and cut costs by offering employees a Very Early Retirement Package (“VERP”). Id.; ECF No. 31 at 2. A few employees from NOV's spare parts division accepted the VERP and retired, prompting the operations director to ask if Washington and a fellow white employee would temporarily assist in the spare parts division. ECF Nos. 26 at 4; 31 at 3. Washington inquired whether the additional responsibilities would come with a pay raise, but NOV said no. ECF No. 31 at 3. In response, Washington asked for time to think about whether to take on the additional responsibilities. Id. According to Washington this was the moment various NOV employees began retaliating against her, starting with Wojcik. Id.
Washington filed a series of complaints with the NOV human resources department. Her first complaint asserted that Wojcik yelled at her and made her cry after she asked for time to think about whether to accept the temporary position in the spare parts division. ECF No. 271 at 30-32. The next day Washington filed a second complaint because an NOV employee canceled her scheduled training, allegedly at Wojcik's direction. ECF Nos. 26 at 5; 27-1 at 30-32. Two days later Washington filed a third complaint, this time alleging that Wojcik moved “a Caucasian employee from another area to [share her] office,” thus subjecting her to surveillance that Washington contends non-black employees did not endure. The third complaint also stated that Wojcik wanted Washington to move to an office next to an NOV employee who Washington alleges was “discriminatory towards black women” because the employee did not talk to Washington.[2] ECF Nos. 31 at 19; 27-1 at 26-33.
After Washington filed her third complaint, NOV Director of Human Resources discussed the three complaints with Washington and investigated her claims. ECF No. 27-7 at 363. The Director observed that Washington refused to speak with Wojcik, and she was “unable to provide any tangible evidence of discrimination or retaliation.” ECF No. 27-8 at 378, 381-84. The Director then recommended that Washington be transferred to the spare parts department within NOV, just as Wojcik asked Washington to do weeks before. ECF No. 27-7 at 363.
Washington was uncooperative during the transition to the new department and continued to complain about-and refused to speak to- Wojcik. ECF No. 27-7 at 371-72. She also requested to take off work nearly every Monday and Friday for three consecutive months. ECF No. 27-7 at 374-75. To remedy the situation, NOV decided to transfer Washington to the shipping department so that she no longer reported to Wojcik. ECF Nos. 27-3 at 244; 27-8 at 383. She received the same pay as her prior position (ECF No. 27-8 at 383), but Washington views the transfer as a demotion because she was required to perform some manual labor (ECF No. 31 at 6). NOV never replaced Washington's position any time after she was transferred to a new division. ECF No. 27-7 at 363, 377.
A few weeks into her position in the shipping department, Washington filed her fourth complaint with NOV human resources, contending that she should have received an increase in pay when she changed jobs. ECF No. 27-1 at 39-40. Two days later on October 23, 2019, Washington filed her first charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), asserting claims of racial and gender discrimination. ECF No. 27-2 at 185-86. EEOC issued Washington a right-to-sue letter on October 30, 2019, which stated that Washington must sue “WITHIN 90 DAYS” of receiving the letter or she would lose her right to sue based on that charge. Id. at 188 (emphasis in original).
Throughout November 2019, Washington continued to notify human resources of various incidents that occurred during the workplace, but she did not file any more official complaints. ECF Nos. 27-8 at 383-84; 26 at 10; 31 at 8. On December 5, 2019, Washington complained that she did not have a “safety mat” for her workstation unlike her non-black coworkers, which was the straw that broke the camel's back. ECF No. 27-1 at 56. Because of Washington's constant complaining, NOV Vice President Cassie Pratt met with NOV's Senior Human Resources Director, Director of Human Resources, and in-house labor counsel, all three of whom are black women, to discuss whether to terminate Washington's employment. ECF No. 27-6 at 360-61. The women agreed that Washington should be fired because of her “rank insubordination” and because her “continuous bad faith complaints” violated NOV policy. Id. at 360. Washington was fired later that day. Id.
Washington filed a second charge of discrimination with the EEOC on February 12, 2020, asserting that NOV retaliated against her for filing her first EEOC charge. ECF No. 27-2 at 194. The second charge mentioned nothing about racial or gender discrimination. See id. She received her second right-to-sue letter on April 22, 2021. Id. at 195.
Washington then filed this suit, asserting racial and sex discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., racial and gender discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, a retaliation claim under Title VII, and a Texas state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). ECF No. 1 at 6-9. After discovery, NOV moved for summary judgment on all claims. ECF No. 25.
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law” are material and “will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.
When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes all facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draws reasonable inferences in the nonmovant's favor. In re Deepwater Horizon, No. 21-30573, 2022 WL 40006944, at *3 (5th Cir. Sept. 2, 2022). The Court “may not evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence, or resolve factual disputes.” Guzman v. Allstate Assurance Co., 18 F.4th 157, 160 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation omitted). Selfserving evidence can create a genuine issue of material fact so long as the evidence is “made on personal knowledge” and “particularized, not vague or conclusory.” Id. at 160-61 (internal quotation omitted).
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race and sex, among other things. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. Before suing under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies. Ernst v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 1 F.4th 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2021). This means that the plaintiff “must file a timely charge with the EEOC and then receive a notice of the right to sue.” Id. After receiving a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, the plaintiff must sue within 90 days or risk dismissal of her claim. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Ringgold v. Nat'l Maint. Corp., 796 F.2d 769, 770 (5th Cir. 1986).
Washington does not address NOV's contention that her Title VII sex and race discrimination claims are untimely. Compare ECF No. 26 at 14-15 with ECF No. 31 at 12. Washington received the first right-to-sue letter, which addressed her allegations of discrimination, on October 30, 2019. The letter explicitly states that her lawsuit “must be filed WITHIN 90 DAYS of your receipt of this notice, or [her] right to sue based on th[at] charge will be lost.” ECF No. 27-2 at 188 (emphasis in original). Washington did not sue until nearly two years later, well beyond the 90-day deadline. ECF No. 1. Her Title VII sex and race discrimination claims are therefore time-barred, and the Court grants summary judgment for NOV on these two claims. See Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 379-80 (5th Cir. 2002).
“Section 1981 [of Title 42] generally forbids racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts, including private employment contracts ....” Bobo v. ITT, Cont'l Baking Co., 662 F.2d 340, 342 (5th Cir. 1981) (collecting cases). As an initial matter, “no court has held that allegations of gender based discrimination fall within [§ 1981's] purview.” Id.; see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976). The Court accordingly grants NOV summary judgment on Washington's gender discrimination claim asserted under § 1981. ECF No. 1 at 8.
Continuing with Washington's § 1981 race discrimination claim (ECF No. 1 at 6-7), “a plaintiff's claims of unlawful discrimination are analyzed using the McDonnell Douglas [Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),] burden-shifting framework” when the claim is based on circumstantial evidence, like Washington's claim. Melvin v. Barr Roofing Co., 806...
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