Washington v. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 24 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-cv-01022-CRB |
| Parties | JASON LEVETTE WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. OAKLAND UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Oakland Unified School District ("OUSD") has renewed its initial motion to dismiss Jason Levette Washington's claims against OUSD and OUSD employees. Mr. Washington's First Amended Complaint ("FAC") alleges OUSD employees violated his constitutional rights by interfering with his religious expression outside of an OUSD school. The City of Oakland ("Oakland") has also moved to dismiss Mr. Washington's FAC, which alleges Oakland violated Mr. Washington's constitutional rights when two Oakland police officers issued a public nuisance citation as a result of Mr. Washington's religious organization's activities. Both motions, and Mr. Washington's motion for leave to file a SAC, are granted.
The morning of February 22, 2019, Mr. Washington arrived at Horace Mann Elementary to "do Christian-themed chalk art upon the public easement outside the school property." FAC (dkt. 40) ¶ 12. That morning, two groups of teachers said "disparaging things to" Mr. Washington. Id. ¶ 16. He also alleges that the defendant identified as "Doe 1" "verbally antagonize[d] and harass[ed]" him, id. ¶ 19, intentionally walked into him, id., kicked over a phone with which he was recording the incident, id. ¶ 23, and "propagat[ed] misinformation and claim[ed] [he] was painting on the sidewalk," id. ¶ 22.
Similarly, Mr. Washington alleges that on August 7, 2019, employees of OUSD "verbally berate[d]" him by calling him "stupid" and erasing his chalk art from the sidewalk. Id. ¶¶ 26-30. Additionally, "from January to August 2019 OUSD Police Officers . . . would while on duty and in uniform, come and harass, question, interrogate, impede and interfere with [Mr. Washington] while he was engaged in . . . religious expression." Id. ¶ 31. In particular, Mr. Washington identifies a January 29, 2019 incident in which OUSD officers "threatened that if [Mr. Washington] did not depart, they would 'cite' him," accused him of spitting at their shoes, "question[ed] his Christianity," and "discourage[d] [Mr. Washington's] religious expression." Id. ¶¶ 32, 41. Mr. Washington also claims that he asked "the supervising officer over OUSD Police personnel . . . to stop these unconstitutional harassments" but that Sergeant Fregoso "neglected to do so." Id. ¶ 33.
The FAC also alleges that Oakland violated Mr. Washington's constitutional rights. According to the FAC, two Oakland police officers "attempted to interrogate" Mr. Washington about who was attending a Team Jesus Youth Ministries event. Id. ¶¶ 34-39. Oakland later fined "him over $500 for what they alleged was [a] violation of a public nuisance ordinance" in connection with this incident. Id. ¶ 42.
The Court granted OUSD's motion to dismiss with leave to amend and denied Oakland's motion to dismiss. See generally Order Granting OUSD MTD and Denying Oakland MTD (dkt. 42). OUSD subsequently renewed its initial motion to dismiss after Mr. Washington failed to file a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"), and Oakland filed a new motion to dismiss the FAC. See generally OUSD's Renewed MTD (dkt. 44); Oakland MTD (dkt. 43). After two requests for extensions of time, see generally Mots. to Extend Time (dkts. 46, 49), which the Court granted, see generally Orders Granting Mots. to Extend Time (dkts. 47, 50), Mr. Washington opposed Oakland's motion and petitionedto file a SAC. See generally Opp'n to Oakland Mot. (dkt. 55); Mot. to File SAC (dkt. 56). Both Oakland and OUSD oppose the motion to file a SAC. See generally Oakland Opp'n (dkt. 58); OUSD Opp'n (dkt. 59).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dismissal may be based on either "the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory." Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2019). A complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 697 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, the Court "must presume all factual allegations of the complaint to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party." Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). "[C]ourts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice." Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
While these standards apply to all pleadings, a pro se complaint "is to be liberally construed, and . . . however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If a court does dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim, it "should liberally allow a party to amend its pleading." Sonoma Cty. Ass'n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma Cty., 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). A court has discretion to deny "leave to amend only if there is strong evidenceof 'undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment, etc.'" Id. (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)).
The Court first addresses Oakland's motion to dismiss, then OUSD's renewed motion to dismiss, and finally Mr. Washington's motion for leave to file a Second Amended Complaint.
Oakland asserts that Mr. Washington's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1986, various tort theories, and 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 242 all fail for a number of reasons. The Court considers each in turn.
Local governing bodies can be sued directly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 where "the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted or promulgated by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 659 (1978). A local government cannot, however, be held liable under this section solely "on a respondeat superior theory." Id. For a local government entity to be liable under this section, the plaintiff must sufficiently allege "(1) they were deprived of their constitutional rights by defendants and their employees acting under color of state law; (2) that the defendants have customs or policies which 'amount[ ] to deliberate indifference' to their constitutional rights; and (3) that these policies are the 'moving force behind the constitutional violation[s].'" Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 681-82 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1477 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Monell 436 U.S. at 694.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must show "the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class." Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976)). And "[w]here the challenged governmental policy is 'facially neutral,' proof of its disproportionate impact on an identifiable group can satisfy the intent requirement only if it tends to show that some invidious or discriminatory purpose underlies the policy." Lee, 250 F.3d at 686 (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264-66).
Mr. Washington asserts that his Fourteenth Amendment right to Equal Protection was violated, and the public nuisance citation was given "in response to his exercise of federally protected rights." FAC ¶ 40, 42; Opp'n to Oakland Mot. at 5. Mr. Washington fails to allege any additional facts sufficient to state a plausible claim that he was intentionally discriminated against on the basis of religion or that he was purposely treated differently from those similarly situated. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010) (); see also Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) ().
Although the Court has discretion to deny leave to amend under certain circumstances, Sonoma Cty. Ass'n of Retired Emps. v. Sonoma Cty., 708 F.3d 1109, 1117 (9th Cir. 2013), Mr. Washington's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims are dismissed without prejudice as his opposition indicates that he could plead additional facts demonstrating intentional discrimination. Opp'n to Oakland Mot. at 5. Because dismissal is warranted on these grounds, the Court need not consider Oakland's argument that Mr. Washington failed to allege the remaining elements of municipal liability. Oakland MTD at 4-5.
A cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 requires "a valid claim for relief...
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