Washington v. Occidental Chemical Corp.

• Decision Date: 06 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. G-97-525.,CIV. A. G-97-525.
• Citation: 24 F.Supp.2d 713
• Parties: Subrina Kay WASHINGTON v. OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas

24 F.Supp.2d 713

Subrina Kay WASHINGTON v. OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAL CORPORATION.

No. CIV. A. G-97-525.

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Galveston Division.

October 6, 1998.

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Gary T. Lester, Attorney at Law, Houston, TX, for Subrina K. Washington, plaintiff.

Holly Harvel Williamson, Littler Mendelson, Fastiff, Tichey and Mathia, Houston, TX, Stewart Edmond Hoffer, Littler Mendelson Fastiff, Tichey and Mathia, Houston, TX, for Occidental Chemical Corporation, defendant.

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

KENT, District Judge.

Plaintiff, a female, began working for Defendant on April 29, 1991 and accepted voluntary termination in February 1996. Plaintiff brought this case on September 3, 1997, alleging discrimination (denial of transfer and wrongful discharge), sexual harassment, constructive discharge, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., discrimination (pressure to resign, preferential treatment of non-disabled employees, and hostile environment harassment) and refusal to provide reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., interference with benefits, wrongful denial of benefits, failure to provide benefit information, and breach of fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, failure to provide leave and failure to reinstate after leave in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2615, and fraudulent inducement, intentional misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law. Now before the Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment of August 14, 1998. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's Motion is GRANTED. Consequently, all of Plaintiff's claims are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). When a motion for summary judgment is made, the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Issues of material fact are "genuine" only if they require resolution by a trier of fact. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law will preclude the entry of summary judgment. See id. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. If the evidence is such that a reasonable fact-finder could find in favor of the nonmoving party, summary judgment should not be granted. See id.; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Dixon v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 799 F.Supp. 691 (S.D.Tex.1992)(noting that summary judgment is inappropriate if the evidence could lead to different factual findings and conclusions). Determining credibility, weighing evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences are left to the trier of fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513.

II. PLAINTIFF'S ABANDONED CLAIMS

As noted above, Plaintiff initially brought this case alleging discrimination (denial of transfer and wrongful discharge), sexual harassment, constructive discharge, and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., discrimination (pressure to resign, preferential treatment of non-disabled employees, and hostile environment harassment) and refusal to provide reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., interference with benefits, wrongful denial of benefits, failure to provide benefit information, and breach of fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461, failure to provide leave and failure to reinstate after leave in violation of the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2615, and fraudulent inducement, intentional misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law. In her Response to Defendant's Summary Judgment Motion, Plaintiff informs the Court that she intends to withdraw her claims for Title VII retaliation, ADA hostile environment harassment, all alleged FMLA violations, and failure to provide benefit information under ERISA. In the first instance, the Court notes that Plaintiff's abandoned claims, for various legal reasons, completely lack any basis in fact and law. By abandoning them, Plaintiff obviously concedes such, and because Plaintiff fails to pursue these claims at this juncture, they are forever barred by the applicable statutes of limitation. Consequently, each and all of Plaintiff's claims alleging retaliation in violation of Title VII, hostile environment under ADA, any violations of FMLA, and failure to provide benefit information in violation of ERISA are hereby DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

III. PLAINTIFF'S TITLE VII CLAIMS

While employed by Defendant, Plaintiff alleges she was discriminated against because of her sex. Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides in relevant part:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to ... discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To be viable, Plaintiff's Title VII claim requires a showing of intentional discrimination. The Fifth Circuit applies the burden shifting analytical framework first established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), to analyze claims under Title VII. See, e.g., Long v. Eastfield College, 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying the McDonnell Douglas analysis to Title VII unlawful retaliation cases); Johnson v. Chapel Hill Indep. Sch. Dist., 853 F.2d 375, 381 (5th Cir.1988) (applying McDonnell Douglas to a differential treatment case brought pursuant to Title VII).¹

Under the now familiar McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework, the Court employs a three-part test designed to determine Defendant's motivation in taking the challenged action. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252-54, 101 S.Ct. at 1093-94; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803-04, 93 S.Ct. at 1824-25. First, Plaintiff is required to establish a prima facie case, wherein she must establish the essential elements of her discrimination claim. If Plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises. See Bodenheimer v. PPG Industries, Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 957 (5th Cir.1993). The burden of production then shifts to Defendant to rebut this presumption by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the alleged discriminatory action. See Olitsky v. Spencer Gifts, Inc., 964 F.2d 1471 1478 n. 19 (5th Cir.1992). Defendant meets this burden by proffering admissible evidence of an explanation that would be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for Defendant. See Guthrie v. Tifco Indus., 941 F.2d 374, 376 (5th Cir.1991). Defendant need not persuade the trier of fact that there was no intentional discrimination; it need only produce evidence on that point. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507-08, 113 S.Ct. at 2747-48. Third, once Defendant satisfies this burden, the presumption of discrimination established by Plaintiff's prima facie case dissolves. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n. 10, 101 S.Ct. at 1095 n. 10. Plaintiff's burden of persuasion then arises, and she must produce evidence that Defendant's proffered reasons are mere pretexts, the real reason for the action having been based on an impermissible animus. See id. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095; Bodenheimer, 5 F.3d at 959. Plaintiff may succeed at this juncture, either by persuading the Court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated Defendant, or by showing that Defendant's proffered reason is unworthy of credence. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095. The ultimate burden of proof of intentional discrimination rests at all times with Plaintiff. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507, 113 S.Ct. at 2749.

As this Court has repeatedly stated, summary judgment is particularly appropriate when the Court is evaluating evidence at the "pretext" stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.

"[I]t is relatively easy both for a plaintiff to establish a prima facie case and for a defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his decision." ... In the context of summary judgment ..., the question is not whether the plaintiff proves pretext, but rather whether the plaintiff raises a genuine issue of fact regarding pretext.

Britt v. The Grocers Supply Co., 978 F.2d 1441, 1450 (5th Cir.1992)(quoting Amburgey v. Corhart Refractories Corp., 936 F.2d 805, 811 (5th Cir.1991) (citations omitted)). Speculation and belief are insufficient to create a fact issue as to pretext. See Britt, 978 F.2d at 1451. Nor can pretext be established by mere conclusory statements of a plaintiff who feels that she has been discriminated against. See E.E.O.C v. Exxon Shipping Co., 745 F.2d 967, 976 (5th Cir.1984).

A. Intentional Discrimination: Denial of Transfer and Discharge

The apparent gravamen of Plaintiff's intentional discrimination claim is that, because of her gender, Defendant refused to honor her transfer requests and ultimately...