Washington v. Office of the State Appellate Defender

• Decision Date: 31 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 12 C 8533,12 C 8533
• Citation: Washington v. Office of the State Appellate Defender, No. 12 C 8533 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2016)
• Parties: ALICE WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. OFFICE OF THE STATE APPELLATE DEFENDER, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

ALICE WASHINGTON, Plaintiff, v. OFFICE OF THE STATE APPELLATE DEFENDER, Defendant.

No. 12 C 8533

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

May 31, 2016

Judge Rebecca R. Pallmeyer

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PlaintiffAlice Washington, who is African-American, filed this Title VII action against her former employer, the Office of the State Appellate Defender(OSAD), alleging (1) that OSAD discriminated against her on the basis of race in reducing her salary, (2) that she was later forced to resign because of her race, and (3) that her forced resignation was a retaliatory response to an internal grievance she had filed regarding her salary reduction.A jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on her retaliation claim, but found for Defendant on the remaining claims.The jury awarded $400,000 in compensatory damages.Defendant subsequently filed a motion to reduce that award to $200,000 pursuant to the damages cap under Title VII. [144]

The issue of equitable remedies was left to the court, which held an evidentiary hearing on the issue on December 21, 2015.[170] Both parties filed pre- and post-hearing briefs in support of their positions on equitable relief.(Def.'s Mot. to Reduce Compensatory Damages [144]; Pl.'s Mot. for Equitable Relief [148]; Pl.'s Post-Hearing Mem. [176]; Def.'s Post-Hearing Mem. [179].)For the reasons discussed below, the court reduces Plaintiff's compensatory damages award to $200,000.Washington is entitled back pay, prejudgment interest, front pay, a tax-component award, and compensation for medical expenses, all of which is yet to be determined based on additional information from the parties.The court denies Plaintiff's requests for compensation related to pension withdrawals and personal loans she accepted from friends and family.

BACKGROUND

Washington worked at OSAD from 1997 until she was forced to resign on February 4, 2008.Washington was hired by OSAD as a "mitigation specialist"(a/k/a "forensic social historian") in its post-conviction unit and remained in that position until July 2007, when she was involuntarily transferred to the death penalty trial assistance unit ("DPTA Unit").Several months later, on January 23, 2008, the newly-appointed State Appellate Defender Michael Pelletier changed Plaintiff's title to "investigator," based on his assessment of her on-the-job responsibilities.(Ex. F to Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. for Equitable Relief.)The new title came with a corresponding reduction in pay from $60,400 to $49,400.(Id.)Washington responded to her demotion by filing a grievance, claiming that her reduced wages were the result of discrimination against her on the basis of her race and her disability (she was being treated for breast cancer at the time).

Almost immediately, Pelletier took action to end Plaintiff's employment with OSAD: on February 4, 2008, he gave her the option of resigning or being fired.(Ex. B. to Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. for Equitable Relief.)Plaintiff resigned on February 4, 2008, effective on March 15, 2008.(Id.)On February 8, 2008, Pelletier denied Plaintiff's grievance.(Ex. B to Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. for Equitable Relief.)

Plaintiff filed two charges of discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human Rights("IDHR") and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission("EEOC") on February 21, 2008.(Ex. A to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss.)The IDHR issued Plaintiff a "right to sue" letter, and she filed suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County in 2010.That suit was dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds in June 2011, but the EEOC issued Washington a right-to-sue letter in July 2012.(Exs. B & C to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss.)Washington filed this suit in October 2012.[1] In the 4.5 years between Plaintiff's resignation and the commencement of this suit, the State of Illinois abolished the death penalty, eliminating the need for the DPTA Unit (which had by then been renamed the Capital Trial Assistance Unit).(Nov. 23 Tr. [143]at 14.)OSAD closed the DPTA Unit on April 15, 2015, while another death-penalty related unit—the Capital Post-Conviction Unit—was eliminated on June 30, 2012.(Id.)On April 15, 2011, all but two employees in these units were terminated: one investigator and one mitigation specialist.They completed their units' work and were also let go on June 30, 2012.(Id.)

In her suit before this court, Plaintiff alleged that she had her salary reduced and was eventually forced to resign because of her race and disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities ActandTitle VII, and in retaliation for the grievance she filed, in violation of Title VII.She included a claim of race discrimination for an earlier job reassignment as well.OSAD sought summary judgment [68] on all of these claims.The court granted OSAD's motion [96] with regard to Plaintiff's ADA claim.The remaining claims survived and the parties proceeded to trial.Following a three-day trial, a jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff on only one of the three counts in her complaint: the retaliation claim.The jury awarded Plaintiff $400,000 in compensatory damages.The issue of equitable relief was left to the court.

As for equitable relief, Plaintiff seeks back pay, front pay, prejudgment interest, fringe benefits (in the form of withdrawn pension benefits), compensation for loans she took from friends and family, and reimbursement for medical bills and insurance premiums.Defendant, for its part, asks the court to reduce the jury's compensatory damages award in light of Title VII's statutory cap.

DISCUSSION

I.Title VII Compensatory Damages Cap

The parties disagree about which entity should be considered Washington's "employer" for purposes of Title VII.Defendant argues that Plaintiff was employed by OSAD (Def.'s Mot. to Reduce Compensatory Damagesat 1-2), while Washington claims that the State of Illinois washer "true" employer.(Pl.'s Mot. for Equitable Reliefat 2-4.)The distinction is an important one."Title VII actions must be brought against the 'employer.'In suits against state entities, that term is understood to mean the particular agency or part of the state apparatus that has actual hiring and firing responsibility."Hearne v. Bd. of Educ., 185 F.3d 770, 777(7th Cir.1999)(citingEEOC v. State of Illinois, 69 F.3d 167, 171-72(7th Cir.1995)).And 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) caps compensatory damages in Title VIIcases based on the number of employees working for the defendant-employer.Defendants having 200-500 employees, such as OSAD¹, face liability of up to $200,000, while awards against larger employers, like the State, max out at $300,000.

Plaintiff argues that, although OSAD is the named defendant in this case, the State of Illinois is the "real party in interest," as "it is the State ultimately that pays the judgment," and OSAD is represented by assistant attorneys general.(Pl.'s Supp. Mot. & Mem. in Support of Max. Cap Under Title VII [153]at 1-2, 5.)Washington points out, as well, that her paychecks came from the State's Comptroller, not OSAD, and her payroll records note her "state service" status.(Ex. A to Pl.'s Supp. Mot.)This is meaningful, she argues, because of the Supreme Court's holding in Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., 519 U.S. 202, 206(1997), that "the employment relationship is most readily demonstrated by the individual's appearance on the employer's payroll."Citing Walters, the Seventh Circuit later described payroll records as the "starting point" for assessing who is employed by a particular employer.Smith v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d 971, 974(7th Cir.2006).But Walters and Smith are far from dispositive here.

In Walters, the defendant argued that it did not have enough employees to fall under the purview of Title VII, which applies to an employer that "has fifteen or more employees for eachworking day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year."42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).The defendant, a retail distributor of encyclopedias, had two part-time hourly employees whose schedules required them to work only four days each week.As a result, the parties stipulated that the company had 15 or more employees on its payroll on each working day during 47 weeks, but was actually compensating (including paid leave as compensation) 15 or more employees on each working day during only 9 weeks.Id. at 212.The issue in Walters, therefore, was "whether an employer 'has' an employee on any working day on which the employer maintains an employment relationship with the employee, or only on working days on which the employee is actually receiving compensation from the employer."Walters, 519 U.S. at 204.The Court adopted the first of these interpretations.For purposes of the question presented in Walters, the so-called "payroll method" of identifying an employer-employee relationship is particularly helpful, because no one in that case challenged which entity the plaintiff worked for; the only issue was when the plaintiff worked for the defendant.In this case, in contrast, where the issue is whether Plaintiff worked for the State or its agency, payroll records are a good "starting point," but they do not tell the whole story.

Washington also relies on Robinson v. Sappington, 351 F.3d 317(7th Cir.2003), a case in which the Seventh Circuit ruled that the State of Illinois could be held liable for sexual harassment claims levied against judges who were employed directly by the state but worked at a county circuit court.Robinson provides little guidance here because the key question in this case—whether Plaintiff was employed by the state or its agency—was undisputed in Robinson:the Robinson court noted that there was "no question" that the defendant judges in that case were employees of the state.Id. at 331 n.9.

On its face, Bloom v. Crook, 78 F. Supp. 2d 1(D. Me.1999), also cited by Plaintiff, better supports...