Washington v. Rhett
Decision Date | 05 February 2014 |
Docket Number | 2014-UP-055 |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | Jamesetta Washington, as Guardian ad Litem for Jayden W., a minor, Appellant, v. Edmund Rhett Jr., M.D. Low Country Obstetrics and Gynecology, P.A., and Tenet South Carolina, Inc., d/b/a East Cooper Regional Medical Center, Defendants, Of whom Edmund Rhett Jr., M.D. is the Respondent. Appellate Case No. 2010-173247 |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Heard December 11, 2013
Appeal From Charleston County J. Michael Baxley, Circuit Court Judge.
Edward L. Graham and John Layton Ruffin, both of Florence, and Mary H. Watters, of Mt. Pleasant, all of Graham Law Firm, PA, for Appellant.
Robert H. Hood and Mary Agnes Hood Craig, of Hood Law Firm, LLC both of Charleston, and Deborah Harrison Sheffield, of Columbia, for Respondent.
In this medical malpractice case, Jamesetta Washington appeals from a jury verdict in favor of her obstetrician, Dr. Edmund Rhett Jr., alleging several errors by the trial court regarding jury selection, the admission of evidence, and the jury charge. We affirm.
On July 15, 2002, Jamesetta Washington arrived at East Cooper Regional Medical Center for the delivery of her first child. After Jamesetta had been in labor for twenty-four hours, the baby's heart rate showed periods of deceleration, which caused Dr. Rhett concern over whether the baby was getting enough oxygen. Dr. Rhett decided to deliver the baby with the help of a vacuum extractor, and the baby was born three minutes and seven seconds later with the umbilical cord wrapped around his neck. An arterial blood gas sample indicated the baby was nearly acidotic and had higher-than-normal carbon dioxide levels and low oxygen levels. As the baby's condition continued to deteriorate medical staff transferred him to the Medical University of South Carolina, where doctors diagnosed him with an intracranial hemorrhage, and operated on him.
Today the eleven-year-old child suffers from brain damage including severe developmental delays. He struggles with coordination, articulation and speech, reading and writing, and memory. Jamesetta presented expert testimony from a pediatric neurologist that the child is unlikely to live independently due to his disabilities.
Jamesetta brought this medical negligence action as the child's Guardian ad Litem against several defendants, each of whom settled except Dr. Rhett. Each of her theories of recovery against Dr. Rhett is based on his alleged negligence regarding the use of the vacuum extractor. After a thirteen-day trial, the jury returned a verdict responding "No" to the following question on the verdict form: "Did the Plaintiff prove by the greater weight or preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant Dr. Rhett deviated from the standard of care?"
To recover in any action for negligence, a plaintiff must prove the following four elements: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) the defendant breached that duty by a negligent act or omission; (3) the plaintiff suffered damages as a result; and (4) the damages were proximately caused by the breach of duty. Grier v. AMISUB of S.C., Inc., 397 S.C. 532, 537, 725 S.E.2d 693, 696 (2012). Because the jury determined Dr. Rhett did not breach his duty of due care, and thus, did not reach subsequent questions related to causation, this court need not address any issue raised by Jamesetta that relates to causation. See Stephens ex rel. Lillian C. v. CSX Transp., Inc., 400 S.C. 503, 520, 735 S.E.2d 505, 514 (Ct. App. 2012) (). On this basis, we decline to address issues related to the admissibility of testimony showing that maternal use of alcohol or genetics may have caused the child's problems because we find these issues relate exclusively to the causation element.
As to the trial court's alleged error in refusing to charge the jury on informed consent, we find Jamesetta's requested charge contained statements that were inapplicable to the facts of this case, and incorrect statements of the law. Specifically, (1) the statement, "a physician must respect a competent patient's refusal of treatment, even in an emergency, " is inapplicable because there is no evidence Jamesetta refused any treatment; (2) the statement, "If a competent patient refuses treatment, any medical treatment is a battery, even in an emergency, " is legally incorrect, see Linog v. Yampolsky, 376 S.C. 182, 187, 656 S.E.2d 355, 358 (2008) (); and (3) the statement, "if the patient is incapable of providing consent, the consent of a family member [should be sought], before administering treatment" is legally inaccurate, see Harvey v. Strickland, 350 S.C. 303, 311, 566 S.E.2d 529, 534 (2002) ( ), as well as inapplicable to the facts of this case because there is no evidence Jamesetta was incapable of providing consent. As to all other statements in the requested jury charge, we find the trial court's charge correctly and adequately covered those points of law. See Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 311, 536 S.E.2d 408, 425 (Ct. App. 2000) (); Dalon v. Golden Lanes, Inc., 320 S.C. 534, 540, 466 S.E.2d 368, 372 (Ct. App. 1996) ().
As to the jury charge Jamesetta requested on expert compensation we find the trial court properly refused to give the charge because a jury may consider any evidence the jury determines to relate to the credibility of any witness. See generally State v. McKerley, 397 S.C. 461, 464, 725 S.E.2d 139, 141 (Ct. App. 2012) (...
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