Washington v. Rucker
Decision Date | 18 February 1992 |
Docket Number | No. A91A2208,A91A2208 |
Parties | WASHINGTON v. RUCKER. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Robert L. Washington, Sr., pro se.
William F. Rucker, pro se.
Robert Lee Washington, Sr. presented for filing in the Superior Court of Fulton County a pro se complaint alleging legal malpractice by the named defendant, William Rucker. Pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-2(d), the pleadings were forwarded to a superior court judge for review prior to filing, and the judge entered an order denying filing on the ground that the complaint failed to set forth a justiciable claim as defined in the statute. Washington filed a pro se appeal to this court.
When examining a pro se complaint, a court should hold it to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and should deny filing only if " Evans v. City of Atlanta, 189 Ga.App. 566, 567, 377 S.E.2d 31 (1988). So construed, appellant's complaint alleges that he engaged appellee to represent him in an employment discrimination claim to be filed in federal court; that in September 1988 when appellee filed the discrimination complaint in United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia he was not admitted to practice before that court; that by August 1989 appellee had indicated to appellant that he intended to withdraw as counsel because he was suffering from a chronic illness and because a recent ruling by the United States Supreme Court had increased the burden of proof for appellant's claim; that on November 8, 1989 the district court judge entered an order granting appellee's petition to withdraw on the ground of "apparently insurmountable differences between plaintiff and counsel and a mutual agreement that their attorney-client relationship should be ended"; that appellant was unable to obtain substitute counsel; and that appellant's case was tried in January 1990, with appellant appearing pro se, and judgment was entered for the defendant.
Pretermitting the applicability of OCGA § 9-11-9.1, we note that both the rules governing practice before our state and federal courts and also the Canons of Ethics for attorneys contemplate that attorneys may petition for and be permitted to withdraw from representation under certain circumstances. See Uniform Superior Court Rule 4.3; Ethical Consideration 2-32; Directory Rule 2-110. We are aware of no case which holds that attorney withdrawal with court permission and in accordance with the applicable rules can constitute legal malpractice. Here, appellant does not allege that the requisite rules were not followed. The district court found that the requirements...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Schibel v. Eymann
...due to the withdrawal. Id. In the course of its analysis, the Arkansas court also relied on the decisions in Washington v. Rucker, 202 Ga.App. 888, 415 S.E.2d 919 (1992), and Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Haynsworth, Marion, McKay & Guerard, 334 S.C. 244, 513 S.E.2d 96 (1999), where cour......
-
Alexandru v. Strong
...have rejected claims against attorneys who have withdrawn as counsel with the permission of the court. See, e.g., Washington v. Rucker, 202 Ga. App. 888, 415 S.E.2d 919 (1992) (finding plaintiff's malpractice claim against former attorney for withdrawing as counsel in compliance with applic......
-
Bright v. Zega
...authorized withdrawal from representing a client by a federal district judge constituted malpractice. See, e.g., Washington v. Rucker, 202 Ga.App. 888, 415 S.E.2d 919 (1992). In Rucker, the Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed a dismissal for failure to state a claim where the plaintiff-client......
- Hudson v. Windholz