Washington v. St. Charles Parish School Bd.

• Decision Date: 14 January 1974
• Docket Number: No. 53524,53524
• Citation: 288 So.2d 321
• Parties: Dan WASHINGTON v. ST. CHARLES PARISH SCHOOL BOARD.
• Court: Louisiana Supreme Court

Page 321

288 So.2d 321

Dan WASHINGTON v. ST. CHARLES PARISH SCHOOL BOARD.

No. 53524.

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

Jan. 14, 1974.

Melvin P. Barre, Dist. Atty., Norman J. Pitre, Asst. Dist. Atty., for defendant-applicant.

John F. Ward, Jr., of Glusman, Ward, Moore & Lopez, Baton Rouge, for amicus curiae.

Murphy W. Bell, Baton Rouge, for plaintiff-respondent.

SANDERS, Chief Justice.

Dan Washington, a teacher, brought this action against his employer, the St. Charles Parish School Board, seeking to recover some $8,100.00 allegedly due him as additional compensation pursuant to the provisions of LSA-R.S. 17:423. At the time this suit was filed, that statute provided that '. . . any person who shall have served in the armed forces of the United States during World War II or the Korean conflict shall receive credit under the minimum salary schedule provided for in R.S. 17:419--422 for the period that he served in the armed forces of the United States, to become effective in the fiscal year 1957--1958.'

Two opinions of the Attorney General interpreting this statute were rendered in 1957, the first year of the statute's operation. Each advised that the word 'person', as used in this Act, applied only to persons already serving as teachers at the time military service began, in other words, only to teachers whose tenure was interrupted by military service. This interpretation of the statute has been followed administratively since the opinions were given, a period of 15 years.

Notwithstanding contemporary construction, both lower courts extended the benefits of the act to the plaintiff, who completed his education and began service as a teacher four years after his military service terminated. In reaching this decision, the Court of Appeal took the phrase 'any person' in its literal sense. See 274 So.2d 909 (1973). We granted writs to consider this interpretation of the statute and pleas of laches and prescription first raised at the appellate level. La., 278 So.2d 509. We now reverse.

The operative facts are clear. The parties stipulated that the plaintiff enlisted in the United States Air Force in 1952 and served 4 years until 1956, at which time he was honorably discharged. After his discharge, plaintiff attended Southern University and received a Bachelor of Science degree in August, 1960. In September of 1960, the St. Charles Parish School Board, defendant herein, employed him as a teacher, fixing his salary under the minimum salary schedule as a beginning teacher.

The complete text of the statute as it then read is as follows:

'Anything in this Part to the contrary notwithstanding, any person who shall have served in the armed forces of the United States during World War II or the Korean conflict shall receive credit under the minimum salary schedule provided for in R.S. 17:419--422 for the period that he served in the armed forces of the United States, to become effective in the fiscal year 1957--1958.'

It is true that the bare language of this Act places no limitations of any kind upon the term 'person.' It is also true that the Act is a part of Chapter 2 of Title 17 of the Revised Statutes, which is entitled 'Teachers and Employees.' In the Chapter, the words 'person' and 'teacher' are sometimes used indiscriminately. See, for example, Section 413 which provides that no 'person shall be appointed to teach without a written contract. . . . Every Teacher shall hold a certificate . . .' With reference to the statute at hand, the title of the Act provides:

'To amend Title 17 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of 1950 by adding thereto a new section to be designated as R.S. 17:423 relative to credit under the minimum salary schedule for Teachers who served in the armed forces of the United States.' (Italics ours).

Within the context of this ambiguity, the responsibility of the courts is the implementation of legislative intent. As we held in In Re Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 185 La. 448, 169 So. 464 (1936), (quoting with approval the written reasons of the trial judge):

'. . . (N)o matter how broad and comprehensive may be the language employed by the statute, if it was not the intention of the Legislature to cover a particular case by that broad and comprehensive language, that then no effect should be given to it because the Legislature did not so intend. . . . But even if the language of the act is as broad as opponents contend, it is then the duty of the court to restrain its operation within narrower limits than its words import, if the Court is satisfied that their literal meaning would extend to cases which the legislature never intended to include. . . .'

In cases such as this, moreover, settled administrative practice may serve as a fair index of legislative intent. This is, of course, the doctrine of contemporaneous construction, a doctrine approved by this Court...