Washington v. State
| Decision Date | 12 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 49S02–1212–CR–669.,49S02–1212–CR–669. |
| Citation | 997 N.E.2d 342 |
| Parties | Jamar WASHINGTON, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Victoria Bailey, Marion County Public Defender Agency, Indianapolis, IN, Attorney for Appellant.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Monika Prekopa Talbot, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 49A02–1202–CR–79
In this case the defendant alleges that the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding his claim that he was acting in defense of another. The defendant argues that the Court of Appeals misinterpreted our precedent in this area. Finding that the trial court did not err in its final instructions when it used the existing Indiana Pattern Jury Instruction on defense of another, we affirm the defendant's conviction but remand the case to the trial court to correct an error in the abstract.
Jamar Washington lived with his girlfriend, Dynasty Brown, and their two children, eight-month-old Jc.W. and two-year-old Ja.W., as well as Dynasty's five-year-old child from a prior relationship. On the evening of May 1, 2012, into the early morning of May 2, 2012, Washington went to a night club in downtown Indianapolis. Sometime after he left, Brown received a Facebook message asking if she knew Washington was at Club Hyde, and then a second picture message of Washington with another woman. When Washington did not answer Brown's phone calls, she drove downtown to confront him. She took eight-month-old Jc.W. along.
Brown arrived downtown and found Washington standing outside the night club talking to a woman, Deja Crayton. While holding Jc.W., Brown punched Washington in the eye and then punched Crayton. A fight ensued and a crowd gathered. A woman in the crowd yelled, “Girl, give me your baby!” [Tr. 72.] Brown gave Jc.W. to the woman and then continued to fight with Crayton.
Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Officer Cedric Young attempted to break up the fight between the two women. Officer Young grabbed Brown from behind, picked her up, and put her on the hood of a nearby car. Washington did not know that Brown had handed their baby to a woman in the crowd and so believed Officer Young was harming Jc.W. Washington grabbed Officer Young around the neck and tried to pull him off Brown.
A second officer on the scene, Officer Christopher Faulds, was trying to calm the crowd when he saw Washington jump on Officer Young's back. Three other officers who were present and assisting in crowd control also attempted to come to the aid of Officer Young. Officer Lisa Weilhammer fell during the struggle with Washington and hit her head on the pavement. Officer Geoffrey Barbieri, while trying to prevent Officer Weilhammer from falling, fell to his knees on the pavement. During the melee, Washington kicked Officer Barbieri several times.
The police officers were eventually able to get Washington into handcuffs and he was taken into custody. The State charged him with Class D felony strangulation, three counts of Class D felony resisting law enforcement, three counts of Class D felony battery on a police officer resulting in injury, and one count of Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. The State later dismissed two of the battery counts.
Washington was subsequently tried by a jury. After the evidence was presented, and over the State's objection, the trial court agreed to give the jury a pattern instruction regarding the defense of another. Washington tendered the following instruction, which largely paralleled the instruction eventually given.
Defendant's Tendered Instruction No. 2:
Use of force to defend another person is a legal defense.
A person is justified in using reasonable force against another person to protect a third person from what the person reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.
No person in this State shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting a third person by reasonable means necessary.
The State has the burden of disproving this defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
(App. at 101, 131; Tr. 239–40.) But Washington also tendered two additional instructions, both of which were refused by the trial court.
Defendant's Tendered Instruction No. 3:
A man has a right to act upon appearance of actual and immediate danger if he sincerely believes such apparent danger exists. The danger need not be actual. It need be only apparent to a reasonable person under the circumstances. He will not be accountable for an error in judgment as to the need to use force or the amount of force necessary,provided he acted honestly. The law protects persons who feel compelled to act at such times even though in retrospect it is proved they have erred. The danger need not be actual but the belief must be in good faith and the reaction must be reasonable.
Defendant's Tendered Instruction No. 4:
With regard to the defense of another, the existence of the danger, the necessity or apparent necessity of force, as well as the amount of force required to resist the attack can only be determined from the standpoint of the Accused at the time and under the then existing circumstances.
Ordinarily, one exercising the right to defense of another is required to act upon the instant and without time to deliberate and investigate, and under such circumstances a danger which exists only in appearance is as real and imminent to him as if it were actual.
A defender [sic] will not be accountable for an error in judgment as to the need to use force or amount of force necessary.
(App. at 102–03.) Washington cited French v. State, 273 Ind. 251, 403 N.E.2d 821 (1980), Franklin v. State, 266 Ind. 540, 364 N.E.2d 1019 (1977), and Drake v. State, 174 Ind.App. 646, 369 N.E.2d 941 (1977) as the basis for his instruction no. 3 and French as the basis for instruction no. 4. The trial court found both instructions were cumulative and unnecessary in light of the instruction it gave.
It is an issue whether the Defendant acted in defense of another person.
A person may use reasonable force against another person to protect someone else from what the Defendant reasonably believes to be the imminent use of unlawful force.
No person in this State shall be placed in legal jeopardy of any kind whatsoever for protecting a third person by reasonable means necessary.
The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant did not act in defense of another person.
(App. at 131.) This instruction was based on the Indiana Pattern Jury Instruction for defense of another. See Ind. Pattern Jury Inst. 10.03A (Feb. 2013).
Washington was found guilty of two counts of resisting law enforcement, one count of battery of a law enforcement officer resulting in injury, and one count of disorderly conduct. He was sentenced to an aggregate of 730 days with 90 days served in the Indiana Department of Correction, credit for 23 days served prior to sentencing, and the balance of the sentence to be served in the home detention component of Marion County Community Corrections.
Washington appealed the trial court's refusal to give his tendered jury instructions. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Washington v. State, 973 N.E.2d 91 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). We have granted transfer to address the jury instructions for self-defense and defense of another and the interpretation of Shaw v. State and French v. State.
Instructing a jury is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and we review its decision only for an abuse of discretion. Stringer v. State, 853 N.E.2d 543, 548 (Ind.Ct.App.2006). We undertake a three-part analysis in determining whether a trial court has abused its discretion. Walden v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1182, 1186 (Ind.2008). First, the reviewing court should determine whether the tendered instruction is a correct statement of the law. Id. Second, it “examines the recordto determine whether there was evidence present to support the tendered instruction.” Id. Finally, it “determines whether the substance of the tendered instruction was covered by another instruction or instructions.” Id.
The trial court gave only the pattern jury instruction and not Washington's tendered instructions no. 3 and no. 4. Washington claims his additional tendered instructions were necessary to adequately inform the jury that he could successfully claim defense of another, even if he was mistaken about Brown no longer holding their infant son when Officer Young attempted to restrain her.
Central to the resolution of Washington's alleged instructional error are two previous cases decided by this Court: French and Shaw v. State, 534 N.E.2d 745 (Ind.1989). Some confusion seems to exist as to whether Shaw repudiated French, and what the correct statement of the law is regarding the instructions for self-defense and defense of another in light of our precedent.
In French, the defendant claimed self-defense in a murder prosecution. French, 273 Ind. at 253, 403 N.E.2d at 823. The homicide occurred in the parking lot of a bar where the decedent and several other men were drinking in the late afternoon. French testified he approached the men and noticed an eighteen- or nineteen-year-old youth. French was active in youth programs and told the youth he did not belong there. According to French's testimony, the scene escalated between French and the decedent with the crowd forming around them and French attempting to walk away. French testified that the decedent charged him and he backed away with his gun pointed at the decedent. As he backed away, he bumped into a car and the gun accidentally fired, hitting the decedent in the heart leading to his death. French's testimony was diametrically opposed to the testimony of the State's witnesses, who claimed...
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