Washington v. Trident Med. Ctr.
| Decision Date | 11 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:20-cv-00953-RMG-MGB |
| Parties | Jim Washington, Plaintiff, v. Trident Medical Center, LLC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
Plaintiff Jim Washington, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights to procedural due process and equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review all pretrial matters in such pro se cases and submit findings and a recommendation to the assigned district judge. For the reasons discussed below, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed with prejudice and without issuance or service of process.
The instant case centers around an underlying medical malpractice action filed by Plaintiff against Defendant in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas on or around September 11, 2015.1 (See Case No. 2015-CP-10-5000.) On January 14, 2016, the circuit court judge issued a check-the-box Form 4 ("Judgment in a Civil Case") granting Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's case. On January 27, 2016, Plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal of hisaction pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure ("SCRCP"). Within the body of this motion, Plaintiff also included two requests "for relief from judgement or order" pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) and (3), SCRCP. The circuit court then issued a written order on February 5, 2016, formally dismissing Plaintiff's lawsuit with prejudice. More specifically, the circuit court judge explained that, "having reviewed the pleadings and having considered arguments and legal memoranda of the parties," Plaintiff had clearly failed to comply with certain statutory pre-litigation requirements, including the filing of an expert witness affidavit pursuant to S.C. Code § 15-79-125(A), and his medical malpractice lawsuit was therefore subject to dismissal.2
Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on March 4, 2016, and the South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision by order dated January 10, 2018. The court of appeals then denied Plaintiff's subsequent petition for rehearing on February 22, 2018. (See Case No. 2016-000495.) The South Carolina Supreme Court denied Plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari shortly thereafter and the remittitur was issued on May 30, 2018. (See Case No. 2018-000489.)
Following the dismissal of his lawsuit, Plaintiff proceeded to file a series of unsuccessful motions in circuit court, which are now the focus of the present § 1983 action. Although Plaintiff's allegations are somewhat convoluted and difficult to follow, it appears Plaintiff filed a "motion to reconsider conclusion" with the circuit court on July 6, 2018, along with a subsequent letter requesting a hearing on said motion. In addition to challenging the merits of the circuit court's February 5, 2016 order, Plaintiff's motion raised allegations of extrinsic fraud against Defendant's attorneys for intentionally misrepresenting the facts of Plaintiff's medical treatment to the courts. Plaintiff also argued that the circuit court judge never explicitly adjudicated his Rule 60(b)claims3—contained within in his Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration filed January 27, 2016—prior to issuing the final order of dismissal.4
On August 20, 2018, Defendant's attorneys filed a letter with the Clerk of Court objecting to Plaintiff's request for a hearing on his July 6, 2018 motion to reconsider. The letter stated, Before the circuit court could respond, Plaintiff filed a separate motion to vacate the judgment and amend the pleadings, apparently labeled as a Rule 60(b) motion, reiterating those same arguments raised in his most recent motion for reconsideration. The parties briefed the issues raised in Plaintiff's motion to vacate and a hearing took place before a circuit court judge on February 7, 2018.
The circuit court ultimately rejected Plaintiff's arguments, explaining that matters decided by the appellate court cannot be reconsidered or relitigated in trial court and, thus, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to rehear Plaintiff's contentions regarding the merits of his malpractice claims. The court also found that to the extent the trial court judge did not expressly resolve Plaintiff's "pending" Rule 60(b) claims in the final written order on February 5, 2016, Plaintiff did not raise the issue with the judge or with the appellate court during his subsequent appeal, and, thus, hadeffectively abandoned the argument. The court therefore concluded that it was not appropriate for Plaintiff to raise the issue at this stage, two years after-the-fact. And finally, with respect to Plaintiff's allegations of extrinsic fraud, the circuit court "thoroughly reviewed Plaintiff's filings and [found] no evidence of any fraud" as it pertained to Defendant's counsel. Plaintiff's motion to vacate was therefore denied.
On February 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of his motion to vacate under Rules 59(e) and 60(b), SCRCP, once again alleging extrinsic fraud with respect to Defendant's counsel and arguing that he was not given the opportunity to fully present his case in light of his unanswered Rule 60(b) claims. The parties briefed the issues and the circuit court issued an order on March 18, 2019, finding that Plaintiff had "presented no novel facts, arguments, or theories" in support of his motion, and that there was nothing in the record the court "may have misunderstood, failed to fully consider, or perhaps failed to rule on." Plaintiff's motion to reconsider was therefore dismissed.
Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with the South Carolina Court of Appeals on April 18, 2019, but his claim was later dismissed on January 23, 2020, for failure to serve the record as required under Rule 210(c) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules ("SCACR").5 (See Case No. 2019-000640.) Plaintiff then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the South Carolina Supreme Court dismissed without prejudice on February 5, 2020, because Plaintiff had failed to file a petition for reinstatement or rehearing with the court of appeals. (See Case No. 2020-000173.)
Plaintiff now brings this federal action against Defendant pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Defendant's attorneys violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process andequal protection of the law by conspiring with state court officials to "intentionally discriminate against Plaintiff" throughout the course of his underlying medical malpractice case. (Dkt. No. 19 at 4.) After reviewing Plaintiff's initial Complaint (Dkt. No. 1), the undersigned determined that Plaintiff's claims were subject to summary dismissal for failure to state a facially plausible claim for relief. The undersigned issued a proper form order notifying Plaintiff of this determination, explaining why his allegations failed to state a claim under § 1983, and providing him an opportunity to submit an amended complaint that resolved these deficiencies. (Dkt. No. 6.) Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint shortly thereafter (Dkt. No. 12), followed by a Motion to Amend/Correct on November 4, 2020 (Dkt. No. 16), which the undersigned granted (Dkt. No. 17). Accordingly, the undersigned's assessment here is limited to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 19), which replaces both of his previous complaints in this action.
Under the established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of Plaintiff's pro se Second Amended Complaint. Specifically, the undersigned has evaluated Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and in light of the following precedents: Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr., 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995); and Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir. 1978).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, an indigent litigant, like Plaintiff, may under certain circumstances commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," "is frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendantwho is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Nagy v. FMC Butner, 376 F.3d 252, 256 (4th Cir. 2004) (). A complaint is frivolous if it is "clearly baseless" and makes "fanciful allegations." Denton, 504 U.S. at 32-33 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325 ()
In determining whether a pro se complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court must look to the familiar pleading standard under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, a complaint filed in federal court "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,'" rather than merely "conceivable." See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court is...
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