Washlefske v. Winston

• Decision Date: 29 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-7321,99-7321
• Citation: 234 F.3d 179
• Parties: (4th Cir. 2000) WILLIAM F. WASHLEFSKE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANDREW J. WINSTON; RONALD J. ANGELONE, Defendants-Appellees. . Argued:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 179

234 F.3d 179 (4th Cir. 2000)

WILLIAM F. WASHLEFSKE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANDREW J. WINSTON; RONALD J. ANGELONE, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 99-7321.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT.

Argued: September 29, 2000.

Decided: December 6, 2000.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk.

Rebecca B. Smith, District Judge. (CA-98-1466) COUNSEL ARGUED: Neal Lawrence Walters, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW APPELLATE LITIGATION CLINIC, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Mark Ralph Davis, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Law Division, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Terry McGarrity, Third Year Law Student, UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW APPELLATE LITIGATION CLINIC, Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellant. Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, Criminal Law Division, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees.

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Niemeyer wrote the opinion, in which Judge Traxler joined. Judge Widener wrote a concurring opinion.

OPINION

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

We are presented with the important question of whether William Washlefske, an inmate in the custody of the Virginia Department of Corrections, was deprived of his private property without just com- pensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause when Virginia expended the interest earned from Washlefske's prison accounts for the general benefit of inmates under the State's care. This question is one of first impression in this circuit. The district court concluded that although Washlefske had a property interest in the interest earned on his prison accounts, an unconstitutional taking did not occur because Washlefske voluntarily chose to place his funds in the accounts and because he received the benefits of the State's expenditure of the interest.¹

We affirm the judgment of the district court, but we do so for dif- ferent reasons. Because Washlefske's limited right to the funds in his prison accounts does not derive from any traditional principle of com- mon law but from a Virginia statute, he was not deprived of any prop- erty, for the purposes of a Takings Clause analysis, when the Department of Corrections followed the dictates of that statute in using the interest generated from these accounts. In reaching this con- clusion, we recognize the unfortunate conflict we create with the Ninth Circuit in Schneider v. California Department of Corrections, 151 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 1998), in which the court held, without con- ducting an inquiry under traditional principles of property law, that a convicted felon enjoyed a private property interest in the funds held in his prison account.

I

Washlefske was committed to the custody of the Virginia Depart- ment of Corrections in 1992 and has since been confined by the Department at the Powhatan Correctional Center. For labor performed while in prison, Washlefske "earns" an average of $108.76 each month, which is credited to his "spend account." He maintains an average monthly closing balance in this account of $67.05. He also has a $25 standing balance in his "hold account," which is maintained to provide him a discharge allowance. These accounts are created and maintained pursuant to the terms of Virginia statutes and regulations.

According to Virginia law, inmates under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections receive an allowance for each day of labor performed in a manner satisfactory to State officials. See Va. Code Ann. §§ 53.1-42, 53.1-43. As the parties acknowledged at oral argu- ment, inmates receive approximately $.90 per hour. The amounts credited to each inmate accumulate in a "spend account" maintained by the State Board of Corrections and may be drawn upon by the inmate for purposes authorized by the Board. The inmates may use the funds in their "spend accounts" to purchase items from the prison commissary or from approved outside sources. They may also have funds sent outside the prison to designated persons, to be invested for the prisoners' benefit in interest-bearing accounts. Amounts that the inmates do not spend while incarcerated are given to them when they are discharged, provided that they have served at least eight months. See Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-190. While in prison, however, the inmates are not given any cash, but enjoy only a right to draw upon these funds to purchase a limited number of approved items. Cash in Vir- ginia prisons is contraband. See Hanvey v. Blankenship, 631 F.2d 296, 297 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Va. Code Ann.§ 53.1-26.

Pursuant to regulations promulgated by the State Board of Correc- tions, ten percent of an inmate's allowance is placed in a "hold account" until $25 accumulates. See State Bd. of Corrections Policy No. 20-7.1. This sum is held until the inmate is discharged, and only then is it paid to him. See Va. Code Ann.§ 53.1-190. And if $25 does not accumulate in this account, each prisoner is nevertheless given a minimum of $25 upon his discharge from prison, paid from Depart- ment of Corrections funds. See id.

The funds in the "spend" and "hold" accounts of all prisoners are pooled, and those amounts that are not needed to meet the immediate requests of prisoners are invested at the discretion of the Director of the Department of Corrections. See Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-44. Income earned in this pooled account "may be used by the Director for the benefit of the prisoners under his care." Id. At Powhatan Correctional Center, where Washlefske is incarcerated, this income has been used to purchase library books, newspaper and magazine subscriptions, exercise equipment, items for family visiting day, and other "extras."

During 1998, the pooled account containing funds from all Depart- ment of Correction facilities produced income for Powhatan Correc- tional Center in the amount of $5,479.45. The Powhatan Correctional Center also earned an average of $59.86 of interest per month on its own checking account maintained with "spend" and "hold" account funds held to address the day-to-day requests of inmates. Washlefske commenced this action in December 1998 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the State's use of interest income derived from his "spend" and "hold" accounts without just compensation to him violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. He requested a declaratory judgment that the State's use of his interest income vio- lated his Constitutional rights, restitution of interest taken, and an injunction requiring the State to credit his accounts with any interest earned in the future.

On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court entered judgment in favor of the State. See Washlefske v. Winston, 60 F. Supp. 2d 534, 543 (E.D. Va. 1999). The court ruled that although Washlefske had a property interest in the interest earned on his prison accounts, the State's actions did not result in an unconstitutional tak- ing because (1) Washlefske "voluntarily cho[se] to place funds in the accounts administered by the prison," and (2) he received just com- pensation in the form of benefits from the items that the Department of Corrections purchased with the income from the pooled funds. Id.

This appeal followed.

II

At the outset, we review our jurisdiction to consider whether Washlefske's Takings Clause claim is sufficiently ripe for federal judicial consideration under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ripeness in this con- text does not refer to Article III's "case or controversy" requirement, for that is plainly satisfied here: Washlefske claims that money belonging to him was taken from his prison accounts. The conduct Washlefske challenges is undisputed and arises from an ongoing application of Virginia statutes. Rather, the question is one of pruden- tial ripeness -- whether we should exercise federal jurisdiction. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 733 n.7 (1997). This issue springs from the decision in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), where the Supreme Court held that a landowner's claim -- that State land-use regulations as applied to him had effected an uncompensated taking of his property -- was premature and, there- fore, not yet ripe for consideration in federal court. The Supreme Court reasoned that because the State agencies had not yet "arrived at a definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete injury," Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 193, there had been no final decision on the nature and impact of the State's actions, and the plain- tiff's injury in fact was too uncertain to satisfy the requirements of prudential ripeness. In Suitum, however, the"final decision" require- ment of Williamson County was found to have been satisfied when the state regulatory process had come to an end and the landowner had to take no further administrative steps to obtain the state's final position. "The demand for finality [was] satisfied by Suitum's claim, . . . there being no question there about how the`regulations at issue [apply] to the particular land in question.'" Suitum, 520 U.S. at 739 (quoting Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 191) (second alteration in original).

In this case, the finality of the State's position has not been ques- tioned; the statute's language is clear and its impact upon Washlefske is uncontroverted. According to Washlefske's complaint, he claims a property interest in the principal in his prison accounts and, as an inci- dent thereto, a property interest in the interest earned on that princi- pal. Not only is the State's use of the interest uncontroverted, but also its amount is readily calculable more than satisfying the Supreme Court's prudential ripeness requirements. Cf. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 740- 42 (fin...