Wassberg v. Anaconda Copper Co.

• Decision Date: 02 April 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-288,84-288
• Citation: 697 P.2d 909,215 Mont. 309,42 St.Rep. 388
• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Parties: Arthur WASSBERG, Claimant and Respondent, v. ANACONDA COPPER COMPANY, a/k/a Anaconda Minerals Co., Employer, and Anaconda Copper Company, a/k/a Anaconda Minerals Co., Defendant and Appellant.

Page 909

697 P.2d 909

215 Mont. 309

Arthur WASSBERG, Claimant and Respondent, v. ANACONDA COPPER COMPANY, a/k/a Anaconda Minerals Co., Employer and Anaconda Copper Company, a/k/a Anaconda Minerals Co. Defendant and Appellant.

No. 84-288.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Nov. 29, 1984.

Decided April 2, 1985.

Michael J. McKeon, Anaconda, for defendant and appellant.

Leonard Haxby, Butte, for claimant and respondent.

GULBRANDSON, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the Workers' Compensation Court, holding that the employer-defendant was estopped from asserting the one year statute of limitations provided in section 39-71-601, MCA as a bar to claimant's request for compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act. We reverse.

The facts leading to this appeal are as follows: The claimant, Arthur Wassberg was employed by the Anaconda Company as an underground miner on an intermittent basis from 1956 to 1981, with one three year period in the Army, and numerous other interruptions apparently due to claimant's own choice.

On June 30, 1973, claimant suffered an injury when he "was putting in stulls and [he] fell off the ladder and twisted [his] back." He reported this accident to his shift supervisor and went to a local chiropractor, Dr. West, for treatment. The Anaconda Company paid all of the bills for this treatment. The claimant also filed a "Claim for Compensation" under the Workers' Compensation Act. In that claim, he reported that he had suffered prior industrial injuries to his head, back and hips.

At trial, claimant testified that he missed three days of work after the 1973 accident. His work records admitted into evidence included vouchers, signed by the claimant, that indicate that he missed work and received compensation for more than three weeks. In the July 17, 1973 "Claim for Compensation" claimant filed for the June 30, 1973 accident, he certified that he was "still off." In any event, the record shows that claimant received approximately three weeks of temporary total benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act; from July 2, 1973, to July 23, 1973.

Claimant returned to work on July 23, 1973. On July 22, 1974, he had another accident. A rock fell from a hanging wall and struck claimant on the back, knocking him over. He reported the accident to his boss, Cliff Newstrand, who filled out a written "Report of Alleged Injury." On the report Newstrand stated that he did not advise Wassberg to get medical treatment. Claimant's testimony at trial, however, was to the contrary; he stated that Mr. Newstrand "told me to go to the doctor and that slip was enough for the company to pay the bills." Claimant again went to see Dr. West, he was not charged for the treatment, so he assumed that the Company had paid for it. Claimant testified at trial that after the 1974 accident, he had "a burning sensation down along side of the legs." At times, he stated, he could not even walk. Apparently though, from claimant's "Service Record," he did not miss any work because of the 1974 accident. He worked until November 28, 1975, and was then laid off.

In 1976, while still laid off, Mr. Wassberg went in to talk to Tom Bugni who was at the time a claims officer in the industrial accident office for the Anaconda mines. He went in at that time because he was so "crippled that [he] could hardly move." He told Mr. Bugni of the 1974 accident and requested further medical care. Bugni authorized medical care at the Company's expense. At the 1976 examination, claimant curiously told the doctor that his injury was from an accident where "I was climbing a ladder, and the ladder pulled loose, and I fell down a raise"--the accident that occurred in 1973 not 1974.

After receiving medical treatment in 1976, claimant continued to be laid off until August 10, 1979. He then was called back to work and remained employed until again laid off on June 21, 1981. This action arose in 1982. Claimant's counsel wrote to Anaconda alleging that claimant was continuing to have problems with his back stemming from the 1974 injury, and requesting further medical care and compensation under the Workers' Compensation Act. The claims officer denied that the Company had knowledge of any injury except the 1973 injury for which Wassberg had already received compensation. As to any other accident, the Company denied liability for compensation because no claim had been filed within the one-year statute of limitations period provided for by section 39-71-601, MCA.

Claimant's reply contended that although no formal claim for compensation had been filed, the Company nonetheless knew about the injury because of the accident report and by the fact that it had paid the medical bills incurred shortly after the accident and for subsequent treatment in 1976. These facts, the claimant asserted, showed either that the Company had accepted liability, or the statutory period was waived. The Company did not change its position.

The matter came to trial on September 14, 1983. At trial, Mr. Wassberg testified that his understanding about the procedures necessary to perfect a Workers' Compensation claim was that "as long as they filed the industrial slip on the hill that you were covered for the rest of your life." He testified that he was surprised that this was not the case, stating "... when the law came out we didn't think nothing about that we had to refile or nothing." Mr. Wassberg further stated that no one had ever told him that his 1974 claim would not be honored, including Mr. Bugni, whom he talked to in 1976. Mr. Wassberg did not testify to any specific misrepresentations made to him that led him to these beliefs.

On cross-examination, Mr. Wassberg admitted that he had filed a previous claim for compensation, separate from any medical benefits, on the 1973 injury. As to any claim for compensation for the 1974 injury, claimant testified as follows:

"Q. [By Mr. McKeon] Well, the question is or the--You did not file a claim for compensation after the 1974 injury; did you?

"A. No, I never did.

"Q. You haven't filed a claim to this day?

"A. No, I haven't."

The Workers' Compensation Court held for Mr. Wassberg. It found that; "[t]he claimant has satisfied the requirements of the Workers' Compensation Act, section 39-71-601, MCA and the employer is estopped from denying the claim on that basis." The court cited the six elements of equitable estoppel set forth in Lindblom v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp. (1930), 88 Mont. 488, 295 P. 1007 and applied them to the findings. In regard to those elements, the court stated:

"Here the conduct of the employer is as follows: Newstrand knew of claimant's injury, but at no time informed claimant of the need to file a claim. Likewise, when claimant visited with Bugni some two years later, Bugni never advised claimant of the necessity to file a claim, through the evidence clearly shows that the employer knew of claimant's seeking medical care for his injury. Clearly, 1 and 2 of the Lindblom test is met."

The court also found the other four factors of Lindblom were met.

The parties raise the following issue on appeal:

Did the Workers' Compensation Court err in holding that the doctrine of equitable estoppel prevents the employer from asserting the statute of limitations provided in section 39-71-601, MCA?

Initially we must reiterate the standard of review in matters such as this. We look at the Workers' Compensation Court's order, and its findings and conclusions, in two ways. As to questions of fact, we are limited to examining the record to determine whether it contains substantial credible evidence to support the court's findings. If this quantum of evidence is in the record, we will defer to the trier of fact's resolution of the factual dispute. Ridenour v. Equity Supply Co. (Mont.1983), 665 P.2d 783, 40 St.Rep. 1012; Wise v. Perkins (Mont.1983), 656 P.2d 816, 40 St.Rep. 1. If it is a question of law, or how particular findings of fact apply to the law, our scope of review is not so limited. In such a case, the appropriate standard of review is simply whether the lower court's interpretation of the law is correct. We are not bound by the lower court's conclusion and remain free to reach our own. Sharp v. Hoerner Waldorf Co. (1978), 178 Mont. 419, 584 P.2d 1298; Anderson v. Carlsons Transport (1978), 178 Mont. 290, 583 [215 Mont. 315] P.2d 440. The issue in this case is one of law. We accept the following relevant findings of fact made by the lower court:

"6. On July 22, 1974 while in the course and scope of his employment with the defendant, claimant was struck on the back by a rock which fell from a wall. (Claimant's testimony; Exhibit No. 1). At the time, claimant was working in the Steward mine. Claimant reported the incident to his boss, a man by the name of C. Newstrand. Other than reporting the incident to Newstrand, claimant did not discuss the incident with any representative of the employer until he talked with Tom Bugni of the Company.

"7. Bugni suggested claimant see a doctor, which claimant did. At no time did the claimant ever pay any medical bills related to his injury. The employer did pay for the medical expenses related to the 1974 incident.

"8. At the time of trial, the claimant had not filed a claim for compensation.

"9. Exhibit No. 1 is titled Report of Alleged Injury. It is a record of the employer, signed by claimant's boss on July 22, 1974. That exhibit discloses that claimant informed Newstrand that he had been hit on the back by a falling rock on July 22, 1974 while working. It described the injury as 'bruises.' It notes the parts of body injured as the upper back. The information in Exhibit No. 1 was known to the employer as early as 1974.

"10. Claimant has never requested the Division of Workers' Compensation to waive the period for filing a claim for compensation pursuant to Section 39-71-601, MCA."

We disagree with the lower court's application of ...