Water Pipe Extension, Bureau of Engineering v. Illinois Local Labor Relations Bd.
| Decision Date | 20 August 1993 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-91-2057,1-91-2057 |
| Parties | , 192 Ill.Dec. 578 WATER PIPE EXTENSION, BUREAU OF ENGINEERING, Laborers Local 1092, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ILLINOIS LOCAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, the City of Chicago, and American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Union, Council 31, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
This appeal involves a union representation dispute between Water Pipe Extension, Bureau of Engineering, Laborers Local 1092 (Local 1092) and the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees Union, Council 31 (AFSCME) over twelve female City of Chicago (City) employees. After unsuccessfully filing a grievance against the City under its collective bargaining agreement, Local 1092 brought a unit clarification petition. The The underlying union representation dispute in this case was precipitated by a federal class action lawsuit filed in 1974 by the National Organization of Women on behalf of female clerical workers employed by the City. In this suit, plaintiff alleged that these female clerical employees, among them "District Clerks" in the City's Water & Sewer Department, were being discriminated against because they were being paid less than their male counterparts. In 1983, as part of the consent decree which settled that suit, the City created the job title of "Assignment Clerk." Pursuant to the consent decree, the twelve female former District Clerks who are the subject of this appeal voluntarily transferred into the Assignment Clerk position in which position they received back pay, additional pension contributions and higher wages. With respect to ten of the clerks, the transfer was completed in 1984, and for the two clerks it was completed prior to 1987. After their transfer, these employees performed the same work as when they were classified as District Clerks.
[192 Ill.Dec. 579] Executive Director of the Local Labor Relations Board (Director) dismissed the petition as untimely and the Local Labor Relations Board (Board) affirmed. Local 1092 now appeals the Board's dismissal of its petition. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
In 1984, Local 1092 was recognized as the representative of a bargaining unit encompassing certain titles in the Chicago Water & Sewer Department including the job title of "District Clerk." This title was listed as being within Local 1092's bargaining unit in the formal recognition agreement and in two successive bargaining agreements effective from February 13, 1986, through December 31, 1991.
In 1984, AFSCME was certified by election as the representative of Unit I, which was the Administrative and Clerical employees unit, which covered the job title of "Assignment Clerk." While Local 1092 challenged the City's authority to hold that election, a challenge which it lost through a dismissal of its complaint (see City of Chicago v. State and Municipal Teamsters (1984), 127 Ill.App.3d 328, 82 Ill.Dec. 488, 468 N.E.2d 1268), it never sought to directly represent that new job title. AFSCME subsequently negotiated two successive collective bargaining agreements, effective between February 13, 1986, and December 31, 1991. In both of these agreements, the job title of Assignment Clerk was included in AFSCME's bargaining unit and the District Clerk job title was excluded from that unit.
On January 1, 1988, the twelve clerks who are the subject of this appeal were again reclassified, this time to the job title "Clerk IIIs." This new job title was within AFSCME's bargaining unit under the provisions of AFSCME's collective bargaining agreement with the City.
It is unclear when Local 1092 first became aware or should have been aware of the employees' reclassification to Assignment Clerks. There is no question, however, that by September 1988 it was fully aware of the employees' reclassification.
On September 28, 1988, Local 1092 filed a grievance on behalf of the District Clerks seeking the return of the clerks to its bargaining unit, alleging that the City had violated its collective bargaining agreement with the local. On November 29, 1989, AFSCME filed charges with the AFL-CIO, alleging that Local 1092 was improperly "raiding" its unit under the AFL-CIO Constitution. On December 21, 1990, an arbitrator ruled that the employees in question were dues paying members of AFSCME's bargaining unit and had not timely contested their reclassification to Clerk IIIs. In rendering his award, the arbitrator also ruled that the City did not improperly establish the Assignment Clerk position or violate the collective bargaining agreement by transferring the District Clerks into that job title, and subsequently denied the grievance.
On January 9, 1991, Local 1092 filed a Petition for Amendment or Clarification of Unit before the Illinois Local Labor Relations Board pursuant to the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch Local 1092 filed a petition for direct administrative review by the Appellate Court pursuant to Section 9(i) of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 48, par. 1609(i)) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 335 (134 Ill.2d R. 335).
[192 Ill.Dec. 580] 48, par. 1601 et seq.) and the Rules and Regulations of the Illinois Labor Relations Boards (80 Ill.Adm.Code. § 1210.170 (1991)). In this petition, Local 1092 sought to restore to its bargaining unit the twelve District Clerks who were initially reclassified into the title of Assignment Clerk and who were at that time classified as Clerk IIIs and in a bargaining unit represented by AFSCME. The Executive Director of the Illinois Local Labor Relations Board dismissed the petitioner's action on April 10, 1991, finding that Local 1092 had waived its right to clarify its unit by failing to promptly exercise that right. Local 1092 appealed and the Illinois Local Labor Relations Board affirmed the Director's decision. In so doing, the Board noted that Local 1092 had knowledge of its former members' reclassification no later than September 1988 when it filed its grievance at which time it had already negotiated two successive contracts with the City. The Board determined that by waiting until January 1991 to file its unit clarification petition, Local 1092 waived its right to do so through this process.
OPINIONOn appeal, Local 1092 argues that the Board erred by dismissing its petition for unit clarification on the alleged grounds that the local failed to exercise "due diligence" in filing its petition which resulted in the untimeliness of the petition. Local 1092 contends that the Board acted contrary to established law and in an arbitrary manner because it failed to expressly consider and take into account certain mitigating factors before concluding that the unit clarification petition was time-barred.
We first discuss the appropriate standard of review. AFSCME argues that the applicable standard is whether the Board's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Citing County of Menard v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board (1990), 202 Ill.App.3d 878, 148 Ill.Dec. 639, 560 N.E.2d 1236; Agans v. Edgar (1986), 142 Ill.App.3d 1087, 97 Ill.Dec. 270, 492 N.E.2d 929.) We note that although the manifest weight standard is the correct one to review factual findings made by the Board, the facts of this case are not in dispute. It is undisputed that Local 1092 did not file a unit clarification petition until over two years after it admittedly had knowledge of the representational problem. Moreover, it is undisputed as to when the District Clerks transferred into the Assignment Clerk classification. Rather, the key question before us on review is the correctness of the Board's interpretation of its own rules and regulations governing unit clarification procedures, particularly those governing timeliness.
The Illinois Supreme Court has followed the policy that an administrative agency's interpretation of its standards and regulations is accorded deference as "courts appreciate that agencies can make informed judgments upon the issues, based upon their experience and expertise." (Illinois Consolidated Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Commission (1983), 95 Ill.2d 142, 153, 69 Ill.Dec. 78, 447 N.E.2d 295; Salaried Employees of North America v. Illinois Local Labor Relations Board (1990), 202 Ill.App.3d 1013, 148 Ill.Dec. 329, 560 N.E.2d 926.) As a result, an agency's construction of its rules is entitled to respectful consideration and deference by courts unless clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or unreasonable. (Illinois Federation of Teachers v. Board of Trustees, Teachers' Retirement System (1989), 191 Ill.App.3d 769, 138 Ill.Dec. 834, 548 N.E.2d 64; Phillips v. Hall (1983), 113 Ill.App.3d 409, 69 Ill.Dec. 201, 447 N.E.2d 418.) This policy is consistent with the agency's inherent authority and wide latitude to adopt regulations reasonably necessary to perform its statutory duty. Chemed Inc. v. State (1989), 186 Ill.App.3d 402, 134 Ill.Dec. 313, 542 N.E.2d 492; see also Decatur Federation of Teachers v. State Educational Labor Relations Board (1990), 199 Ill.App.3d 190, 197, 145 Ill.Dec. 162, 556 N.E.2d 780 ().
The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 48, par. 1601 et seq.) makes no specific provision for unit clarification petitions. Section 1210.170(a) of the Illinois...
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