Waterford School Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., Docket No. 63788
| Decision Date | 06 February 1984 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 63788 |
| Citation | 344 N.W.2d 19,130 Mich.App. 614 |
| Parties | , 16 Ed. Law Rep. 265 WATERFORD SCHOOL DISTRICT, a fourth class school district, Stanley W. Kurzman, Doris C. Warner, and A.J. Stepanski, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION and State of Michigan Treasurer, Jointly and Severally, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Bruce T. Leitman, Bloomfield Hills, and William G. Wolfram, Franklin, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., and Gerald F. Young, and James E. Riley, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendants-appellees.
Hiller, Larky & Hoekenga (by Daniel J. Hoekenga and Gregory J. Bator), Southfield, for Michigan Educ. Ass'n, Waterford Educ. Ass'n and Michigan Educ. Support Personnel Ass'n, amici curiae.
Before BEASLEY, P.J., KELLY and LAMBROS, * JJ.
In a complaint filed on March 7, 1980, plaintiffs alleged that a reduction in the amount of per pupil state aid to the Waterford School District (located primarily in Waterford Township, Oakland County) violated the so-called Headlee Amendment to the Michigan Constitution. 1 In April, 1980, the trial court granted accelerated judgment for defendants pursuant to GCR 1963, 116.1(2), (3), on the ground that the Court of Appeals possessed exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving the Headlee Amendment. Plaintiffs appealed as of right and this Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 2
On remand, both plaintiffs and defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which were denied by the trial court. In July, 1981, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint to which defendants filed their answer. After a hearing, the trial judge filed a 31 page opinion granting summary judgment to defendants for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 3 Plaintiffs appeal the order as of right.
This litigation is the result of a reduction in state funding to the Waterford School District. Defendants, pursuant to the school aid formula found in M.C.L. Sec. 388.1621(1); M.S.A. Sec. 15.1919(921)(1), reduced state aid for education in the school district from $660.27 per pupil in fiscal year 1978-1979 to $614.18 per pupil in fiscal year 1979-1980. 4 Further reductions allegedly occurred in fiscal years 1980-1981 and 1981-1982.
On appeal, plaintiffs raise five basic issues, the first three of which involve construction of the Headlee Amendment, Const.1963, art. 9, Secs. 25-34. They are: (1) whether article 9, Sec. 25 created substantive rights and duties; (2) whether article 9, Sec. 29, prohibiting the state from reducing its financial proportion of the necessary costs of any existing activity or service required of local government units by state law, refers to all activities or services appropriate to providing public education; (3) whether article 9, Sec. 30 requires the state to allocate a fixed percentage of its budget to public school districts; (4) whether the current funding of public education violates equal protection of the law; and (5) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant plaintiffs' request for equitable relief.
The central issue, as correctly stated by the trial judge in his comprehensive opinion, is whether the school aid formula, as applied, violates the Headlee Amendment's prohibitions against shifting the tax burden to local government by reducing the proportion of state spending in the form of aid to local units of governments or by reducing the state financed proportion of necessary costs of activities required of local units of government.
At trial, plaintiffs contended that it does and requested injunctive and mandamus relief for the allegedly irreparable, continuing damage to the district, its schools and its students. The trial court denied plaintiffs' request.
The impact of the Headlee Amendment on state aid to a school district was also at issue in Durant v. Dep't of Education (On Remand), 5 recently decided by this Court. In that case, plaintiffs petitioned this court for a writ of mandamus, seeking to compel the defendants to fund the Fitzgerald Public Schools in the same proportion as those schools were funded in fiscal year 1978-1979, pursuant to the Headlee Amendment. Mandamus was denied, as plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies prior to seeking a judicial remedy. 6 The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for consideration on the merits, 7 and, on remand, plaintiff's complaint was again dismissed. 8
Resolution of plaintiffs' first three issues rests on interpretation of the Headlee Amendment. In Durant (On Remand), supra, a case of first impression, this Court addressed the amendment's effect on state financed school aid.
Plaintiffs in the within case first contend that Sec. 25 of the amendment creates specific rights and duties. Const.1963, art. 9, Sec. 25 provides:
The trial court correctly found that Sec. 25 was an introductory paragraph to the amendment which, by its very language, indicates that its substantive implementation is specified in the sections of the statute which follow. It is Secs. 29 and 30 which detail the prohibition against shifting the tax burden to local government. There is no indication that these introductory sentences are to be given the substantive effect of creating specific rights and duties.
Section 29 states:
Section 30 states:
"The proportion of total state spending paid to all units of Local Government, taken as a group, shall not be reduced below that proportion in effect in fiscal year 1978-79."
Plaintiffs contend that Sec. 29 refers to all activities or services provided by a local school board that are appropriate to its constitutionally required duty to provide meaningful education.
This Court held to the contrary in Durant (On Remand), supra, stating:
"[T]he fact that the state has delegated to local school districts its constitutional duty to provide education does not result in the conclusion that all functions performed by a school district are required by state law within the meaning of the Headlee Amendment." 9
In Durant (On Remand), this Court found that the term "state law" as used in Sec. 29 refers only to state statutes and state agency regulations which require school districts to provide a few specific and identifiable services and activities. 10 The Court held that the remainder of the school day is filled with programs that are completely a matter of local discretion, and stated:
11
The Court further held that:
"[T]he 'necessary costs' of a required service or activity are those costs which are essential to the completion of the intended purpose of the state-mandated activity, and they must be determined on a statewide basis, computed according to the actual cost to the state, were it to provide the required activity or service; * * * the state is not required to maintain the level of unrestricted state school aid which was present at the time Sec. 29 became effective; and * * * the state is required to maintain the level of...
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