Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor v. Governor Newjersey

Decision Date05 June 2020
Docket Number No. 19-2459,No. 19-2458,19-2458
Citation961 F.3d 234
Parties WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF NEW YORK HARBOR v. GOVERNOR OF NEW JERSEY, Appellant President of the New Jersey State Senate ; Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly; New Jersey Senate; General Assembly of the State of New Jersey, Intervenors Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor v. Governor of New Jersey General Assembly of the State of New Jersey; Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly; New Jersey Senate; President of the New Jersey State Senate, Intervenor-Defendants/Appellants
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Alychia L. Buchan, Proskauer Rose, One Newark Center, 18th Floor, Newark, NJ 07102, Sean R. Kelly [ARGUED], Catherine Soliman Saiber, 18 Columbia Turnpike, Suite 200, Florham Park, NJ 07932, Lawrence R. Sandak, Proskauer Rose, 11 Times Square, 17th Floor, New York, NY 10036, Counsel for Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor.

Aaron A. Love [ARGUED], Gurbir S. Grewal, Melissa H. Raksa, Christopher Edwards, Office of Attorney General of New Jersey, Division of Law, 25 Market Street, Richard J. Hughes Justice Complex, Trenton, NJ 08625, Counsel for Governor of New Jersey.

Leon J. Sokol [ARGUED], Steven Siegel, Cullen & Dykman, 433 Hackensack Avenue, Hackensack, NJ 07601, Counsel for President of the New Jersey State Senate; Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly; New Jersey Senate; and General Assembly of the State of New Jersey.

A. Matthew Boxer, Joseph A. Fischetti, Rebecca J. Ryan, Lowenstein Sandler, One Lowenstein Drive, Roseland, NJ 07068, Counsel for Amicus New York Shipping Association, Inc.

Jeffrey B. Litwak, Columbia River Gorge Commission, 57 N.E. Wauna Avenue, P.O. Box 730, White Salmon, WA 98672, Counsel for Amicus Columbia River Gorge Commission.

Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges

SMITH, Chief Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT

The States of New Jersey and New York agreed more than half a century ago to enter into the Waterfront Commission Compact. More recently, New Jersey enacted legislation to withdraw from the Compact. To prevent this unilateral termination, the Waterfront Commission sued the Governor of New Jersey in federal court. But because New Jersey is the real, substantial party in interest, its immunity should have barred the District Court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, this case must be dismissed.

I
A

By the mid-twentieth century, New York Harbor was rife with corruption, particularly in waterfront hiring practices. See De Veau v. Braisted , 363 U.S. 144, 147–48, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960) (plurality opinion); N.Y. Shipping Ass'n v. Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor , 835 F.3d 344, 348–49 (3d Cir. 2016). After studying the problems created by corrupt practices, representatives of New Jersey and New York prepared remedial legislation, which each State enacted in 1953. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:23-1 et seq. (repealed 2018); N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 9801 et seq. Because the reciprocal statutes collectively function as an agreement between the States, Congress consented to the formation of the Waterfront Commission Compact, consistent with the Compacts Clause in Article I, § 10, of the U.S. Constitution.1 Act of Aug. 12, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-252, 67 Stat. 541, 541.

The Compact reformed waterfront hiring practices by, inter alia , introducing registration and licensing requirements and channeling hiring through designated centers. E.g. , N.Y. Unconsol. Law §§ 9812, 9827, 9853. To implement such reforms, the Compact also established the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, §§ 9807, 9810, and authorized the Commission to fund its operations by levying assessments on employers, § 9858.2

B

As the decades passed, most of the Harbor workforce shifted from New York to New Jersey, where deepwater berths better accommodated the modern trend toward containerized shipping. Such developments redounded to the benefit of New Jersey's economy. Eventually, the New Jersey legislature came to see the Commission as "over-regulat[ing] the businesses at the port in an effort to justify its existence," which made the Commission "an impediment to future job growth and prosperity at the port." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:23-229.

New Jersey repeatedly tried to cabin the Commission's powers, and even to withdraw from the Compact entirely. Those efforts came to fruition at the end of Governor Chris Christie's term in office, when he signed into law Chapter 324. Act of Jan. 16, 2018, 2017 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 324 (codified at, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 32:23-229 to -230). That chapter immediately repealed the New Jersey legislation that had contributed to the formation of the Compact. Ch. 324, §§ 33–34 (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 32:23-1 et seq. ).

But Chapter 324 set out additional steps intended to further the State's withdrawal from the Compact. It required the New Jersey Governor to notify Congress, the Governor of New York, and the Commission of the "intention to withdraw." § 2.a. That notification would initiate a ninety-day countdown to the "transfer date" when the Compact and the Commission would be "dissolved." §§ 3, 31. Thereafter, the New Jersey Division of State Police would assume the Commission's law enforcement functions on the New Jersey side of the Harbor. See §§ 1.d, 4.b, 34.

C

The day after the outgoing Governor signed Chapter 324, the Commission filed suit in federal district court against New Jersey Governor Philip Murphy in his official capacity.3 The one-count Complaint sought two forms of relief: a declaration that Chapter 324 violated the Compact and the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and an injunction against its enforcement. The District Court permitted the New Jersey Senate, Senate President, General Assembly, and Assembly Speaker (collectively, the "Legislature") to intervene in defense of Chapter 324.

The Commission filed a motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent the Governor from effectuating withdrawal, while the Governor and Legislature moved for dismissal. The District Court denied dismissal and granted the injunction. Nearly a year later, the Court granted the Commission's motion for summary judgment and denied the separate motions of the Governor and the Legislature.

In these consolidated appeals, the Governor and Legislature challenge the District Court's orders denying dismissal, granting an injunction, denying them summary judgment, and granting summary judgment to the Commission.4 Briefing included amicus curiae filings by the New York Shipping Association (NYSA) in support of the Governor and Legislature, and the Columbia River Gorge Commission in support of the Waterfront Commission.

II

The District Court had federal-question jurisdiction over this dispute because the Complaint invoked the Supremacy Clause and the Compact. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ; Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor v. Elizabeth-Newark Shipping, Inc. , 164 F.3d 177, 180 (3d Cir. 1998) (observing that Congressional consent enshrined the Compact in federal law). But that jurisdiction does not extend to any claim barred by state sovereign immunity. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman , 465 U.S. 89, 98, 119–21, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984).

In denying the Governor's motion to dismiss, the District Court rejected the "suggest[ion]" that sovereign immunity applied to the Governor in this case.

Waterfront Comm'n of N.Y. Harbor v. Murphy , No. 18-650 (SDW) (LDW), 2018 WL 2455927, at *4 (D.N.J. June 1, 2018). We have plenary authority to determine whether sovereign immunity deprived the District Court of jurisdiction.5 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ; In re PennEast Pipeline Co. , 938 F.3d 96, 103 (3d Cir. 2019), petition for cert. filed , No. 19-1039 (Feb. 18, 2020).

III

State sovereign immunity dates back to our Nation's Founding, and is deeply rooted in English law. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt , ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1493–94, 203 L.Ed.2d 768 (2019) ; 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 234–35 (1765). Assurances that States would remain immune from federal suit—absent their consent—were instrumental in securing sufficient support for the Constitution's adoption. Edelman v. Jordan , 415 U.S. 651, 660 & n.9, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). Although the Eleventh Amendment expressly protects a State from federal suits by citizens of another State or country,6 case law recognizes that the actual scope of immunity extends beyond the Amendment's text. Alden v. Maine , 527 U.S. 706, 727–28, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999). As a rule, "federal courts may not entertain a private person's suit against a State" unless the State has waived its immunity or Congress has permissibly abrogated it. Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart , 563 U.S. 247, 253–54, 131 S.Ct. 1632, 179 L.Ed.2d 675 (2011) [hereinafter VOPA ].

An "important limit" to that rule allows federal suits against state officials in certain circumstances. Id. at 254–55, 131 S.Ct. 1632. Under the Ex parte Young doctrine, a state official is "stripped of his official or representative character" and thereby deprived of the State's immunity, Ex parte Young , 209 U.S. 123, 159–60, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), when he commits an "ongoing violation of federal law." VOPA , 563 U.S. at 254–55, 131 S.Ct. 1632 (quoting Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md. , 535 U.S. 635, 645, 122 S.Ct. 1753, 152 L.Ed.2d 871 (2002) ). A person who is aggrieved may therefore seek prospective relief by suing him in his official capacity. See id. But Ex parte Young ’s "authority-stripping theory ... is a fiction that has been narrowly construed." Pennhurst , 465 U.S. at 114 n.25, 104 S.Ct. 900. Ex parte Young applies only to the "precise situation" of "a federal court command[ing] a state official to do nothing more than refrain from violating federal law." VOPA , 563 U.S. at 255, 131 S.Ct. 1632.

Consistent with this narrow construction of Ex parte Young , the doctrine ...

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