Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor, Application of

• Citation: 171 A.2d 295,35 N.J. 62
• Decision Date: 22 May 1961
• Docket Number: No. A--78,A--78
• Parties: Application of the WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF NEW YORK HARBOR, to punish William Murphy for failure to obey a Subpoena. Application of the WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF NEW YORK HARBOR, to punish John Moody, Sr. for failure to obey a Subpoena.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 62

35 N.J. 62

171 A.2d 295

Application of the WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF NEW YORK HARBOR,

to punish William

Murphy for failure to obey a Subpoena. Application of the

WATERFRONT COMMISSION OF NEW YORK HARBOR, to

punish John Moody, Sr. for failure to

obey a Subpoena.

No. A--78.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued April 11, 1961.

Decided May 22, 1961.

Robert Wall, Jersey City, for appellant, William Murphy.

Samuel L. Marciano, Hoboken, for appellant, John Moody, Sr. (Florio, Dunn, Marciano & Lypinski, Hoboken, attorneys; Samuel L. Marciano, Hoboken, on the brief).

Robert A. Pin, Park Ridge, for respondent, Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor (William P. Sirignano, of the New York Bar, Gen. Counsel and Irving Malchman, of the New York Bar, Asst. to Gen. Counsel, New York City).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

PROCTOR, J.

This case turns on whether the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor has jurisdiction to investigate a work stoppage by longshoremen, when the Commissioners have reason to believe that the stoppage was designed to inhibit effective operation of the port watchman system. The defendants, John Moody, Sr. and William Murphy--officials of the striking union--appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court, Law Division, ordering that they be incarcerated until they are willing to answer certain questions addressed to them by the Commission during the course of its investigation. Each was also fined $50. We certified the appeal before argument in the Appellate Division.

The events leading up to the judgment from which defendants appeal are as follows: One James H. Markley was an investigator for the Commission, assigned principally to cover the piers and terminal of the American Export Lines in Hoboken. On or about May 16, 1960, Markley left the employ of the Waterfront Commission in order to work for American Export as a security officer. To fulfill his security functions, Markley obtained a license from the Commission permitting him to operate as a port watchman. On May 16, 1960, the day Markley was to commence work for American Export, the longshoremen and checkers employed by American Export in Hoboken did not report for work. With the exception of the morning of May 17, the work stoppage continued until May 25. The striking employees were members of Hoboken Local No. 2 of the International Longshoremen's Association (ILA). Defendant Moody is an organizer for the ILA in New Jersey; and defendant Murphy is business agent for Local No. 2.

The Waterfront Commission had information that the work stoppage was 'a concerted effort to keep James H. Markley off the piers of the American Export Lines.' Accordingly, it instituted an investigation to determine whether any persons registered or licensed by the Commission were violating the Waterfront Commission Act (N.J.S.A 32:23--1 et seq.) by coercing an employer to limit the functions of, or discharge, a licensed port watchman. In connection with the investigation, the Commission served subpoenas ordering the defendants to appear and testify. When defendants appeared, they were informed of the above-described purposes of the investigation. They were also informed that the Commission was proceeding under its statutory authority to make investigations and collect and compile information concerning waterfront practices generally, and all matters relating to the accomplishment of the objectives of the act. The defendants were also told that the Commission was 'asking questions to determine the true nature of this work stoppage, to see whether it's a labor dispute or whether there's violation of both the criminal law or the * * * (Waterfront Commission Act).'

Defendant Moody gave his name and address, testified that he was a union official, and refused to answer any other questions. Defendant Murphy testified that he was business agent of Local No. 2 and represented members of the Local working at the American Export facilities in Hoboken. He stated that he knew the longshoremen did not work on May 16, 1960, and that it was common knowledge for the ten days preceding May 16 that things were not normal at the American Export piers. Murphy refused to say whether the abnormal conditions were related to the employment of Markley as port watchman, and he refused to answer any other questions. Neither defendant asserted his privilege against self-incrimination; but each stated, Inter alia, as a reason for his refusal to answer that the Commission did not have jurisdiction to conduct the investigation. ¹

The Commission interrogator overruled the defendants' objections to the questions, directed them to answer, and informed them that continued recalcitrance would subject them to 'contempt proceedings.' Defendants persisted in their refusal; and subsequently the Law Division, pursuant to a motion by the Commission, and after a hearing, rendered the judgment which imposed a fine upon the defendants and directed their incarceration.

Defendants urge reversal of the judgment below on the ground that, even assuming the purpose of the work stoppage was to subvert the port watchman system, the Commission does not have jurisdiction to investigate it. They argue (1) that the investigation adversely affects or limits 'the right to strike' which is expressly reserved by the Waterfront Commission Act (N.J.S.A. 32:23--68); and (2) that the Commission's power to investigate is in conflict with and therefore pre-empted by the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) ( 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.). Defendants' first argument is encompassed by their pre- emption argument. Article XV, section 1, par. 1 of the Waterfront Commission Act provides:

'* * * nothing contained in this compact shall be construed to limit in any way the right of employees to strike.' N.J.S.A. 32:23--68.

Assuming, Arguendo, that investigation and the concomitant power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is in itself regulation, the effect of this statutory provision upon the Commission's power to investigate necessarily depends upon what is meant by the 'right to strike.' Like most rights, that right is not absolute. A strike is not immune under all conditions from any form of governmental regulation. The Waterfront Act does not purport to define the dimensions of the right to strike. It therefore merely declares a rule of interpretation which prevents any use of the act to qualify or impede whatever right exists under New Jersey or Federal law. Cf. International Union v. Wisconsin Empl. Rel. Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 259, 69 S.Ct. 516, 93 L.Ed. 651, 665 (1948) (interpreting § 163 of the LMRA, which provides that 'Nothing in this subchapter * * * shall be constured so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike * * *.' 29 U.S.C.A. § 163.) We do not know of any New Jersey law which prevents state investigation of a strike intended to inhibit effective functioning of a security system. If that right exists, it must come from federal law. The applicable federal law is the LMRA and its amendments. By the 'right to strike,' therefore, defendants must mean that under the federal statute the alleged union activity is either immune from limitation or subject to limitation only by the federal government. So viewed, the argument is that because the work stoppage falls within the purview of the LMRA, the National Labor Relations Board has exclusive primary jurisdiction to Deal with it. This is the same as defendants' pre-emption argument and shall be discussed together therewith.

Defendants' pre-emption argument goes as follows: The power to investigate is the power to regulate. A state may regulate union activity only when the activity is clearly not protected by § 7 or prohibited by § 8 of the LMRA. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 157, 158. Otherwise stated, if union activity is arguably protected or prohibited by the federal legislation, the National Labor Relations Board has exclusive primary jurisdiction to deal with it. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). The Waterfront Commission states that the purpose of its investigation is to determine whether defendants' union struck to cause an employer (American Export) to discriminate against one of its employees (Markley). Defendants contend that such a strike is an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(2) of the LMRA (29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b)(2)). Accordingly, the Waterfront Commission has no primary jurisdiction to investigate it.

For reasons subsequently to be discussed, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether the strike by defendants' union arguably falls within the protections or proscriptions of the LMRA. The constitutional doctrine of pre-emption--the exclusion of state power over a particular matter because it is the subject of comprehensive federal regulation--is designed to implement congressional purpose. See De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 153, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109, 1116 (1960); Garner v. Teamsters, C. & H. Union, 346 U.S. 485, 488, 74 S.Ct. 161, 98 L.Ed. 228, 238 (1953). If by its regulation of a particular activity Congress has exhibited a purpose which is incompatible with the exercise of state power over the same activity, the state power must give way. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, supra; Garner v. Teamsters, C. & H. Union, supra. The applicability of the doctrine to the present case therefore depends upon an answer to the question: Would Congress regard a Commission investigation of a strike designed to limit the effecitiveness of the portwatchman system as incompatible or in conflict with federal regulation of labor relations?

The answer to the above question turns on the nature of the Waterfront Commission Act. Our act is a counterpart of one contemporaneously adopted by New York. L.1953, cc. 202, 203, (N.J.S.A. 32:23--1 et seq.; N.Y.Laws 1953, cc. 882, 883, McKinney's Unconsolidated Laws, §§ 6700-aa et seq. It has three...