Waterhouse v. State, 59765

Citation429 So.2d 301
Decision Date17 February 1983
Docket NumberNo. 59765,59765
PartiesRobert Brian WATERHOUSE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida

Philip J. Padovano, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Peggy A. Quince, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This case is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of murder in the first degree. The trial court sentenced appellant to death. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const.

Appellant Robert Brian Waterhouse was tried before a jury and found guilty of the murder of Deborah Kammerer, which occurred in St. Petersburg on the night of January 2, 1980. A separate sentencing hearing was held, after which the jury recommended that appellant be sentenced to death. Appellant now challenges the legality of several items of evidence used against him and questions the propriety of the sentence of death on several grounds. We affirm the conviction and the sentence of death.

On the morning of January 3, 1980, the St. Petersburg police responded to the call of a citizen who had discovered the dead body of a woman lying face down in the mud flats at low tide on the shore of Tampa Bay. An examination of the body revealed severe lacerations on the head and bruises around the throat. Examination of the body also revealed--and this fact is recited not for its sensationalism but because it became relevant in the course of the police investigation--that a blood-soaked tampon had been stuffed in the victim's mouth. The victim's wounds were such that they were probably made with a hard instrument such as a steel tire changing tool. Examination of the body also revealed lacerations of the rectum. The cause of death was determined to have been drowning, and there was evidence to indicate that the body had been dragged from a grassy area on the shore into the water at high tide. The body when discovered was completely unclothed. Several items of clothing were gathered from along the shore at the scene.

The body showed evidence of thirty lacerations and thirty-six bruises. Hemorrhaging indicated the victim was alive, and defense wounds indicated she was conscious, at the time these lacerations and bruises were inflicted. Acid phosphotase was found in the victim's rectum in sufficient amount to strongly indicate the presence of semen there. Also, the lacerations in this area indicated that the victim had been battered by the insertion of a large object. The medical examiner was also able to determine that at the time of the murder the victim was having her menstrual period.

After several days of investigation the police were unable to identify the victim, so they announced the situation to the public. They then received an anonymous telephone call simply informing them of appellant's automobile tag number and advising them to investigate it.

The police also learned the identity of the victim from two of her neighbors. These two acquaintances, Yohan Wenz and Carol Byers, testified at trial that they went to the ABC lounge with the victim on Wednesday night, January 2, 1980. They testified that they later left the lounge and that Ms. Kammerer remained there at that time. Kyoe Ginn, who was working there as a bartender that night, testified that the victim came into the bar with a man and a woman, that they later left, that Ms. Kammerer then began talking with appellant (who was known to the witness) and that at about 1:00 a.m. appellant and Kammerer left the bar together.

On the evening of January 7, 1980, police officers asked appellant to voluntarily go with them to police headquarters for an interview. At this time he said that he did not know any girl named Debbie and that he went to the ABC lounge on January 2 but did not leave with a woman. After this interview appellant was allowed to leave but his car was impounded for searching pursuant to warrant. The automobile was searched on January 8 and appellant was arrested on January 9.

Detectives Murry and Hitchcox arrested appellant. In the car on the way to the police station, after advising appellant of his rights, Hitchcox asked him, "We were right the other night, weren't we, when we talked to you about being involved in this case?" Appellant responded simply, "Might." Shown a picture of Deborah Kammerer, appellant this time admitted that he did in fact know her.

On the afternoon of January 9, the detectives again interviewed appellant. Detective Murry testified concerning this interview. She said that appellant became emotionally upset and said repeatedly that his life was over, that he was going to the electric chair. He said that he wanted to talk to his interviewers as people and not as police officers. He then said that he had some personal problems with alcohol, sex, and violence.

The two detectives interrogated appellant again on January 10. Again appellant said he wanted to talk to them as people rather than as police officers. Detective Murry testified that appellant again indicated that he experienced a problem involving sexual activity. He said that when he drinks a lot, it is like something snaps and he then finds himself doing things that he knows are terrible and bad, and that he cannot control his behavior on such occasions. Appellant also told the officers that when he wanted to engage in sexual activity with a woman but learned that she was having her menstrual period, he would become frustrated and angry and that this is what had happened the previous Wednesday night. He also said that he had had a lot to drink on Wednesday night.

Inspection of the interior of appellant's car revealed the presence of visible blood stains, and a luminol test revealed that a large quantity of blood had been in the car but had been wiped up. Analysis of the blood in the car and comparison with known blood samples of appellant and the victim revealed that the blood in appellant's car could have come from the victim but was not appellant's blood.

A forensic blood analyst testified that it is possible through analysis of blood stains on certain surfaces to make estimates concerning the direction and velocity of motion of the blood making the stains. This witness concluded from her analysis that the blood in appellant's car was deposited in the course of a violent attack.

A forensic hair analyst testified that hairs found in appellant's car were consistent in their characteristics with known hair samples from the victim.

A forensic fiber analyst testified that fibers found in the debris adhering to the victim's coat were similar to fibers from the fabric of the seat cover in appellant's car. Also, fibers were found in the car that had the same characteristics as fibers from the victim's coat and pants.

Appellant was employed as a plaster and drywall worker. His foreman testified at trial that on the morning of January 3, appellant arrived at work asking for the day off. He appeared to have a hangover and said he was feeling rough. The witness said that at this time appellant had scratches on his face. The witness also said that appellant had told him that he liked anal intercourse and liked being with women who allowed themselves to be hit and slapped.

On this appeal, appellant contends (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements he made during his first interview, on January 7; (2) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the tangible evidence obtained from inside his car; (3) that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the statements he made after his arrest, on January 9 and 10; (4) that the trial court erred in denying his motions to exclude evidence of collateral unlawful activity; (5) that the trial court erred in giving improper double consideration to a single aggravating factor in imposing the sentence of death; (6) that the trial court erred in considering the aggravating circumstance that the capital felony was committed in the course of a felony since the felony was an essential element of proof of felony murder; (7) that the trial court erred in finding the capital felony was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; and (8) that the trial court erred in finding that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest. On several of the above points, appellant argues two or more grounds.

Prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress his statement of January 7. Appellant asserted that the initial stop of his car was an illegal arrest and that he was forced to accompany the officers to the police station. At the hearing on the motion, however, the state presented the testimony of officers who said that appellant was not arrested at this time and that he accompanied them voluntarily. Moreover, we conclude that when appellant was first stopped and was asked to go in for questioning, the investigators had reason to believe that appellant and his car had some connection with the murder. Therefore appellant's contention of error in admitting testimony of the January 7 statement is without merit.

Appellant argues that his car was seized without probable cause. After appellant's initial interview was concluded, he was allowed to leave the police station; he was not under arrest at that time. However, he was not allowed to take his car, which he had parked on the street across from the police station. Later that night, a warrant for the search of the car was issued and the next day it was searched. Since appellant was not allowed to remove his car from where he had parked it, it is indisputable that the car was seized by the state without a warrant. It does not follow, however, that the subsequent search pursuant to a warrant was illegal. There was probable cause for the search, as is evidenced by the issuance of the warrant. There was also the exigent circumstance that the car was on the street and the appellant could have removed it and destroyed the...

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