Waterman v. Bristol
| Decision Date | 31 December 1844 |
| Citation | 1 Gilman 593,6 Ill. 593,1844 WL 4116 |
| Parties | HIRAM WATERMANv.SOLOMON W. BRISTOL et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
THIS cause was originally commenced before Albert Neeley, Esq. a justice of the peace of Boone county, by the defendants in error, against the plaintiff in error. The defendants not appearing, judgment was rendered against them for $47.56, and costs of suit. Subsequently he appealed to the circuit court, and at the September term, 1842, the plaintiffs obtained leave to file an additional account, not exhibited at the trial before the justice, when the cause was tried by the court, and judgment rendered for the plaintiffs for $63.91, and costs of suit.
W. T. BURGESS, and L. DAVIS, for the plaintiff in error:
1. On the trial of an appeal from a justice of the peace, the same matter can only be tried in the circuit court.
2. The statute (Gale's Stat. 406 § 16) requires the parties to bring forward all their demands, or be barred. Brookbank v. Smith, 2 Scam. 78.
3. The appeal bond was entered into by the parties with reference to a suit upon a particular subject matter, and their liability in justice extends only so far. In this judgment, they are made liable for other and different matters.
ANSON S. MILLER, for the defendants in error: The main question before the court arises on the construction of “an act concerning justices of the peace and constables.” Gale's Stat. 410 § 35, which provides that in cases of appeal from justices of the peace, “the circuit court shall at any time admit such amendents of the papers and proceedings, as may be necessary to a fair trial of the case upon its merits.”
The question is, as to the character and extent of these amendments. There was no error in allowing the plaintiff to amend his bill of particulars in the circuit court. This was “necessary to a fair trial of the case upon its merits,” was a matter in the discretion of the court, and this discretion applies to all papers, to bills of particulars as well as process, to matters of substance as well as to those of form. The amendments are permitted with a view to substantial justice between the parties, and the cause is tried de novo in the circuit court.
This view is confirmed by “an act to amend the several laws in relation to appeal bonds and the trial of appeals,” Laws of 1838-9, 291 § 4, which provides that the circuit The doctrine was recognized by this court, in the case of Webb v. Lasater, 4 Scam. 547, 548; and though in that case the question arose as to the defendant's right to amend, yet no distinction is made, either in that case, or any of the statutes between the rights of the plaintiff and defendant in this respect. The court shall admit amendments “of the papers, and proceedings,” without restriction to either of the parties. The Revised Statutes of Indiana, and the case Nelson v. Zink, 3 Blackf. cited by the opposite counsel, strengthen rather than weaken this position.
The sixteenth section of the act first referred to, and so much relied on by the other side, does not conflict in the least with the construction given to the thirty-fifth section. It provides that “each party shall bring forward all his or her demands against the other, which can be consolidated,” etc. or be forever debarred from sueing for such debt or demand. The object of the statute was to prevent a multiplicity of suits for that which might be “consolidated into one action or defence,” and that a final judgment should be conclusive upon the parties. McKinney v. Finch, 1 Scam. 152. The party is precluded from bringing a new suit on his neglected demands; but the circuit court on appeal, may permit him to file the same by amendment in the action already commenced. Nothing in the record shows that the amount recovered by the defendants in error exceeded the demand originally indorsed on the back of the summons from the justice's court. There is no complaint that surprise or injustice was caused by the amendment. The exercise of the discretionary power of the court in allowing the amendment is the sole ground of error. The authorities all show there was no error; and that the judgment below should be affirmed with costs.
O PETERS, on the same side: It is a question of discretion with the circuit court whether to allow the amendment or not. The case of Webb v. Lasater is decisive of this point. Nor does the case of Brookbank v. Smith, 2 Scam. 78, which has been cited and relied upon by the other side, necessarily imply the contrary. In that case, the court in its discretion refused the amendment, and though the decision was sustained, the case does not show that this court intended to deny the circuit court the exercise of its discretion in allowing amendments in such cases.
From the notoriously loose and irregular manner of doing business in justices' courts, there are strong reasons for the exercise of the discretion of the circuit court in cases of appeals, to prevent injustice. If this is a matter of discretion there is an end of the case, because what rests in the discretion of the circuit court can not be assigned for error in this court. 1 Peters' Dig. 203; 4 Cowen 503.
The case of Nelson v. Zink, 3 Blackf. 101, is not applicable. In that case, the court was prohibited by statute from allowing amendments, and expressly required to try this case on appeal, without any substantial amendment or alteration whatever. The whole course of legislation on the subject of justices' court in this state manifests an intention on the part of the legislature to have cases, brought in these inferior courts, tried on their merits and to divest them of technicalities so that justice, and not injustice, may be done to the parties. Laws 1838-39, 291.
L. DAVIS, for the plaintiffs in error, in conclusion: The case of Webb v. Lasater, cited by the other side, is in conflict with the case of Brookbank v. Smith. The court travelled out of the record in that case, and what is there said as to the discretion of the court is mere dicta.
In Indiana, either party may amend, etc. upon the payment of costs. Nelson v. Zink, 3 Blackf. 103. But this is by virtue of a statute, while in this state we have no such statute.
The cases cited from Peters' Digest, were cases where ...
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