Waterman v. Morningside Manor

Decision Date30 October 2013
Docket NumberNo. 26631.,26631.
Citation2013 S.D. 78,839 N.W.2d 567
PartiesBarbara WATERMAN, Claimant and Appellant, v. MORNINGSIDE MANOR, Employer and Appellee, and MHA Insurance Company, Insurer and Appellee.
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Jolene R. Nasser, Dean Nasser of Nasser Law Office, PC, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorneys for claimant and appellant.

Charles A. Larson, Meghann M. Joyce of Boyce, Greenfield, Pashby & Welk, LLP, Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Attorneys for employer, insurer and appellees.

KONENKAMP, Justice.

[¶ 1.] In this workers' compensation appeal, we determine, for statute of limitations purposes, whether an amended petition related back to the original petition.

Background

[¶ 2.] Barbara Waterman, a nurse, began working at Morningside Manor in June 2008. In November of that year, she injured her lower back while assisting a resident. She received medical treatment for her injury and returned to work with restrictions in December. On May 13, 2009, she was released from work restrictions. A month later, Morningside's insurance carrier sent Waterman a letter denying future benefits, stating:

Based on the fact that you have returned to work without restrictions and you are done treating, plus the fact that Anne Zweifel, CNP, has assigned a 0% impairment rating and places you at MMI, you are entitled to no further benefits under workers' compensation for your claim that occurred on 11/09/08.

If you disagree with this denial for further benefits, you have the right to file a petition for hearing with the Department of Labor within two years of the date on this letter. Absent such petition, your claim will be forever barred from coverage.

[¶ 3.] Although Waterman returned to work without restrictions, she continued to experience intermittent pain and symptoms. But she found the pain manageable. Then, on October 3, 2010, her pain increased during an overnight shift when she and another employee performed a two-person lift of a resident. The pain, she believed, localized in her hip, but later included her lower back and radiated down her leg. She sought medical care.

[¶ 4.] On October 26, 2010, Waterman called Morningside's Director of Nursing, Stephanie Van Gelder, seeking advice on whether her care would be covered by workers' compensation. Van Gelder later testified that Waterman told her that Waterman's doctor said her pain was from an exacerbation of her 2008 injury. Van Gelder asked Waterman if she remembered a particular incident at work, to which Waterman replied that she could not. Van Gelder instructed Waterman to talk to the Administrator at Morningside, Desiree Duncan. Duncan later testified that Waterman told her that her injury was a “flare-up from 2008.” When Duncan asked about a date, Waterman said, “Well, approximately three weeks ago.” Duncan instructed Waterman to fill out a first report of injury form, which she did, reporting the date of injury as October 3, 2010.

[¶ 5.] Morningside's carrier denied Waterman's claim in November on the ground that she failed to give notice of her October 3, 2010 injury as required by SDCL 62–7–10. On December 27, 2010, Waterman petitioned the Department of Labor for benefits. She alleged that on “an overnight shift on October 3–4, 2010, ... she suffered a low back injury ... while performing a two-person lift of a patient.” Dr. Ryan Schwiesow had been treating Waterman since before her November 2008 work injury. In his deposition, he testified that although Waterman returned to work after her November 2008 injury, her condition was not healed, but was merely asymptomatic, and that the October 2010 incident caused her asymptomatic November 2008 injury to become symptomatic.

[¶ 6.] In their depositions, Van Gelder and Duncan each explained that Waterman described her injury as one related to her 2008 injury. Both testified that they asked Waterman if she could remember a date she was injured, confirming that Waterman had no specific date she could relate to her need for treatment in October 2010.

[¶ 7.] The testimony from these depositions alerted counsel that Waterman's October 3, 2010 incident caused a recurrence of her 2008 injury, rather than a new injury. Accordingly, Waterman sought to amend her petition, and Morningside consented, but reserved all rights and defenses. On March 16, 2012, Waterman filed an amended petition alleging that during “an overnight shift beginning on the evening of Sunday, October 3, 2010, and ending the morning of Monday, October 4, 2010, [she] began experiencing an increase in her symptoms after performing a two-person lift of a patient.” Waterman asserted that she “experienced a recurrence of her original compensable back injury” incurred in November 2008.

[¶ 8.] Morningside moved for summary judgment asserting that the statute of limitations had run on claims from Waterman's 2008 injury. In particular, Morningside referred to its June 2009 denial letter indicating its intent to deny any future requests for benefits from this injury and that if Waterman disagreed she had two years to petition for benefits. Because Waterman filed her amended petition after June 2011, Morningside argued that Waterman's claim was time barred.

[¶ 9.] Waterman responded that under SDCL 15–6–15(c) the claims in her amended petition related back to her original petition, which was filed before the expiration of the statute of limitations. Alternatively, Waterman argued that she had three years under SDCL 62–7–35.1, rather than two years under SDCL 62–7–35, to petition for benefits because Morningside originally deemed Waterman's 2008 injury compensable. Lastly, Waterman asserted that, even if the statute of limitations expired after two years, she experienced a “change in condition” sufficient to reopen her 2008 claim under SDCL 62–7–33.

[¶ 10.] In August 2012, the administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that Waterman's claims in her amended petition did not relate back to her original petition. Under SDCL 15–6–15(c), when a claim “asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading.” Relying on dictionary.com and its definition of “occurrence,” the ALJ reasoned that the alleged recurrence of the November 2008 injury did not arise out of the same incident or occurrence asserted in the original petition.

[¶ 11.] The ALJ also rejected Waterman's contention that the three-year statute of limitations under SDCL 62–7–35.1 applied. Because Morningside's June 2009 letter informed Waterman that Morningside intended to deny all claims stemming from the November 2008 incident, the ALJ ruled that the letter constituted a notification from the employer sufficient to invoke the two-year statute of limitations under SDCL 62–7–35. Because the amended petition was filed more than two years after June 2009, Waterman's claim deriving from the 2008 injury was deemed time barred.

[¶ 12.] In assessing whether Waterman experienced a change in condition sufficient to reopen her 2008 claim under SDCL 62–7–33, the ALJ used October 3, 2010, as the date Waterman allegedly experienced the change in condition. As October 3, 2010, was before the statute of limitations expired in June 2011, Waterman could not rely on SDCL 62–7–33 to reopen an already open claim.

[¶ 13.] Because the ALJ concluded that the statute of limitations expired on claims from Waterman's 2008 injury and that her alleged “change in condition” occurred before the statute of limitations expired, the ALJ granted summary judgment to Morningside. The circuit court affirmed the ALJ's decision, and Waterman appeals. She contends that her amended petition relates back to the date of her original petition, the three-year statute of limitations in SDCL 62–7–35.1 applies, and SDCL 62–7–33 permits her to reopen her claim.

Analysis and Decision

[¶ 14.] At issue here is whether the “conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading” was sufficient to allow the claim in the amended pleading to relate back to the date of the original pleading. SeeSDCL 15–6–15(c). This presents a fully reviewable question of law. Caldwell v. John Morrell & Co., 489 N.W.2d 353, 357 (S.D.1992). Moreover, because the facts relevant to our inquiry are undisputed, whether SDCL 15–6–15(c) applies in this case is also reviewed de novo. See Darling v. W. River Masonry, Inc., 2010 S.D. 4, ¶ 10, 777 N.W.2d 363, 366 (quoting McNeil v. Superior Siding, Inc., 2009 S.D. 68, ¶ 6, 771 N.W.2d 345, 347).

[¶ 15.] Waterman argues that the ALJ interpreted the statutory language too restrictively, relying solely on the dictionary.com definition of “occurrence.” Citing federal case law and secondary sources, Waterman maintains that the relation back rule applies because her amended petition seeks identical workers' compensation benefits, based on the same employment relationship and same job duties, stemming from an already-determined compensable work-related injury, and Morningside knew that the October 2010 incident was related to her November 2008 injury. SeeFed.R.Civ.P. 15(c), Advisory Committee Notes; 6A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1496 (3d ed.2013); Tiller v. Atl. Coast Line R. Co., 323 U.S. 574, 580–81, 65 S.Ct. 421, 424–25, 89 L.Ed. 465 (1945); Senger v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 493 F.Supp. 143, 145 (D.Minn.1980).

[¶ 16.] In response, Morningside argues that the relation back rule cannot apply because Waterman's original and amended pleadings refer to different claims and assert different theories of recovery. The original petition claimed a new injury on October 3, 2010, while the amended petition claimed a recurrence of an injury in November 2008. Moreover, Morningside contends that it had no notice that Waterman's October 2010 incident was related to the November...

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