Waterman v. Seeley

• Decision Date: 08 October 1873
• Citation: 28 Mich. 77
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Joshua W. Waterman v. Betsey A. Seeley and others

28 Mich. 77

Joshua W. Waterman v. Betsey A. Seeley and others

Supreme Court of Michigan

October 8, 1873

Heard July 24, 1873; July 25, 1873

Appeal in Chancery from Genesee Circuit.

Bill to perfect title. Complainant appeals. Affirmed.

Decree affirmed, with costs.

William Newton, for complainant.

Oscar Adams, for defendants.

OPINION

Campbell J.

The bill in this cause was filed to perfect the title to certain lands bid off by complainant upon a mortgage sale; and the necessity alleged for seeking relief arises out of the fact that the legal title was not in the mortgagor, and has never been in him, but has been so transferred and disposed of, as in complainant's view, to give him an equity to reach it. The bill was dismissed at the circuit, and some controversy has arisen concerning its nature, upon which the parties hold conflicting theories. It therefore becomes necessary to consider upon what special equity the claim to relief is founded.

The bill sets forth a mortgage from Alanson A. Seeley to Ira Davenport, which was foreclosed under the statute, and the land bid off in October, 1860, by complainant. The redemption ran out in October, 1861, and the deed was recorded in December, 1861. It is averred in the bill that the land was conveyed to Seeley by Isaac Parshall and Seraphina, his wife June 30th, 1846, by warranty deed, but that they did not then hold the title; that the land was patented by the United States to George Luther; that when he gave the mortgage to Davenport, Seeley represented Mrs. Parshall to have inherited the land from George Luther, as his heir at law, but that in fact Parshall and wife had only an equitable interest by reason of having furnished the purchase money, and that Roswell Luther, father of said George, was his heir at law, subject to that equity.

The bill further avers that one Harrison G. Conger, a brother-in-law of Alanson A. Seeley, and of Norris O. Seeley, one of the defendants, acting in concert with one Cornelius G. Rook, and with the knowledge, concurrence, aid, and abetting of all the defendants (except Mrs. Abrams), and of Chauncey W. Seeley, another brother, and with the design of defeating the mortgage, applied to Roswell Luther, June 11, 1860, for a quit-claim to Conger, representing that he (Conger) had been requested by Parshall and wife, to call on him and obtain such quit-claim, for the purpose of confirming and making good the conveyance from the Parshalls to Alanson Seeley, and saving Mrs. Parshall from damage on her covenants; and representing also that such conveyance would enure to the benefit of those holding under the Parshall deed; and that Roswell Luther was induced thereby to convey his title, without any consideration, to Conger.

It then sets up a series of conveyances, alleged to be fraudulent and without consideration, first to Rook, and through him to Betsey A. Seeley (wife of Norris O. Seeley), of 76 acres, and to Judson S. Seeley and Stephen J. Seeley of the remaining 4 acres, containing a mill.

That Lucretia Abrams, widow of Alanson A. Seeley, was turned out of the premises after her husband's death in 1861, and that in 1863, on representing to Roswell Luther that the conveyance to Conger had defrauded Alanson Seeley's heirs, as well as complainant, she obtained from him a deed to herself, which the bill avers she holds for the purpose, first, of protecting complainant's rights, and second, of protecting her former husband's widow and heirs.

The bill claims and prays that the conveyances to Conger and those holding under him may be held void, and that Mrs. Abrams may hold her deed for the purposes mentioned, and may be restrained from using it to the prejudice of complainant, and asks for a second foreclosure, in case the first should turn out to be irregular, and offers, on payment of his mortgage, to release to Mrs. Abrams and her children.

It also asks for possession and releases, and a perpetual injunction.

It is apparent that complainant's case is based on the claim that he is entitled to relief against all these parties on the ground that he has a complete equity, and that they have set up claims that are subordinate to it and in fraud of it. If his theory is correct, the case is one of original equity cognizance, and not in any way derived from the statute for quieting titles in favor of parties in possession. The fact that he is out of possession is not important.

The case on which complainant rests himself by his bill, and the only one consistent with its general theory, is that a trust resulted to Isaac Parshall in the land in question, arising out of his payment of the original purchase money to the United States, whereby it is claimed George Luther was made a bare trustee, and Parshall the equitable owner. It is claimed further, however, that an independent cause of action arises out of the alleged frauds, without reference to any resulting trusts.

If Parshall had this equitable interest, complainant claims to have succeeded to it as mortgage purchaser under Parshall's grantee, as against any but bona fide purchasers without notice of the trust; and it is claimed there are no such purchasers.

The claim to a resulting trust, springing from the payment of purchase money, though made the prominent feature of the bill, was not very strongly urged on the argument. The transaction took place before the adoption of the Revised Statutes of 1846, and therefore such resulting trusts were not forbidden. They are not, however, in harmony with our land system, and our courts have never been disposed to extend them beyond the line of authority.

In order to maintain such a trust, there must have been an intention to create it, and there must have been an actual payment of the consideration, made out beyond any doubt to have been the individual money of the party seeking to raise the trust. Proof of such payment will usually, as between strangers, raise a presumption in favor of such an intention, but even then, the trust raised by parol may be rebutted by parol. Mr. Sanders laid it down that such a trust could not be raised after the death of the person holding the legal title, without some written evidence.--Sanders on Uses and Trusts, 322, and seq. This seems to be disputed. But the rule requiring the most convincing proof has been recognized here, and ought not to be relaxed.--Bernard v. Bougard, Harr. Ch. R., 130; see also Botsford v. Burr, 2 J. C. R., 405; Jackson v. Bateman, 2 Wend. 570.

No such presumption arises where the title is taken in the name of a wife or child, and the principle covers cases where, without legal relationship, the person paying the purchase money stands, or assumes to stand, in loco parentis to the grantee. The presumption there is both natural and legal, that in paying for land to be granted to the child so situated, it is intended as a donation or advancement, and not as a trust in favor of the donor.--1 Sand. 325-6-7; Glaister v. Hewer, 8 Ves. 195, and note in 2 Hov. Suppl., 65; 1 Lead. Ca. in Eq., 195-6-7, 204-5, and cases.

In Beckford v. Beckford, Lofft., 490, and Currant v. Jago, 1 Collyer 261, the principle was applied very broadly, as well as in some of the American cases referred to in the notes to the leading cases cited. And the rule cannot be doubted, that such a trust cannot be inferred where there is any thing in the relations of the parties, and the facts of the transaction, which would fairly go to rebut it.

In the present case, the testimony of payment is all hearsay, and there is no documentary proof of it whatever. If the decision depended on the question of payment, we could not not hold it...