Waters v. Drake

• Decision Date: 24 April 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:14–cv–1704.
• Parties: Jonathan N. WATERS, Plaintiff, v. Michael V. DRAKE, M.D., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

105 F.Supp.3d 780

Jonathan N. WATERS, Plaintiff,

v.Michael V. DRAKE, M.D., et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:14–cv–1704.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

Signed April 24, 2015.

David Freeman Axelrod, Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP, James M. Petro, Roetzel & Andress, LPA, Columbus, OH, Katherine S. Decker, Mark D. Wagoner, Jr., Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, LLP, Toledo, OH, for Plaintiff.

Michael Hiram Carpenter, Caitlin E. Murphy, Timothy R. Bricker, Carpenter Lipps & Leland LLP, Columbus, OH, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

JAMES L. GRAHAM, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on the Defendants' Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (doc. 9). For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the Defendants' Motion.

I. Background

The Plaintiff, Jonathan Waters, is the former Ohio State University Marching Band director. The Defendants are: Michael Drake, the President of the Ohio State University; Joseph Steinmetz, Executive Vice President and Provost of the Ohio State University; and the Ohio State University. After serving as the Interim Director of the OSU Marching and Athletic Bands during the 2012 football season, Compl. at ¶ 23, doc. 1, the Plaintiff became the full-time Director of the Band on February 1, 2013, id.at ¶¶ 1, 23. In 2014, the Plaintiff received a positive performance review based on the Band's on-field performance during the 2013–14 season. Id.at ¶ 24. Off the field, the Plaintiff worked to improve the Band's culture. Id.at ¶ 25. This effort included the development of policies prohibiting demeaning or inappropriate behavior and instituting extensive training for Band members to educate them regarding alcohol and drug abuse, sexual harassment, and hazing. Id.at ¶¶ 25–55.

More than a year after the Plaintiff began his tenure as full-time Director, the United States Department of Education Office of Civil Rights announced that it was investigating OSU, along with 54 other colleges and universities, for possible violations of federal law based on their handling of sexual violence and harassment complaints. Id.at ¶ 3. Shortly after the Department of Education's announcement, the mother of a former Band member complained to the University's Office of Integrity and Compliance about the Band's allegedly “sexualized” culture and requested an investigation of those allegations. Id.

Chris Glaros, Assistant Vice President of Compliance Operations and Investigations for the University's Office of Compliance, led the subsequent investigation of the Band and its culture. Id.at ¶ 4. Upon completion of the investigation, Glaros issued a report (the Glaros Report) detailing the Office's findings, id.,which was published on the University's website on July 24, 2014, Answer at ¶ 107, doc. 8. That report served as the basis for the University's decision to terminate the Plaintiff's employment as Band Director. Compl. at ¶ 4.

In late May 2014, Glaros contacted the Plaintiff and informed him that a Title IX complaint had been filed against him Id.at ¶ 93. An associate of Glaros, Jessica Tobias, conducted two subsequent interviews with the Plaintiff. Id.at ¶¶ 94–96. At the conclusion of the second interview, Tobias directed the Plaintiff to submit a written report of his efforts to rehabilitate the Band's culture since he became the Director. Id.at ¶ 97.

After completing and submitting that report on July 14, 2014, id.,the Plaintiff met with Defendant Steinmetz about the Title IX complaint, id.at ¶ 98. Defendant Steinmetz informed the Plaintiff that he had two options in response to the Title IX Complaint—he could resign or adopt a zero tolerance policy and agree to an assessment of the Band's culture by an outside firm, the Sports Conflict Institute. Id.The Plaintiff agreed to the latter option. Id.

One week later, on July 23, 2014, the Plaintiff met with Defendant Steinmetz again. Id.at ¶ 100. Defendant Steinmetz issued an “ultimatum” to the Plaintiff, stating that the Plaintiff could resign by 5:00 PM or he would be fired. Id.at ¶ 11. The Plaintiff then received a copy of the Glaros Report for the first time. Id.at ¶ 100. The Plaintiff did not resign, and the next morning, the University sent the Plaintiff a letter terminating his employment as Director of the Marching Band. Id.at ¶¶ 100–01.

Prior to his termination, the Defendants did not provide the Plaintiff “notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the contents of the Glaros Report.” Id.at ¶ 102. Nor, according to the Plaintiff, have the Defendants provided him any meaningful opportunity to be heard following his termination. Id.at ¶ 103. Shortly after his termination, on August 27, 2014, the Plaintiff's counsel sent the University's counsel a request that they provide the Plaintiff with a public name-clearing hearing. Id.at ¶ 104. The University denied the Plaintiff's request that same day. Id.at ¶ 105.

Following the Plaintiff's termination, the University defended its decision publicly, releasing the Glaros Report and publishing it on a dedicated website. Id.at ¶ 107. The University also issued a video statement in which Defendant Drake explained the basis for the University's decision. Id.The Plaintiff's termination and the Defendants' public defense of his termination garnered widespread attention in local and national media outlets. Id.at ¶¶ 108–117.

The Plaintiff subsequently filed his two-count Complaint (doc. 1) on September 26, 2014. In his Complaint, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants violated his Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. In Count One of the Complaint, the Plaintiff brings two procedural due process claims and one substantive due process claim. First, the Plaintiff alleges that he had a constitutionally-protected property interest in his continued employment by the University and that Defendants Drake and Steinmetz violated that property interest when they failed to provide him with notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard prior to terminating his employment. Id.at 39–41. Second, the Plaintiff alleges that he had a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in his good name and reputation and that Defendants Drake and Steinmetz violated that liberty interest when they failed to provide him with a public name-clearing hearing following his termination. Id.Third, the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' actions leading up to and following his termination were “so unjust that it shocks the conscience” in violation of his substantive due process rights. Id.

Count Two of the Complaint alleges that the Defendants violated Title IX when they discriminated against the Plaintiff on account of his gender. Id.at 41–44. The Plaintiff alleges that similarly-situated female employees were treated more favorably than him despite leading programs that also had cultures of sexual harassment and hazing.

The Plaintiff asks that the Court:

(1) declare that the Defendants have violated the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983;

(2) order a meaningful name-clearing opportunity, which shall require that OSU (i) fully comply with all public records requests prior to the date of the hearing; (ii) provide Waters with two full eight-hour days at which he can present evidence and testimony; (iii) make OSU officials, including Defendant Drake, available for testimony and subject to cross-examination; (iv) limit any statements made by OSU during to the duration of the name-clearing hearing strictly to the confines of the hearing; (v) provide notice of the hearing to all local and national media; and (vi) make available such resources necessary for the live broadcasting and recording of the hearing;

(3) order that the Plaintiff be reinstated as Director of the OSU Marching Band; and(4) award Plaintiff compensatory damages in an amount in excess of $1 million, punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial; prejudgment and post-judgment interest, and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs.

Id.at 44.

The Defendants filed their Answer (doc. 8) and Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (doc. 9) on October 23, 2014. The parties completed their initial briefing on the Defendants' Motion on December 4, 2014. On January 20, 2015, the Court scheduled a hearing on the Defendants' Motion. Due to a conflict, the Court subsequently rescheduled the hearing for April 10, 2015. On March 23, 2015, the Court entered an Order (doc. 23) requesting supplemental briefing on the Defendants' Motion. After receiving the parties' supplemental briefs, the Court heard oral arguments on the Defendants' Motion on April 10, 2015.

The parties have submitted their briefs, and with the aid of oral argument, the Defendants' Motion is now ripe for resolution.

II. Standard of Review

Courts apply the same analysis to motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c)as they apply to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Warrior Sports, Inc. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n,623 F.3d 281, 284 (6th Cir.2010). “For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.” JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget,510 F.3d 577, 582 (6th Cir.2007)(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). However, the court need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. Id.(citing Mixon v. Ohio,193 F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir.1999)).

To withstand a Rule 12(c)motion for judgment on the pleadings, “a complaint must contain direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements under some viable legal theory.” Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co.,508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir.2007). “The factual allegations in the complaint need to be sufficient to give notice to the defendant as to what claims are alleged, and the plaintiff must plead ‘sufficient factual matter’ to...