Waters v. Pleasant Manor

Decision Date10 October 2000
Docket NumberNo. 104,104
Citation361 Md. 82,760 A.2d 663
PartiesMildred WATERS v. PLEASANT MANOR NURSING HOME and Injured Workers' Insurance Fund.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

Arthur L. Buist (the Law Offices of Art Buist, on brief), Baltimore, for Petitioner.

James A. Haynes, Towson, for Respondent.

Argued before BELL, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL and HARRELL, JJ HARRELL, Judge.

Mildred Waters, Petitioner, challenges a judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The Circuit Court affirmed an Order of the Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) limiting an award of permanent total disability, paid by Pleasant Manor Nursing Home (the Nursing Home) and the Injured Workers' Insurance Fund (the Fund), Respondents, to the statutory amount in effect at the time of her compensable injury, rather than that applicable when she was determined to be permanently totally disabled. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Waters v. Pleasant Manor Nursing Home, 127 Md. App. 587, 736 A.2d 358 (1999). We granted Petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari.1 We affirm.

Petitioner asks us to consider the following issue:

Is the total amount of Petitioner's permanent total disability compensation established by the statute in effect when Petitioner became permanently totally disabled?

I

On 6 May 1973, Petitioner, a nursing assistant at the Nursing Home in Baltimore, was injured when she and another nurse's aide attempted to pull a patient out of a chair. According to the accident report that documented Petitioner's injury, the other aide mistakenly released the patient, shifting all of the patient's weight on Petitioner and causing Petitioner and the patient to fall to the floor. As a result of the fall, Petitioner sustained a back injury.

Petitioner filed for workers' compensation benefits with the Commission on 15 May 1973. The Commission held a hearing on 10 August 1973 to address Petitioner's claim and found that Petitioner experienced a compensable accidental injury on 6 May 1973. The Commission awarded her temporary total disability benefits in an Order dated 5 September 1973. The Order directed the Nursing Home and the State Accident Fund,2 its insurer, to pay workers' compensation benefits to Petitioner for five weeks, subject to further consideration.

Although she returned to work at the Nursing Home for a brief time, Petitioner's physical condition did not improve, and she returned to the Commission for modification of her benefits. On six separate occasions from 1973 to 1987, the Commission held several hearings and issued Orders modifying Petitioner's award, ordering temporary total disability and permanent partial disability benefits. Upon the expiration of the permanent partial disability payments in 1991, pursuant to an Order dated 3 February 1987, Petitioner again requested a hearing to reopen her case. In a 13 June 1991 Order, the Commission found Petitioner permanently totally disabled and ordered permanent total disability payments, pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1972 Cum.Supp.), Article 101 § 36(1)(a).3 The Commission further ordered the payments to be paid retroactively from 28 March 1985, with the total benefit not to exceed $45,000. Due to the retroactivity of this award, after credit for previous payments, Petitioner received her last compensation payment on 9 July 1991.

At a hearing held on 27 September 1993, Petitioner requested that the Commission reopen her claim for continuing permanent total disability benefits. She argued that the date of the Commission's finding that she was permanently totally disabled should govern the amount of her benefits, rather than the date of the injury. By this argument, Petitioner sought to take advantage of the amended version of Article 101 § 36(1)(a), which the Legislature had enacted on 24 May 1973, shortly after her injury occurred.4 The amended statute removed the $45,000 compensation "cap" and, therefore, she would be entitled to permanent total disability benefits as long as she remained permanently totally disabled. The Commission denied Petitioner's request by Order dated 8 October 1993. No judicial review was sought of this Order.

Petitioner filed a written issue with the Commission on 24 April 1996, essentially again requesting a reopening of her claim. During Petitioner's tenth and final hearing on 30 September 1996, she asked the Commission to resume payment of permanent total disability benefits pursuant to the amended statute. The Commission, in a 7 October 1996 Order, denied the petition. On 6 November 1996, Petitioner filed an action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City seeking judicial review of the 7 October 1996 Commission Order. The Circuit Court, after holding a hearing on 1 December 1997, affirmed the Commission's Order on 4 December 1997. Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. The Court of Special Appeals first addressed Respondent's argument that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction, pursuant to Maryland Code (1974, 1991 Repl.Vol.), Labor and Employment Article, § 9-736(b),5 to review the Commission's 7 October 1996 Order because the Order was a denial of reconsideration rather than a ruling on the merits following the grant of a rehearing or reopening request. Waters, 127 Md.App. at 590,736 A.2d at 360. The intermediate appellate court concluded that Petitioner "appropriately" had asked for her claim to be reopened in light of Maryland's broad reopening statute, Maryland Code § 9-736, which "not only gives the Commission continuing jurisdiction over each case, it also invests the Commission with blanket power to make such changes as in its opinion may be justified." Waters, 127 Md.App. at 591,736 A.2d at 360 (quoting Subsequent Injury Fund v. Baker, 40 Md.App. 339, 345, 392 A.2d 94 (1978) (discussing Article 101, § 40, the precursor to Md.Code § 9-736)). As to the substantive issue, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit Court judgment, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to a higher benefit level because the statute in effect on the date of injury, Maryland Code (1957, 1972 Cum.Supp.), Article 101 § 36(1)(a), capped her benefits at $45,000.

II

Before we reach the substantive issue presented by this case, we pause to consider Respondents' argument that the Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction to review the Commission's Order of 7 October 1996. Relying on our recent decision in Blevins v. Baltimore County, 352 Md. 620, 724 A.2d 22 (1999), Respondents assert that a claimant may not seek judicial review of the Commission's mere refusal to reopen or reconsider an earlier decision when the previous decision settled the merits of the claim. See also Robin Express, Inc. v. Cuccaro, 247 Md. 262, 264-65, 230 A.2d 671, 672 (1967) (stating that if a court or administrative body refuses to reopen a case, "it decides only not to interfere with its previous decision which stands unimpeached as of its original date"); Gold Dust Corp. v. Zabawa, 159 Md. 664, 666, 152 A. 500, 501 (1930) (explaining that "it is regularly considered that a decision declining to interfere with a previous decision is not one intended to be included under a general statutory allowance of appeal from any decision").

In Blevins, we consolidated for argument and decision the cases of Blevins v. Baltimore County and Wills v. Baltimore County, 120 Md.App. 281, 707 A.2d 108 (1998). The Wills case presented a procedural issue, not present in the Blevins case, whether a Commission decision amounted to a mere refusal to reopen or reconsider a case, or whether it had issued a new, and therefore appealable, order. We explained:

[w]hen, upon the filing of an application to reopen or on its own initiative, the Commission enters a new order that differs in any material way from the earlier order, whether or not the end result is the same, it is obvious that the matter has been reconsidered and a new holding made. Conversely, if the Commission denies an application without discussing the merits or propriety of the earlier order, it is evident that the earlier order has not been reconsidered and no new holding has been made. The prospect of ambiguity arises when the Commission considers an application to reopen and, without making clear its intent, enters an order declining to revise the earlier order. The reviewing court then must attempt to determine from the record whether the Commission has, in effect, granted the application and affirmed its earlier ruling or has simply declined to reconsider that ruling. In trying to fathom the Commission's intent, the court should consider, among other things, whether evidence was taken on the application, whether, in entering its new order, the Commission discussed or made findings with respect to the correctness, validity, or propriety of the earlier order, and whether, in denying relief, the Commission either acted summarily, without assigning reasons, or focused only upon defects in the application itself.

Blevins, 352 Md. at 633-34, 724 A.2d at 28 (emphasis added).

Respondents argue that the Commission's 7 October 1996 Order in the present case, after applying the Blevins test, amounts to a decision not to reopen or reconsider its prior suspension, or "capping," of Petitioner's disability payments at $45,000. According to Respondents, although the Commission held a hearing on 30 September 1996 regarding Petitioner's 24 April 1996 filing of issues, no evidence was taken at the hearing; there was no discussion regarding the correctness of the earlier Order; the Commissioner that presided over the hearing merely inquired into the argument presented by Petitioner; and the Order issued after the hearing stated that "the said Petition is hereby denied," without further elaboration. Respondents' view of these proceedings is that the Commission made no new holding and that Petitioner's right to seek judicial review of the Commission's "cap" on her...

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