Waters v. United States

Decision Date04 January 2023
Docket Number3:22-cv-333-MMH-PDB
PartiesWENDY WATERS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
ORDER

MARCIA MORALES HOWARD, United States District Judge.

THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant United States' Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support (Doc 6; Motion) filed on May 24, 2022. Plaintiff Wendy Waters filed Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8; Response) on June 14, 2022. Accordingly, the Motion is ripe for the Court's review.

On March 23, 2022, Waters initiated this negligence action under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (“FTCA”). See Complaint at 1 (Doc. 1). Waters alleges that she tripped and fell on a metal bracket protruding from a sidewalk near the main entrance of a United States Postal Service (“Postal Service”) office in Jacksonville, Florida. Id. at 1-2. She further alleges that the Postal Service negligently maintained its premises by “allowing the metal brackets to remain on the sidewalk and/or failing to warn of the existence of the metal brackets.” Id. at 2. As a result of her fall, Waters alleges that she has suffered and will continue to suffer, bodily injury, as well as pain suffering, and mental anguish, and has incurred economic losses including medical expenses and lost wages. See id.

In the Motion, the United States seeks dismissal of Waters' Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule(s)). See Motion at 1. Specifically, the United States argues that Waters failed to exhaust her administrative remedies-a jurisdictional prerequisite to pursuing claims under the FTCA-because she did not adequately present her claim to the Postal Service before filing suit. See Motion at 4-6. Waters does not dispute that exhaustion is a prerequisite to pursuing an FTCA claim. See Response at 4-6. Instead, she argues that she presented her claim sufficiently to satisfy the FTCA's jurisdictional prerequisites. See Response at 2.

Before initiating this litigation, Waters submitted a Standard Form 95 (“SF-95”) to the Postal Service. See Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death (Doc. 6-3; “First SF-95”).[1]In the First SF-95, Waters identified herself as the claimant and described the basis of her claim as follows:

Ms. Waters had just got out of her truck and was walking to the entrance to the USPS located at 10990 Fort Caroline Rd., Jacksonville FL 32225. As Ms. Waters was walking along the sidewalk, her shoe caught an uncovered, free-standing metal bracket, approximately three inches high, embedded in the sidewalk. This metal bracket caused her to fall on to her face with such force she bounced off the ground and hit her face again.

First SF-95 at 2.[2] She described the “nature and extent of each injury” as:

Deviated septum, several large abrasions to Ms. Waters's face, injured right pinky, stiff neck and right shoulder, and headaches. Deviated septum will likely require surgery.

Id. Finally, Waters identified her claim as one for personal injury valued at $5,000,000. Id.

I. Standard of Review

In any case, “a court must first determine whether it has proper subject matter jurisdiction before addressing the substantive issues.” Taylor v. Appleton 30 F.3d 1365, 1366 (11th Cir. 1994). If jurisdiction is found to be lacking, the Court cannot proceed at all; its sole remaining duty is to state that it lacks jurisdiction and dismiss the case. See Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999). Attacks on subject matter jurisdiction based on Rule 12(b)(1) come in two forms: facial attacks and factual attacks. Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1528-29 (11th Cir. 1990). A factual attack “challenges the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings such as testimony and affidavits, are considered.” Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir. 1980).[3]When a defendant makes a factual attack, he is challenging the accuracy of the allegations, not their sufficiency. See, e.g., Valentin v. Hospital Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 364 (1st Cir. 2001). In the matter before the Court, the United States mounts a factual attack to subject matter jurisdiction by arguing that, despite having submitted two SF-95 forms, Waters has not exhausted her administrative remedies as required by the FTCA. See generally Motion. Thus, the Court may consider extrinsic evidence such as testimony and affidavits to determine whether jurisdiction exists. Lawrence, 919 F.2d at 1529 (“no presumptive truthfulness attaches to plaintiff's allegations”).[4]

II. Discussion

“The FTCA provides a limited waiver of the United States' sovereign immunity for tort claims.” Dalrymple v. United States, 460 F.3d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). However, before instituting an action under the FTCA, a claimant must first exhaust the required administrative remedies. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 107, 113 (1993); see also Turner v. United States, 514 F.3d 1194, 1200 (11th Cir. 2008). If a party files suit in a district court before exhausting the statutory administrative remedies, the suit will be premature and the district court will lack subject matter jurisdiction over the action. See Turner, 514 F.3d at 1200 (quoting McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113 (“the FTCA bars claimants from bringing suits in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative remedies”)).

To exhaust the required administrative remedies under the FTCA, a plaintiff must present the claim to the relevant federal agency. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (creating the FTCA's presentment requirement).[5]Presentment of a claim requires a plaintiff to (1) give[] the agency written notice of [the plaintiff's] claim sufficient to enable the agency to investigate, and (2) place[] a value on his or her claim.” Adams v. United States, 615 F.2d 284, 289 (5th Cir. 1980). However, a plaintiff need not exceed these “minimal requirements” to satisfy the presentment requirement of § 2675(a). Id. at 292; see also Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1982) (agreeing with Adams, and noting that the FTCA's “legislative history indicates that a skeletal claim form, containing only the bare elements of notice of accident and injury and a sum certain representing damages, suffices” for jurisdiction).

In the instant Motion, the United States asserts that “the Code of Federal Regulations clarifies [the FTCA's] presentment requirement for USPS claims in particular.” Motion at 4. Specifically, the United States cites 39 C.F.R. § 912.8, which states that [i]n order to exhaust the administrative remedy provided, a claimant shall submit substantial evidence to prove the extent of any losses incurred and any injury sustained, so as to provide the Postal Service with sufficient evidence for it to properly evaluate the claim.” However, the Motion cites no authority supporting the contention that satisfaction of 39 C.F.R. § 912 is a jurisdictional requirement or that it modifies the holding of Adams. In Adams, the former Fifth Circuit held that an FTCA regulation did not create a jurisdictional bar because it was created under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 2672, which permits agencies to promulgate regulations to facilitate settlement. See Adams, 615 F.2d at 288. The regulation at issue here, § 912, is different from those in Adams because § 912 was ostensibly promulgated under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680, not just § 2672. See 39 C.F.R. § 912; Adams, 615 F.2d at 288. However, § 2672 is “the only provision in the Federal Tort Claims Act which authorizes the promulgation of agency regulations.” Pagel v. United States, 986 F.Supp. 1315, 1325 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (applying the reasoning of Adams to “reject[] the contention that 39 C.F.R. § 912.7(b) and 912.8 were duly promulgated to clarify or implement the requirements for claim presentation in 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a));[6] see also Knapp v. United States, 844 F.2d 376, 379 (6th Cir. 1988) (Section 2675(a) requires only ‘minimal notice' consisting of the two elements identified in Adams-a sufficient description of the injury to enable the agency to conduct an investigation, and a statement of the value of the claim.”); Byrne v. United States, 804 F.Supp. 577, 581-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining that the Attorney General simply lacks the statutory authority to promulgate jurisdictional regulations under section 2675). Moreover, as the Adams court held, [a]n agency's demand for anything more than a written and signed statement setting out the manner in which the injury was received, enough details to enable the agency to begin its own investigation and a claim for money damages is unwarranted and unauthorized” as part of the jurisdictional scheme.[7]615 F.2d at 292; accord Avery, 680 F.2d at 610-11 (adopting the holding of Adams as “the proper one,” and reasoning that Section 2675(a) was not intended to allow an agency to insist on proof of a claim to its satisfaction before the claimant becomes entitled to a day in court).

Accordingly the question is whether Waters (1) gave the Postal Service sufficient written notice to enable an investigation, and (2) placed a value on her claim. See Adams, 615 F.2d at 292. The United States does not dispute that the second requirement was satisfied. See Motion at 2 (describing how Waters valued her claim at $5,000,000). Instead, the United States argues that the Postal Service “was not able to investigate” Waters' claim with “nothing more than her name and the body parts that she allegedly injured in her fall.”[8]Motion at 6. The United States relies on two cases as part of this argument,...

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