Waters v. Young, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
| Decision Date | 11 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-56055,PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES,95-56055 |
| Citation | 100 F.3d 1437 |
| Parties | B. BENEDICT WATERS,, v. CHARLES YOUNG, DEFENDANT, AND PAUL TOWNSEND AND WILLIAM CORMIER, |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
B. Benedict Waters, Los Angeles, California, in pro per for the plaintiff-appellant.
Melinda W. Ebelhar, Hagenbaugh & Murphy, Glendale, California, for the defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California, Stephen V. Wilson, District Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. CV-90-6145-SVW.
Before: Harry Pregerson, Robert Boochever, and Stephen Reinhardt, Circuit Judges.
Byron Benedict Waters appeals from the district court's rejection of his civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983, and 1985(3) against employees of the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). Waters argues on appeal that the district court erred in granting the defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) without first apprising him of the deficiencies in his proof and giving him an opportunity to present further evidence on any dispositive facts. We agree and remand for a new trial.
Waters is an African-American male who formerly worked as a temporary employee at UCLA. From 1986 to 1987, he was assigned to work in the mailroom at UCLA Capital Programs, an organization that performs general contracting work for the university. During that time, he met his current girlfriend, a white woman and mailroom co-worker. Waters has alleged that one of his supervisors at Capital Programs made a variety of disparaging and racist remarks about his interracial relationship. When a career position in the mailroom opened, it was offered to him, but following the alleged criticism of his interracial relationship, the offer was withdrawn. Waters then applied for another career position at Capital Programs as an "Administrative Assistant II." Citing budgetary constraints, Capital Programs simultaneously eliminated both that position and Waters' temporary position in the mailroom. Alleging civil rights violations, Waters filed a variety of lawsuits in state and federal court against Capital Programs staff and other UCLA employees.
In 1989, Waters again applied to work at Capital Programs, this time as a "Secretary II." Responsibility for the decision to reject his application was apparently shared by appellees Paul Townsend, an executive assistant at Capital Programs, and William Cormier, the director of operations at Capital Programs. Cormier's letter informed Waters that he would not be considered either for that position or for others that might become available at Capital Programs "in the near future." Although the letter specifically denied that the decision to exclude Waters was in response to his previous lawsuits against UCLA employees, it characterized his conduct in the prosecution of those suits as "seeking only to ridicule, embarrass, degrade and intimidate University employees, including those who would be your co-workers."1
In 1990, Waters filed the present pro se action in district court against twenty-two defendants, including Townsend, Cormier, and UCLA Chancellor Charles Young. Waters asserted, inter alia, claims under 42 U.S.C. 1981 for employment discrimination on the basis of race; claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for retaliatory refusal-to-hire based on his prior lawsuits; and claims under 42 U.S.C. 1985(3) for conspiracy to violate his civil rights. Prior to trial, the district court dismissed or otherwise rejected all of his claims except for his 1981, 1983, and 1985(3) claims against Townsend and Cormier.
Waters' remaining claims against Townsend and Cormier proceeded to trial in 1995. Waters represented himself throughout the district court proceedings, which lasted a total of one hour and twenty minutes. Following opening arguments, Waters examined himself regarding his employment history and his current duties as chief neuropsychological assessor at the Brentwood Movement Disorders Clinic, a research project funded by UCLA. Waters testified that in 1989 he applied for a "Secretary II" position advertised at UCLA Capital Programs, and that he received a letter from Cormier informing him that he would not be considered for any position at Capital Programs then or in the near future. Although Waters testified as to his own job skills and qualifications, he did not testify as to the requirements of the Secretary II position or the qualifications of the person eventually hired.
At the end of his testimony, Waters stated that he had completed his direct examination. Prompted by the district court, the defendants made their first motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(a):
The trial continued, and Waters called Townsend as his second witness. Townsend testified only that his duties included hiring for the position Waters had sought, that he had rejected Waters' application, and that he had subsequently hired a white woman for the position.
Waters then called Cormier as his third and final witness. Cormier testified as to the nature of his involvement in the decision to reject Waters and to Townsend's participation in that decision. Cormier asserted that Waters had made threats of physical violence against Townsend and a former supervisor, and claimed these threats as the basis for the rejection of Waters' application. Cormier also acknowledged that he had previously described Waters' behavior as "threatening" to himself, but clarified that what he found "threatening," "harassing," and "intimidating" was "the process of being involved in repeated litigation where I was called a racist."
Following Cormier's brief testimony, Waters rested. At this point, the district court again prompted defendants' counsel to move for judgment as a matter of law, and a brief sidebar ensued:
(SIDEBAR CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE COURT AND PARTIES HELD ON THE RECORD.)
(END OF SIDEBAR CONFERENCE)
In a subsequent written order granting the motion, the district court stated that it found no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to have found for Waters on any of his claims. Included among the reasons given by the district court for its ruling was Waters' failure to introduce any evidence of the skills required for the Secretary II position, or of the qualifications of the person ultimately hired. The district court also stated, post hoc, that Waters failed to introduce evidence to show that the defendants' stated reason for their refusal to hire him was pretextual.
Waters argues on appeal that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) requires that a non-moving party be apprised of the deficiencies in its proof. Rule 50(a) reads:
(1) If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the court may determine the issue against the party and may grant motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party with respect to a claim or defense that cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on that issue.
(2) Motions for judgment as a matter of law may be made at any time before submission of the case to the jury. Such a motion shall specify the judgment sought and the law and the facts on which the moving party is entitled to judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a) (emphasis added). Rule 50(a) thus explicitly requires the moving party to "specify . . . the law and the facts on which [it] is entitled to judgment." The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 50 makes it clear that the trial court has an overlapping responsibility to inform the non-moving party of deficiencies in its proof and to afford that party an opportunity to correct any such deficiency. That note reads in relevant part:
The second sentence of paragraph (a)(1) authorizes the court to consider a motion for judgment as a matter of law as soon as a party has completed a presentation on a fact essential to that party's case. Such early action is appropriate when economy and expedition will be served. In no event, however, should the court enter judgment against a party who has not been apprised of the materiality of the dispositive fact and been afforded an opportunity to present any available evidence bearing on that fact.
Fed. R....
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