Watison v. Parker
| Decision Date | 10 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 1:19-cv-00088,1:19-cv-00088 |
| Parties | RAYMOND WATISON, Plaintiff, v. TONY PARKER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM
Raymond Watison, a prisoner at the South Central Correctional Facility in Clifton, Tennessee, filed a pro se complaint in the Western District of Tennessee (Doc. No. 1) and an application to proceed without prepaying fees and costs (Doc. No. 2). That court granted the application and transferred the case to this Court. (Doc. No. 4, 7). Plaintiff subsequently filed a Second Amended Complaint against Tennessee Department of Correction ("TDOC") Commissioner Tony Parker, TDOC Assistant Commissioner Lee Dotson, and Tennessee Attorney General Herbert H. Slattery, III, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act, and state law.1 (Doc. No. 15). The case is before the Court for an initial review of the Complaint pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e.
I. INITIAL REVIEW OF THE COMPLAINT
Under the PLRA, the court must review and dismiss any prisoner complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief from an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A.
To determine whether a complaint "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted" under the PLRA's screening requirements, the court applies the same standard as under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). The court must (1) view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and (2) take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true unless they are entirely without credibility. Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011); Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 2009)). An assumption of truth does not extend to legal conclusions or "'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). The court determines whether those factual allegations "plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief," Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681), that rises "above the speculative level," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
"Pro se complaints are to be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, and should therefore be liberally construed." Williams, 631 F.3d at 383; Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976)). Even under this lenient standard, however, pro se plaintiffs must meet basic pleading requirements and are not exempted from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 714 (6th Cir. 2004); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989); see also YoungBok Song v. Gipson, 423 F. App'x 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2011) ().
The liberally-construed Complaint alleges the following facts that the Court must accept as true for purposes of initial review. On May 10, 2019, Plaintiff received a "Memorandum" from TDOC regarding trust fund administration. (Id. at 6.) The Memorandum stated that, pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-25-143, TDOC has the authority to collect from Plaintiff's trust fund account money necessary to satisfy unpaid court costs imposed upon Plaintiff. (Id.) The Memorandum further indicated that the sum of $379.50 would be deducted from Plaintiff's trust fund. (Id.) The Memorandum noted these costs had been assessed by the Shelby County Criminal Court in case number 16-4807, the amount would not appear on the judgment, and that the fees could not be waived, set aside, or suspended. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff was convicted in Shelby County Criminal Court in January 2018, but he did not receive a "Judicial Bill of Costs," writ of execution, or any "bona fide document" regarding the payment of fees. (Id.)
Beginning on July 16, 2019, 50 percent of all deposits made to Plaintiff's trust fund account has been deducted to satisfy this outstanding debt. (Id.) Plaintiff submitted a grievance under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-25-143 to Commissioner Parker, Assistant Commissioner Dotson, and Attorney General Slattery. (Id.) Dotson responded to the grievance by stating that "appealing decisions of any agency other than TDOC" in not appropriate subject of a TDOC grievance. (Id. at 8). The Complaint alleges that it is the TDOC "Commissioners" who "approve of such transactions"; that Defendants "knowingly . . . diverted" his funds to "benefit other agencies not entitled thereto"; and that they "refuse to stop their unlawful debt collecting activities." (Id.)
Plaintiff sues Parker, Dotson, and Slattery in their individual and official capacities. (Id. at 2-3). Plaintiff brings a civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations ("RICO") Act; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961, 1962, 1964; claims under Section 1983 for violation of the First and Eighth Amendments; and a state law claim under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-25-144. (Id. at 3). He seeks compensatory damages, punitive damages, and injunctive relief. (Id. at 5).
Plaintiff first brings claims against Defendants under the RICO Act. In a "civil RICO" claim, a plaintiff may seek redress for racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962.2 The collection of unlawful debt is both a predicate act for racketeering activity, see Otworth v. Budnik, 594 F. App'x 859, 862 (6th Cir. 2014), and a native offense under the RICO Act. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c). However, the RICO Act has a very restrictive definition of "unlawful debt." Specifically, "unlawful debt" under the RICO Act is only a debt "incurred or contracted in gambling activity' or 'which is unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in part . . . because of the laws relating to usury.'" 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6). Accordingly, "collection efforts that do not go to an unlawful debt do not fall within the scope of the RICO Act." 77 C.J.S. RICO § 15 (June 2020); see also Otworth, 594 F. App'x at 862 ().
Here, the Complaint alleges that Defendants engaged in "unlawful debt collecting activities" by deducting court costs assessed by the Shelby County Criminal Court from Plaintiff'sprison trust account. (Doc. No. 15 at 7-8). Those court costs, even if improperly assessed, fall within neither category of "unlawful debt" included in the RICO Act. See Otworth, 594 F. App'x at 862; 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6). Accordingly, Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants improperly collected this debt fails to state a civil RICO claim. This claim must, therefore, be dismissed.
Section 1983 creates a cause of action against any person who, acting under color of state law, deprives an individual of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution or federal laws. Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012). Thus, to state a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Carl v. Muskegon Cty., 763 F.3d 592, 595 (6th Cir. 2014).
Plaintiff first sues Defendants under Section 1983 in their individual capacities. "Persons sued in their individual capacities under § 1983 can be held liable based only on their own unconstitutional behavior." Heyerman v. Cty. of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 647 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Murphy v. Grenier, 406 F. App'x 972, 974 (6th Cir. 2011) (); Hall v. Trump, No. 3:19-cv-00628, 2020 WL 1061885, at *5 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 5, 2020). Furthermore, because there is no respondeat superior liability under Section 1983, supervisory officials are not liable in their individual capacities unless they "either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it." Hall, 2020 WL 1061885, at *5 (citing Hays v. Jefferson Cty., Ky., 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982)). Supervisory officials who are aware of the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates but fail to act generally cannot be held liable in their individual capacity. Grinter v.Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575-76 (6th Cir. 2008); Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 751 (6th Cir. 2006); Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999).
Here, the Complaint alleges that Tennessee submitted a claim for reimbursement of Plaintiff's court costs to TDOC via a January 2019 letter from Slattery to Parker and Dotson, and, several months later, TDOC began collecting from Plaintiff's trust fund to repay this debt. (Doc. No. 15 at 6-7). Even construed most liberally, these allegations suggest nothing more than an exchange of documentation between state department supervisors Slattery and Parker. Plaintiff does not allege that Slattery or Parker actively engaged in, or were even aware of, particular acts that allegedly violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights. For example, the Complaint makes no allegation that Slattery or Parker have ever had any personal knowledge about Plaintiff or his particular court costs, or were personally involved in any decisions or efforts concerning collection of Plaintiff's debt. Plaintiff's...
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