Watkins & Son Pet Supplies v. Iams Co.

• Decision Date: 18 March 2002
• Docket Number: No. C-3-95-189.,C-3-95-189.
• Citation: 197 F.Supp.2d 1030
• Parties: WATKINS & SON PET SUPPLIES, Plaintiff, v. The IAMS COMPANY, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

Page 1030

197 F.Supp.2d 1030

WATKINS & SON PET SUPPLIES, Plaintiff, v. The IAMS COMPANY, Defendant.

No. C-3-95-189.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division.

March 18, 2002.

John Regan, Stephen Colbert, Lewisville TX, for Plaintiff.

Jeff Ireland, Mary Wiseman, Dayton, OH, John Yeager, East Lansing, MI, Nicholas Subashi, Dayton, OH, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ENTRY SUSTAINING IN PART AND OVERRULING IN PART DEFENDANT'S RENEWED MOTION FOR ORDER COMPELLING PAYMENT OF COSTS AND SANCTIONS (DOC. # 183); DEFENDANT AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS IN THE SUM OF $23,367.61, PLUS POST JUDGMENT INTEREST, PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1961, ON $7,315.73 OF THAT SUM FROM JANUARY 27, 2000, AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST ON THE REMAINDER FROM DATE; JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF

RICE, Chief Judge.

On September 9, 1999, this Court entered a Decision in which it sustained Defendant's Motion for Sanctions (Doc. # 113), a motion with which Defendant had sought an award of attorney's fees and expenses incurred as a result of being required to depose an expert witness identified by Plaintiff a second time, and as a result having had to bring its motion seeking sanctions. See Doc. # 134. The Defendant had brought that motion pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In that Decision, the Court also directed the Defendant to submit a statement quantifying the amount of the expenses and attorney's fees it was seeking. Id, To comply with that directive, Defendant submitted its Verified Statement of Costs (Doc. # 137). Given that this Court had previously concluded that the Defendant is entitled to recover its attorney's fees and expenses, the Court sustained that request and indicated that it would quantify the amount to be awarded to Defendant by separate entry, after the completion of the then pending appellate proceedings. See Doc. # 178. The Defendant has also sought to recover costs under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Doc. # 170.

After the Sixth Circuit had issued its opinion, affirming this Court's decisions on the merits of this litigation (see Watkins & Son Pet Supplies v. Iams Co., 254 F.3d 607 (2001)), Defendant filed a motion, renewing its requests for attorney's fees and expenses, as a sanction under Rule 37, and costs pursuant to Rule 54(d). See Doc. # 183. The Defendant also requests that the Court award post-judgment interest on the amount of attorney's fees and expenses to which it is entitled, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961, computed from September 9, 1999, the date upon which the Court entered its sanctions order. As a means of analysis, the Court will initially address the parties' arguments pertaining to the Defendant's request for an award of attorney's fees and expenses as a sanction, following which it will turn to their contentions concerning costs under Rule 54(d). Finally, the Court will rule upon the Defendant's request for post-judgment interest.

I. Attorney's Fees and Expenses as a Sanction

In its Decision September 9, 1999, this Court sustained the Defendant's Motion for Sanctions (Doc. # 113), concluding that the Plaintiff should be required to pay, as a sanction under Rule 37, the amount, including reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the Defendant to depose Dr. David A. Huettner ("Huettner"), an expert witness retained by Plaintiff, a second time, and to bring that motion before the Court. See Doc. # 134. Therein, the Court also directed Defendant's counsel to submit a statement of that amount and afforded Plaintiff the opportunity of submitting a responsive memorandum. The Defendant has filed such a statement (see Doc. # 137), and the Plaintiff has filed its responsive memorandum (see Doc. # 143). In addition, although this Court's September 9, 1999, Decision did not authorize the Defendant to file a reply memorandum, it has filed such. See Doc. # 146. With its initial statement, the Defendant sought to recover $12,160.84. See Doc. # 137. With its reply memorandum, the Defendant requests an award of $12,940.34, asserting that it incurred $779.50 to prepare that filing. See Doc. # 146. With its Renewed Motion for Order Compelling Payment of Costs and Sanctions (Doc. # 183), the Defendant requests that the Court award it $12,940.34 in attorney's fees and expenses, the amount set forth in its reply memorandum.

The Plaintiff devotes a significant portion of its memorandum opposing that motion, by arguing that the Court should not impose sanctions upon it. The Plaintiff has not, however, presented a basis for revisiting the Decision of September 9, 1999 (Doc. # 134), which imposed sanctions on the Plaintiff. For the reasons set forth in that exhaustive Decision, and in the absence of a rational argument as to why that Decision should be reconsidered, this Court rejects the Plaintiff's argument in that regard. That said, the Court must determine the amount of sanctions to award. As indicated, the Defendant seeks $12,940.34, a sum which is composed of $10,771.25 for attorney's fees and $2,169.09 for expenses. As a means of analysis, the Court will initially discuss the attorney's fees requested by the Defendant, following which it will turn to the amount of expenses it seeks.

Courts have held that the lodestar method of calculating reasonable attorney's fees is applicable to fees awarded under Rule 37. See e.g., Hart v. Parks, 2001 WL 636444 (C.D.Cal.2001); CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 106 F.Supp.2d 780, 787 (D.Md.2000); Envirosource Inc. v. Horsehead Resource Dev. Co., 981 F.Supp. 876, 881 (S.D.N.Y.1998); Trbovich v. Ritz-Carlton Hotel Co., 166 F.R.D. 30, 32 (E.D.Mo.1996); Bowne of New York City, Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 161 F.R.D. 258, 266 (S.D.N.Y.1995). In Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), the Supreme Court established the lodestar method of determining attorney's fees, stating that "[t]he most useful starting point for determining the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate." Id. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933. See also, Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 94, 109 S.Ct. 939, 103 L.Ed.2d 67 (1989). Such computation results in the lodestar amount.¹ The party seeking attorney's fees bears the burden of proof on the number of hours reasonably expended and the reasonableness of the rates claimed. Granzeier v. Middleton, 173 F.3d 568, 577 (6th Cir.1999). See also, Reed v. Rhodes, 179 F.3d 453, 472 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that the party seeking attorney's fees bears the burden of documenting her entitlement to the award). In determining the number of hours reasonably expended, the District Court should exclude excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S.Ct. 1933. A District Court's award of attorney's fees is entitled to "substantial deference." Fisher v. City of Memphis, 234 F.3d 312, 319 (6th Cir.2000).

As indicated, the Defendant seeks attorney's fees in the sum of $10,771.25, which is comprised of $3,407.50 to redepose Huettner, $4,411.25 to brief its Motion for Sanctions including the reply memorandum, $2,180.00 to file its Verified Statement of Costs (Doc. # 137), and $772.50 to file a verified reply in support of that verified statement. The Court will address these items in the above order.

The Plaintiff argues that the Court should deny recovery of the attorney's fees Defendant incurred to redepose Huettner. See Doc. # 143. Since this Court has previously concluded that the Defendant is entitled to recover such fees (see Doc. # 134), it rejects the Plaintiff's argument that all recovery should be denied. The Defendant seeks to recover for the work of three attorneys on the redeposition of Huettner, 15.25 hours for D. Jeffrey Ireland ("Ireland"), 0.75 hours for Mary Wiseman ("Wiseman") and 1.00 hour for Lisa Parilo ("Parilo"). Ireland took Huettner's deposition and the Defendant has not explained why the participation of Wiseman and Parilo was necessary; therefore, the Court will approve the amount of attorney's fees requested for Ireland and deny those requested for Wiseman and Parilo. Accordingly, the Court awards $3,202.50 for attorney's fees for Ireland (15.25 hours at $210.00 per hour).²

The Defendant seeks to recover fees for three attorneys and two paralegals to prepare and to file its Motion for Sanctions and its reply in support thereof, to wit: Ireland 2.00 hours, Wiseman 4.00 hours, Parilo 33.25 hours, paralegal Sandy Kreitzer 6.50 hours and paralegal Beth O'Connor 2.25 hours. The Plaintiff argues that the Defendant is seeking an excessive amount to prepare and to brief its request for sanctions. This Court agrees. To expend 48 hours briefing a relatively simple request for sanctions is excessive. Moreover, to devote the energies of five professionals to that task can lead to redundancies and inefficiencies. It is apparent that Parilo did most of the work briefing that request, while Ireland and Wiseman reviewed her work. This Court will not approve attorney's fees for such a multi-level review of a straight forward request for sanctions. Therefore the Court will only approve the fees requested for Wiseman, $640.00 (4.00 hours at $160.00 per hour).³ Based upon its experience ruling upon all manner of requests for attorney's fees, the Court also finds the number of hours requested for Parilo to be excessive and will reduce that number to 15.00, thus awarding Defendant $1275 (15.00 hours at $85.00 per hour) for the time expended by her to brief the request for sanctions. The Court will also award attorney's fees for the time spent by only one paralegal, Kreitzer, who spent more time than her colleague, thus awarding Defendant $390 (6.5 hours at $60.00 per hour) for the time expended by her. In sum, the Court awards the Defendant $2,305.00 for attorney's fees incurred to brief its request for sanctions.

The...