Watkins v. Brown

• Decision Date: 07 November 2001
• Docket Number: No. JFM-00-2793.,JFM-00-2793.
• Citation: 173 F.Supp.2d 409
• Parties: Arlene WATKINS, Administratrix of the Estate of James Watkins, Sr., Plaintiff, v. C. Earl BROWN, Inc. et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

173 F.Supp.2d 409

Arlene WATKINS, Administratrix of the Estate of James Watkins, Sr., Plaintiff, v. C. Earl BROWN, Inc. et al., Defendants.

No. JFM-00-2793.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

November 7, 2001.

Lauren Clingan, David M. Hammer, Hammer, Ferretti & Schiavoni, Martinsburg, WV, for Plaintiff.

Brett R. Wilson, Miller, Oliver, Baker, Moylan & Stone, Hagerstown, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

GESNER, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff, Arlene Watkins, brings this action as administratrix of James Watkins' estate against his former employer, C. Earl Brown, Inc., and David Lent, its general manager, for alleged violations of Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law and for breach of contract.¹ Plaintiff claims that defendants unlawfully withheld commissions owed to Mr. Watkins. (Paper No. 9, Counts I & II).

The case was referred to the undersigned for all proceedings with the consent of the parties. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c); Local Rule 301.4. Pending before the court is Defendant Lent's Motion for Summary Judgment (Paper No. 20) and Plaintiff's Opposition (Paper No. 21).² No hearing is deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants Defendant Lent's Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Factual Background³

For purposes of the pending motion, the parties do not dispute the following facts. Defendant C. Earl Brown, Inc. engages in the sale, leasing and servicing of commercial vehicles and accessories. (Paper No. 20 at 1). From August 18, 1998 through July 1, 2000, James Watkins was a salesman for C. Earl Brown, Inc. at its Hagerstown, Maryland sales facility. (Paper No. 21 at 1).

Defendant David Lent has been general manager of C. Earl Brown, Inc. at all times relevant to this case, up to and including the present. (Paper No. 20 at 1). He is paid a salary plus "a commission based on the net profit of the corporation." (Paper No. 21, Ex. 3 at 41). In addition, Mr. Lent was the company's sole corporate representative designated to testify on behalf of the company in this matter. (Paper No. 21 at 2).

As general manager,⁴ Mr. Lent sets the salary/draw and rate of commission for the sales people and has final approval on hiring and firing employees. (Paper No. 21 at 2). He reviews sales invoices and assigns a value to trade-in vehicles as well as determining the amount of profit to be made on a sale. (Id.). Mr. Lent sets the procedures salesmen must follow in order to receive their commissions and can authorize that an employee be paid despite being off from work. (Id. at 3).

On June 29, 2000 Mr. Lent sent Mr. Watkins a letter terminating his employment. (Paper No. 21, Ex. 1). Mr. Watkins then wrote to Mr. Lent requesting payment of commissions earned prior to his termination. (Paper No. 21, Ex. 2). Since that time, Mr. Watkins and his estate have not received any of the commissions claimed by Mr. Watkins.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and a decision may be rendered as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The party moving for summary judgment has the burden to demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir.1987).

If there clearly exist factual issues "that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party," then summary judgment is inappropriate. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. The only facts that are properly considered "material" are those that might affect the outcome of the case under the governing law. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If the evidence favoring the non-moving party is "merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Thus, the existence of only a "scintilla of evidence," is not enough to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, all facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are construed in favor of the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The non-moving party, however, may not rest on its pleadings, but must show that specific, material facts exist to create a genuine, triable issue. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

On those issues for which the non-moving party will have the burden of proof, it is his or her responsibility to oppose the motion for summary judgment with affidavits or other evidence specified in the rule. Id.; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1993) ("The summary judgment inquiry thus scrutinizes the plaintiff's case to determine whether the plaintiff has proffered sufficient proof, in the form of admissible evidence, that could carry the burden of proof in her claim at trial."). If a party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an essential element on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is proper. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

III. Discussion

A. Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law Claim

Count I of plaintiff's Complaint alleges that defendants, C. Earl Brown, Inc. ("the Company") and David Lent, violated the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law ("MWPCL"), Md.Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. § 3-501 et seq. (1999 Repl.Vol.), by failing to pay Mr. Watkins commissions he earned during his employment. (Paper No. 9, Count I). Specifically, the MWPCL requires employers to pay accrued wages⁵ to an employee upon termination of employment, § 3-505, and provides a private cause of action against an employer who violates the statute. § 3-507.1(a).⁶

The parties do not dispute the material facts regarding Mr. Lent's position as general manager or his job responsibilities. They do disagree, however, as to the legal effect of those facts. Plaintiff seeks to hold Mr. Lent liable for violation of the MWPCL for nonpayment of commissions the Company owed to Mr. Watkins based on the theory that, by virtue of his job responsibilities as general manager, Mr. Lent was Mr. Watkins' "employer" within the meaning of the statute. Mr. Lent argues that his supervisory position as an employee at the Company does not make him an "employer." The parties agree that Mr. Lent can only be held liable if he is considered an "employer" under the MWPCL.

The MWPCL defines the term "employer" as "any person who employs an individual in the State or a successor of the person." § 3-501(b). Section 3-101, the general definition section for Title 3 (Employment Standards and Conditions) of the Labor and Employment Article (hereinafter "Title 3"), defines "employ" as "to engage an individual to work ... [including] (i) allowing an individual to work; and (ii) instructing an individual to be present at a work site." § 3-101(c). Plaintiff contends that Mr. Lent is an "employer" under the MWPCL because he engaged Mr. Watkins to work within the meaning of § 3-101(c) by "direct[ing] Mr. Watkins' actions and, most importantly, decid[ing] what compensation Mr. Watkins was to be paid." (Paper 21 at 3).

Neither party has directed the court's attention to any case law on point, and the court's own research has not revealed any cases interpreting the relevant definitions. Accordingly, the court must apply principles of statutory interpretation to ascertain the meaning of the term "employer" as defined in the MWPCL. Specifically, the question before the court is whether the statutory definition of "employer," as a matter of law, can include an individual like Mr. Lent, with supervisory job responsibilities as described above, such that Mr. Lent may be personally liable to plaintiff for wages owed to Mr. Watkins. For the reasons outlined below, the court finds that, as a matter of law, Mr. Lent does not fall within the definition of "employer." Accordingly, Defendant Lent is entitled to summary judgment on Count I of the Complaint.

1. Statutory Interpretation

It is well-settled that the starting point for statutory interpretation is to examine the plain meaning of the words of the statute. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980); see also Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Md. v. Director of Finance for Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567, 578, 683 A.2d 512, 517 (1996) (the inquiry into plain meaning ends "when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their commonly understood meaning"). When applying the plain meaning rule, the court must consider the context surrounding the statute, including related statutes, legislative history and other evidence bearing on legislative purpose. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997) ("The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole."); see also Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987) ("[T]he `meaning of the plainest language' is controlled by the context in which it appears.").⁷

In the context of the pending motion, the court must examine the plain meaning of the term "employer" to determine whether it would be possible for a factfinder to conclude that Mr. Lent was an "employer" under the MWPCL. As discussed in detail below, the court finds that neither the plain language of the statute nor the clear legislative intent supports such a conclusion. As the Court of Appeals explained, "[w]here the language is...