Watkins v. Campbell
| Decision Date | 20 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 1:16-cv-294 |
| Parties | Carl Sinatra Watkins, Petitioner, v. Sherman Campbell, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
Carl Sinatra Watkins, Carson City, MI, pro se.
This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether "it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court." Rule 4, RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; see Allen v. Perini , 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir.1970) (). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. Carson v. Burke , 178 F.3d 434, 436–37 (6th Cir.1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court concludes that the petition must be dismissed because it fails to raise a meritorious federal claim.
Petitioner is incarcerated at the Carson City Correctional Facility in Carson City, Michigan. The Saginaw County Circuit Court convicted Petitioner of one count of armed robbery, in violation of MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.529, following his plea of guilty on October 25, 2011. In exchange for Petitioner's plea, the prosecutor dismissed another count of armed robbery as well as one count of attempt to commit armed robbery. The plea agreement did not include any terms with regard to Petitioner's sentence. At the plea hearing, the court informed Petitioner that the count of armed robbery carried a potential maximum sentence of life imprisonment. (ECF No. 2–1, PageID.22–23.) Petitioner informed the court that no person had made any promises to him to induce him to plead guilty other than what had been stated on the record. (ECF No. 2–1, PageID.23.) Petitioner also informed the court that no person had told Petitioner that his sentence would be lighter than what had been stated on the record. (ECF No. 2–1, PageID.23–24.)
On December 21, 2011, the court sentenced Petitioner to a minimum of eight years and a maximum of twelve years' incarceration. The pre-sentence investigation report referenced a prior felony conviction for robbery from the State of Georgia. The inclusion of that conviction had a significant impact on the scoring for Petitioner's minimum sentencing guidelines range.
Petitioner's counsel informed the sentencing judge that the Georgia conviction increased Petitioner's minimum sentencing range by more than five years at the low end of the range and by as much as eight years at the high end of the minimum range. (Sentencing Transcript, ECF No. 2–1, PageID.88.) Petitioner's counsel argued that the Georgia conviction should be disregarded because the Georgia State Board of Pardons and Paroles had pardoned Petitioner on January 16, 2008. (Pardon, ECF 2–1, PageID.68.)
The court reviewed the pardon supplied by Petitioner's counsel and concluded that, by its terms, it appeared to be similar in nature to an expungement under Michigan law. (ECF No. 2–1, PageID.89–90.) Based upon that conclusion, the court considered the Georgia conviction when it computed the minimum range under the sentencing guidelines. (Id. ) The minimum range was 81 to 135 months. (Id. at PageID.94.)
At sentencing, Petitioner was permitted to address the court directly. Petitioner noted that he had fully cooperated with the prosecutor and that he accepted the plea agreement with the understanding that the minimum would be two years and three months. (ECF No. 2–1, PageID.91.) The prosecutor noted that there had been no agreement with respect to sentencing. (Id. at PageID.92.) Petitioner's counsel concurred and explained that Petitioner was referencing counsel's calculation of the minimum range if the Georgia conviction were not considered. (Id. ) Petitioner's minimum sentence of eight years fell within the minimum guideline range taking into account the Georgia conviction. (Id. at PageID.94.)
Petitioner sought leave to appeal his conviction and sentence to the Michigan Court of Appeals raising two issues: (1) whether trial counsel was ineffective in his representation by not stating on the record what the calculations would be if the Georgia pardon were taken into consideration as he had discussed with Petitioner prior to the plea; and (2) whether the trial court erred in not allowing the Georgia pardon to be considered in the scoring of the guidelines and setting the sentencing guidelines at 81 to 135 months. (ECF No. 2–1, PageID.102.) On May 3, 2013, the court of appeals denied the application for leave to appeal for lack of merit in the grounds presented. (Id. at PageID.57.)
Petitioner applied for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court raising, presumably, the same issues he had raised in the Michigan Court of Appeals.1 The supreme court denied the application initially on September 3, 2013, and then upon reconsideration on November 25, 2013.
Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment under MICH. CT. R. 6.500 et seq. in the Saginaw County Circuit Court. In his motion, Petitioner raised the overarching concern that his appellate counsel had provided ineffective assistance because counsel had failed to raise six issues:
(ECF No. 2–1, PageID.120,127.) On April 21, 2014, the court denied Petitioner's motion concluding that Petitioner had "not shown that the result of his case would have been different, and therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise these issues." (ECF No. 2–1, PageID.60.) The court also rejected Petitioner's underlying issues of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. (Id. )
Petitioner sought leave to appeal the Saginaw County Circuit Court's decision to the Michigan Court of Appeals. The court of appeals denied leave on December 11, 2014. (ECF No. 2–1, PageID.61.) Petitioner then turned to the Michigan Supreme Court; but that court denied leave to appeal on November 24, 2015. (ECF No. 2–1, PageID.62.)
On March 22, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petition raises the two issues raised in the direct appeal of Petitioner's conviction and sentence as well as the six issues raised in his Rule 6.500 motion.2
This action is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, PUB. L. 104–132, 110 STAT. 1214 (AEDPA). See Penry v. Johnson , 532 U.S. 782, 792, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001). The AEDPA "prevents federal habeas ‘retrials' " and ensures that state court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under the law. Bell v. Cone , 535 U.S. 685, 693–94, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002). The AEDPA has "drastically changed" the nature of habeas review. Bailey v. Mitchell , 271 F.3d 652, 655 (6th Cir.2001). An application for writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person who is incarcerated pursuant to a state conviction cannot be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication: "(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This standard is "intentionally difficult to meet." Woods v. Donald , 575 U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1372, 1376, 191 L.Ed.2d 464 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).
A federal habeas court may issue the writ under the "contrary to" clause if the state court applies a rule different from the governing law set forth in the Supreme Court's cases, or if it decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has done on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Bell , 535 U.S. at 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843 (citing Williams , 529 U.S. at 405–06, 120 S.Ct. 1495 ). "To satisfy this high bar, a habeas petitioner is required to ‘show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’ " Woods , 135 S.Ct. at 1376 (quoting Harrington v. Richter , 562 U.S. 86, 103, 131 S.Ct. 770, 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011) ). In other words, "[w]here the precise contours of the right remain unclear, state courts enjoy broad discretion in their adjudication of a prisoner's claims." White v. Woodall , 572 U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1705, 188 L.Ed.2d 698 (2014) (quotations marks omitted). The court may grant relief under the "unreasonable application" clause "if the state court correctly identifies the governing legal principle from our decisions but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular...case." Williams , 529 U.S. at 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495. A federal habeas court may not find a state...
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