Watkins v. Chicago Housing Authority, 16678.

• Decision Date: 05 February 1969
• Docket Number: No. 16678.,16678.
• Citation: 406 F.2d 1234
• Parties: Lorine WATKINS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

406 F.2d 1234 (1969)

Lorine WATKINS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 16678.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

February 5, 1969.

Marshall Patner, Margaret Ewing, Alfred R. Lipton, Gordon H. S. Scott, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Kathryn M. Kula, Calvin H. Hall, Louis I. Gordon, Chicago, Ill., for defendant-appellee.

Before CASTLE, Chief Judge, MAJOR, Senior Circuit Judge, and SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judge.^*

MAJOR, Senior Circuit Judge.

This is an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief brought under 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983, and 28 U.S. C.A. Secs. 1343(3) and 2201. The named plaintiffs, twenty-three in number, sued in a representative capacity on behalf of a class of approximately 32,000 families and 140,000 persons, all tenants of The Chicago Housing Authority, a municipal corporation created in conformity with the laws of Illinois (Ill. Rev.Stats.1965, Ch. 67½, Secs. 2, 3 and 8), and financed in part by the Federal government. The appeal comes from orders of the trial court dismissing the complaint on the ground that the issues presented had become moot and denying plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment.

The complaint challenged the constitutionality of two clauses in The Chicago Housing Authority's standard lease which gave the Authority the power to evict public housing tenants at any time merely by giving fifteen days' notice cancelling their lease. The clauses under attack are:

"After the original term of one month specified herein, this lease shall automatically be renewed for successive terms of one calendar month, until terminated by either party hereto by giving to the other party at least fifteen (15) days\' written notice of such termination."

"Termination of this lease shall be by either party hereto giving to the other party hereto at least fifteen days\' written notice of such termination. The exercise by either party of this power to terminate is unqualified and unrestricted, nor need any reasons be given therefor."

The Authority contends that by virtue of these clauses it may evict its tenants without giving notice of the cause, if any, for eviction and without permitting the tenant a hearing in which that cause, or lack of it, may be disputed. Plaintiffs contend that the clauses confer upon the Authority arbitrary power by which they and all other tenants were denied due process and equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amendment.

The complaint alleged:

"The individual plaintiffs each are tenants of the Robert Taylor Homes who have actions for eviction currently pending against them in the Municipal Division of the Circuit Court of Cook County, and who bring this action on behalf of themselves, all other tenants with similar actions pending against them, and on behalf of all tenants of the Chicago Housing Authority."

The Authority moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction and failed to state a legal claim. In support of its motion, the Authority took the position that the clauses of the lease in dispute were constitutional and binding upon the parties. Consistent therewith, it claimed that it was legally entitled to evict its tenants on fifteen days' notice, with or without cause. At the time the suit was commenced, all named plaintiffs had been served with eviction notices and sued by the Authority in a State court. During the pendency of such suits, the Authority abandoned enforcement of its State court judgments against the named plaintiffs, and reinstated them as tenants. When this stipulation was called to its attention, the court dismissed the complaint upon the basis of mootness.

The contested issues as stated in plaintiffs' brief are:

"Was a class suit for declaratory judgment and an injunction against the `no-cause\' eviction clauses in a public housing authority\'s lease mooted by the Authority\'s abandonment of individual state court eviction suits brought against the named class representatives?"

"Does the due process clause of the 14th Amendment permit a public housing authority created as a state agency and partly supported by federal funds to evict its tenants without cause or without giving notice of the cause and the opportunity to rebut it in a due process hearing?"

Inasmuch as we conclude that the case was properly dismissed on the ground of mootness, we need go no further than to consider the situation as it pertains to that issue.

The Federal Declaratory Judgments Act, Title 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2201, confers upon the district court the authority to grant certain relief only in a case of "actual controversy." Assuming that there was such a controversy between the twenty-three named plaintiffs and the Authority at the time the suit was filed, it was based on the premise that there was pending in the State court suits brought by the Authority for possession of the premises which plaintiffs occupied. When these suits were settled and all plaintiffs were restored to their original status, we think any controversy between the parties was extinguished. Such being the situation, it seems plain to us that the named plaintiffs were no longer entitled to maintain the action on their behalf. However, plaintiffs appear to argue on brief that they were still in a position to pursue their suit on behalf of all other tenants similarly situated.

It must be a novel theory, at least one to which we do not subscribe, that named plaintiffs without the right to further represent themselves can continue to represent unnamed parties allegedly in a similar situation.

Plaintiffs, with great confidence, cite a number of cases in support of their contention that an actual controversy existed between them and the Authority at the time the action was dismissed. Aetna Life Insurance Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 57 S.Ct. 461, 81 L.Ed. 617; Stephenson v. Stephenson, 249 F.2d 203 (CA-7); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co., 372 F.2d 435 (CA-7); Yellow Cab Co. v. City of Chicago, 186 F.2d 946 (CA-7), and American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Howard, 173 F.2d 924 (CA-4).

There is little, if any, dispute as to the rule to be applied in determining when an action for declaratory relief is appropriate. The difficulty arises in applying the rule to the particular facts of a case. A review in detail of the cases relied upon by plaintiffs would unduly prolong this opinion, but we shall discuss them in brief form.

In Aetna, the rule is stated in headnote 3 (300 U.S. page 227, 57 S.Ct. page 461):

"A controversy, in the constitutional sense and in the sense of the Declaratory Judgment Act, must be justiciable — it must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relation of parties having adverse legal interests — it must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a conclusive decree, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical statement of facts."

In that case the holder of insurance policies made demand upon the insurer for the payment of certain benefits, which the insurer denied. The dispute involved a construction of the policies, and the court held...