Watkins v. Chirrick
| Decision Date | 14 October 1974 |
| Citation | 19 Or.App. 241,526 P.2d 1399 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the Adoption of Darci Joanne Cooper, a minor. Janice WATKINS, Appellant, v. Gerald G. CHIRRICK and Betty M. Chirrick, Respondents. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Charles O. Porter, Eugene, argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant.
Leslie M. Swanson, Jr., Eugene, argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Arthur C. Johnson, John B. Arnold and Johnson, Johnson & Harrang, Eugene.
Before SCHWAB, C.J., and FOLEY and FORT, JJ.
This is an appeal from an order dismissing with prejudice a petition filed by the petitioner-natural mother to vacate the decree of adoption of her child by respondent-adoptive parents. The dismissal followed an order sustaining respondents' demurrer to the petition. Petitioner asserts that consent to the adoption of her baby was not freely and intelligently given and that such consent was necessary as a jurisdictional prerequisite for a valid decree of adoption. Petitioner further asserts that she has standing to petition to vacate the decree of adoption because the legislature cannot, consistent with due process of law, enact a statute of limitations which will bar petitioner from challenging the adoption decree as void for want of jurisdiction.
ORS 109.381 is the primary statute in question. It reads as follows:
'(1) A decree of a court of this state granting an adoption, and the proceedings in such adoption matter, shall in all respects be entitled to the same presumptions and be as conclusive as if rendered by a court of record acting in all respects as a court of general jurisdiction and not by a court of special or inferior jurisdiction, and jurisdiction over the persons and the cause shall be presumed to exist.
'(3) After the expiration of one year from the entry of a decree of adoption in this state the validity of the adoption shall be binding on all persons, and it shall be conclusively presumed that the child's natural parents and all other persons who might claim to have any right to, or over the child, have abandoned him and consented to the entry of such decree of adoption, and that the child became the lawful child of the adoptive parents or parent at the time when the decree of adoption was rendered; all irrespective of jurisdictional or other defects in the adoption proceeding; after the expiration of such one-year period no one may question the validity of the adoption for any reason, either through collateral or direct proceedings, and all persons shall be bound thereby; provided, however, the provisions of this subsection shall not affect such right of appeal from a decree of adoption as may be provided by law.
We turn to the complaint. For purposes of appeal, a demurrer admits all facts that are well pleaded. Kendall v. Curl et al., 222 Or. 329, 353 P.2d 227 (1960); Turrini v. Gulick, 16 Or.App. 167, 517 P.2d 1230, Sup.Ct. review denied (1974).
Reading the complaint in the light most favorable to petitioner the following facts are alleged:
Petitioner is the mother of the minor child involved herein and has never been married. The father of the infant is unknown. On July 11, 1971, the date the child was born, petitioner was 16 years old. On August 21, 1972, the date petitioner signed a consent to adoption, petitioner was 17 years of age. The adoption decree was entered on November 13, 1972, almost three months later. Petitioner's complaint was filed on January 28, 1974, at which time petitioner stated that she was 19 years old. We therefore infer that by January 28, 1973, she was 18 years old.
Petitioner alleges that on August 21, the day she signed the consent for...
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Hogue v. Olympic Bank
...urges us to affirm that decision, relying mainly on Hughes v. Aetna Casualty Co., supra. Appellant argues that Watkins v. Chirrick, 19 Or.App. 241, 526 P.2d 1399 (1974), controls and that Hughes is In Watkins, the petitioner appealed from an order dismissing her petition to vacate the adopt......
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1997 -NMCA- 94, Drummond, Matter of
... ... not render decree void; a judgment is void only if there is a lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction, or a denial of due process); Watkins v. Chirrick, 19 Or.App. 241, 526 P.2d 1399, 1401 (1974) (even if facts show that consent was not voluntary, one-year statute of limitations was not ... ...
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Wimber v. Timpe
... ... See Watkins v. Chirrick, 19 Or.App. 241, 245, 526 P.2d 1399 (1974). If we were to apply the tolling provisions here, it would expose birth parents, adoptive ... ...
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Campbell v. Kindred
... ... The welfare of the child is the dominating reason for the statute. See Watkins v. Chirrick, 19 Or.App. 241, 245, 526 P.2d 1399 (1974), and particularly the discussion of a similar statute in Walter v. August, 186 Cal.App.2d 395, ... ...
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§19.6 Revocation of Consent and Attack On Judgment
...76 Or App 17, 708 P2d 605 (1985), rev den, 300 Or 545 (1986); Watkins v. Chirrick (In re Adoption of Cooper), 19 Or App 241, 245-26, 526 P2d 1399 (1974). The application of ORS 109.381(3) to a legal father in a stepparent adoption was held to be unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause......