Watkins v. Green

• Decision Date: 25 September 1894
• Citation: 101 Mich. 493,60 N.W. 44
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: WATKINS v. GREEN.

60 N.W. 44

101 Mich. 493

WATKINS v. GREEN.

Supreme Court of Michigan

September 25, 1894

Error to circuit court, Wayne county; George S. Hosmer, Judge.

Action by Gilbert Watkins against Nelson Green for breach of covenant of warranty. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Reversed. George W. Radford (Edward A. Barnes, of counsel), for appellant.

Jay Fuller, for appellee.

GRANT J. (after stating the facts).

Meyers, at the time of the purchase of his one-ninth interest from Edward L'Esperance, was not in possession, nor did he take possession either under that deed or his tax deeds. He occupied no relation of trust or confidence towards the widow and the heirs. He was therefore under no obligation to pay their taxes, or to buy up outstanding interests or titles for their benefit. Hanley went into possession under his warranty deed from Meyers claiming the entire title, and under a deed which purported to convey the entire and absolute fee. It cannot be said that he accepted this deed charged with any duty to protect the life estate, or the undivided interests of any of the tenants in common. Hanley's possession at once became open notorious, hostile, and exclusive to all claiming any interest in the land. That possession continued in Hanley and his grantees for nearly 40 years, and more than 20 years after the minor children became of age. It is established in this state that one who purchases an undivided interest in lands, and enters as a stranger to the rights of his cotenant, is not estopped from setting up against them an adverse title that originated before his purchase. Blackwood v. Van Vleit, 30 Mich. 118; Campau v. Dubois, 39 Mich. 274; Sands v. Davis, 40 Mich. 14.

Such entry operated as an ouster of all those having an interest in the land and the right of entry. The widow was then entitled to the possession of one-third by virtue of her one-third ownership, and to the possession and enjoyment of the other two-thirds by virtue of her life estate. Clearly, therefore, her acts, and those of her grantee of these two interests, were lost by adverse possession, and the title vested in the defendant.

When Ball purchased the interest of the widow and one of the children, and the tax titles for the taxes of 1851 and 1852 which were then outstanding, all these titles became merged in him. He was then entitled to possession, as against Hanley. The right of entry became complete, and the statute of limitations began to run. By the deed from Ball to White, dated in 1856, and from White to Boltwood, in 1857, Boltwood...