Watkins v. Haynes, CV 212-050
| Decision Date | 27 March 2013 |
| Docket Number | CV 212-050 |
| Parties | ERIC WATKINS, Plaintiff, v. ANTHONY HAYNES, RAYMOND HOLT, ROBUTA M. TRUMAN, and HARRELL WATTS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia |
Presently before the Court are the parties' Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. See Dkt. Nos. 34, 37. After careful consideration and an independent and de novo review of the record, the Court ADOPTS IN PART the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. See Dkt. No. 32. Defendants' Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 37) are SUSTAINED IN PART, and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 23) is GRANTED.
This action is predicated on the alleged violation of Plaintiff's First and Fifth Amendment rights. See Dkt. No. 1. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that Defendants denied Plaintiff meals that comported with his religious beliefs while he was incarcerated at the Federal Correction Institute in Jesup, Georgia. Id. Plaintiff further contends that members of other religious faiths were provided meals that comported with their religious beliefs. Id.
Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. See Dkt. No. 23. Plaintiff responded to Defendant's motion. See Dkt. No. 28. The Magistrate Judge then reported his recommendation to deny Defendants' motion. See Dkt. No. 32. Both parties objected to the Report and Recommendation. See Dkt. Nos. 34, 37, 40. This Court conducted an independent and de novo review.
In considering a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court must "construe[] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept[] all well-pled factsalleged . . . in the complaint as true." Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1260 (11th Cir. 2009). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations" but must include enough facts to raise a right to relief above the "speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The complaint must allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" meaning that the factual content "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Speaker v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 623 F.3d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir. 2010).
"A complaint is subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b) (6) when its allegations—on their face—show that an affirmative defense bars recovery on the claim." Marsh v. Butler Cnty., Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1022 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) ().
Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, this Court liberally construes his pleadings. See Bingham v. Thomas, 654 F.3d 1171, 1175 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) .
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is predicated on two grounds: (1) Plaintiff's Complaint is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and (2) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
Defendants assert that Plaintiff's Complaint is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. See Dkt. No. 23. Plaintiff responds that, if the limitations period is properly tolled, his claim is timely. See Dkt. No. 28. The Magistrate Judge recommended that Defendants' motion be denied, reasoning that the statute of limitations was equitably tolled while Plaintiff pursued his administrative appeal. See Dkt. No. 32, at 5-6. For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's claims as untimely is DENIED.
Plaintiff's claims contest certain conditions of his confinement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Dkt. No. 1, at 3.
The statute of limitations for Bivens claims is the statute of limitations applicable to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 actions. Walker v. United States, 196 F. App'x 774, 776 (11th Cir. 2006). Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not contain a limitations period, federal courts "borrow" the applicable state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (). Plaintiff brought his claim in Georgia, where the governing limitations period for personal injury claims is two (2) years. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (); Interial v Chippi, 427 F. App'x 842, 843 (11th Cir. 2011).
A statute of limitations begins to run when a cause of action accrues. Although the applicable statute of limitations of a § 1983 action is determined by state law, "the accrual date . . . is a question of federal law that is not resolved by reference to state law." Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388; see also Mullinax v. McElhenney, 817 F.2d 711, 716 (11th Cir. 1987). Section 1983 and Bivens claims "accrue[]—and the statute of limitations begins to run—when the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights." Hafez v. Madison, 348 F. App'x 465, 467 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Walker, 196 F. App'x at 776 .
For Bivens actions, state law determines tolling of the limitations period. See Wallace, 549 U.S. at 394 ; Salas v. Pierce, 297 F. App'x 874, 877 (11th Cir. 2008) . Under Georgia law, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that the statute of limitations should be tolled. See McClure v. Raper, 463 S.E.2d 125 (Ga. 1995).
On July 24, 2001, Plaintiff was convicted by a jury for drug violations. Dkt. No. 1, at 3-4. He was sentenced to 121 months imprisonment. Id. at 4. In October of 2009, Plaintiff was transferred to Jesup Federal Correctional Institution ("Jesup FCI"). Id.
After his transfer to Jesup FCI, Plaintiff "quickly discovered" that the food provided at Jesup FCI was inconsistent with his religious dietary beliefs. Id. at 7. Plaintiff complained about the deficiencies of this food from October 2009 until his release in June 2010. Id.
Specifically, Plaintiff sought administrative remedies from the appropriate personnel at Jesup FCI. The timeline of Plaintiff's pursuit of administrative remedies is as follows: On November 8, 2009, Plaintiff initiated the administrative remedy process by submitting an administrative remedy request, BP-9, to Jesup FCI's warden. Id. at 11. On December 1, 2009, the warden responded. Id. On December 11, 2009, Plaintiff submitted an administrative appeal, BP-10, to the Regional Director's Office. Dkt. No. 23 Ex. A.1 On December 21, 2009, the regional director responded. Id. at 11-12. On January 10, 2010, Plaintiff submitted a final administrative appeal, BP-11, to the Board of Prison's Central Office. Id. at 12. On May 7, 2010, the Central Office responded. Id. Plaintiff was dissatisfied with each response to his administrative complaint. See Dkt. No. 1.
On June 7, 2012, the Bureau of Prisons released Plaintiff from custody. Id. at 4. On March 5, 2012, Plaintiff brought this action. See Dkt. No. 1.
Plaintiff alleges violations of his constitutional rights while incarcerated in Georgia at Jesup FCI. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants "willfully violate[d] Plaintiff's [First and Fifth Amendment rights] and discriminated against him when they directly and indirectly denied Plaintiff's request for a religious diet consistent with his religious dietary belief." Id. at 5.
Plaintiff's personal injury action is subject to Georgia's two-year statute of limitation. See supra Part III.A.1.a. Therefore, Plaintiff's claim is barred unless it accrued after March 5, 2010 (i.e. two (2) years prior to the filing of this suit on March 5, 2012) or was tolled such that the two-year limitations period is satisfied.
i. Knowledge of Injury's Existence and Cause
Plaintiff's cause of action accrued when the facts supporting the action were apparent. See supra Part III.A.1.b. Plaintiff and Defendant contend that the cause of action accruedin October 2009, when Plaintiff discovered that the food provided by FCI Jesup was incompatible with his religious belief. See Dkt. Nos. 28, at 3; 23, at 3-4. However, Plaintiff's claim is that Defendants—in their individual capacities2— willfully violated Plaintiff's rights "when they directly and indirectly denied Plaintiff's request for a religious diet consistent with his religious dietary belief." Dkt. No. 1, at 5. Thus, Plaintiff's claim depends upon the actions of each individual Defendant.
Accrual occurs when a plaintiff knows both the existence and the cause of an injury. See supra Part III.A.1.b; Fisher v....
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