Watkins v. Lewis, Gen. No. 51586
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
| Writing for the Court | CRAVEN; SMITH, P.J., and TRAPP |
| Citation | 237 N.E.2d 830,96 Ill.App.2d 182 |
| Parties | Frank WATKINS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. William A. LEWIS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 29 May 1968 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 51586 |
Page 830
v.
William A. LEWIS, Jr., Defendant-Appellant.
Rehearing Denied July 1, 1968.
[96 Ill.App.2d 183]
Page 831
George F. Barrett, Chicago, for defendant-appellant; Donald J. Duffy, Chicago, of counsel.Gunn, Davidson & Brantman, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellee; Edwin N. Gunn, Chicago, of counsel.
[96 Ill.App.2d 184] CRAVEN, Justice.
The plaintiff brought suit for personal injuries sustained in an automobile accident. The trial court entered summary judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant on the issue of liability. The issue of damages was tried before a jury and a verdict returned in the amount of $10,000.
The plaintiff's amended complaint alleged that while the plaintiff was stopped for a red light he was rear-ended by the defendant. The complaint set forth the following alleged acts of negligence: Following too close, excessive speed for conditions, insufficient lookout, failure to equip with adequate brakes, failure to apply brakes, failure to keep the vehicle under
Page 832
control, failure to avoid collision, and a general allegation of negligent operation. The defendant denied all material allegations in the complaint relating to the issue of liability.At the time of the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the defendant's deposition was on file. This deposition contained certain admissions of a party-opponent and admitted therein that the defendant pulled away from the curb 50 feet from the intersection where the accident occurred. At that time the plaintiff's vehicle was stopped at the intersection for a red light. The plaintiff's car was the only car stopped at the intersection and occupied the third lane of five lanes of northbound traffic. All other lanes of traffic were unoccupied. The defendant stated that he was traveling 8 to 10 mph when he first attempted to apply his brakes some 20 to 25 feet behind the plaintiff. The brakes did not work and the defendant stated his speed at the time of the impact was 8 to 10 mph.
The plaintiff then filed an affidavit swearing to the facts of the accident within his personal knowledge; that his car was rear-ended while stopped for a red light in the center lane of a highway containing two unoccupied [96 Ill.App.2d 185] lanes of traffic to his right and two unoccupied lanes of traffic to his left. These basic facts are not in dispute.
Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. The defendant then filed a counteraffidavit which raised the defense of sudden mechanical failure. The basic facts within the defendant's knowledge were alleged as follows:
'That when he applied his foot to the brake pedal it went all the way to the floor and the foot brake did not slow or stop his automobile. * * * That the brakes of the 1957 Ford station wagon had been adjusted on August 3, 1960 by J. J. Wright Motor Company, 242 West 55th Street and from that date until the time of the accident said brakes had performed normally while your affiant was operating that car. The first notice your affiant had of the failure of the brakes on the 1957 Ford station wagon to properly stop and hold the automobile was when he applied them 20--25 feet behind the rear of the vehicle stopped at the traffic light at 43rd and Indiana.'
At this point the defendant again reaffirmed that at that time he was only 20 to 25 feet behind the plaintiff and traveling at a speed of 8 to 10 mph.
The rules of law with respect to summary judgment were succinctly restated in the recent...
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Scottish & York Intern. Ins. Group/Guarantee Ins. Co. v. Comet Cas. Co., No. 1-88-3543
...743, 406 N.E.2d 946; Gagliardo v. Vodica (1978), 58 Ill.App.3d 1053, 16 Ill.Dec. 424, 374 N.E.2d 1302; Watkins v. Lewis (1968), 96 Ill.App.2d 182, 237 N.E.2d 830; Scharf v. Waters (1946), 328 Ill.App. 525, 66 N.E.2d [152 Ill.Dec. 793] Page 480 While we do not quarrel with the trial court's ......
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Williams v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co., No. 70-193
...present a genuine issue as to any [13 Ill.App.3d 600] material fact, summary judgment should not be granted. (Watkins v. Lewis, (1968), 96 Ill.App.2d 182, 237 N.E.2d 830; Morris v. Anderson, (1970), 121 Ill.App.2d 169, 259 N.E.2d 601.) If, on the other hand, the record shows there is no tri......
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Truemper v. Bowman, No. 72--224
...evidence. Plaintiffs argue that while sudden mechanical failure is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury (Watkins v. Lewis (1968), 96 Ill.App.2d 182, 186, 237 N.E.2d 830), the defense was not here supported by convicing evidence that the accident happened solely from the alleged [17 Il......
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Witzig v. Illinois Power Co., Gen. No. 11062
...v. Dean Berenz Asphalt Co., Inc., 83 Ill.App.2d 258, 227 N.E.2d 100, and also while sitting in the first district, Watkins v. Lewis, 96 Ill.App.2d 182, 237 N.E.2d 830. In each of these cases, we carefully enunciated the rules applicable and their repetition in this opinion would appear to b......
-
Scottish & York Intern. Ins. Group/Guarantee Ins. Co. v. Comet Cas. Co., No. 1-88-3543
...743, 406 N.E.2d 946; Gagliardo v. Vodica (1978), 58 Ill.App.3d 1053, 16 Ill.Dec. 424, 374 N.E.2d 1302; Watkins v. Lewis (1968), 96 Ill.App.2d 182, 237 N.E.2d 830; Scharf v. Waters (1946), 328 Ill.App. 525, 66 N.E.2d [152 Ill.Dec. 793] Page 480 While we do not quarrel with the trial court's ......
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Williams v. Chicago & E. I. R. Co., No. 70-193
...present a genuine issue as to any [13 Ill.App.3d 600] material fact, summary judgment should not be granted. (Watkins v. Lewis, (1968), 96 Ill.App.2d 182, 237 N.E.2d 830; Morris v. Anderson, (1970), 121 Ill.App.2d 169, 259 N.E.2d 601.) If, on the other hand, the record shows there is no tri......
-
Truemper v. Bowman, No. 72--224
...evidence. Plaintiffs argue that while sudden mechanical failure is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury (Watkins v. Lewis (1968), 96 Ill.App.2d 182, 186, 237 N.E.2d 830), the defense was not here supported by convicing evidence that the accident happened solely from the alleged [17 Il......
-
Witzig v. Illinois Power Co., Gen. No. 11062
...v. Dean Berenz Asphalt Co., Inc., 83 Ill.App.2d 258, 227 N.E.2d 100, and also while sitting in the first district, Watkins v. Lewis, 96 Ill.App.2d 182, 237 N.E.2d 830. In each of these cases, we carefully enunciated the rules applicable and their repetition in this opinion would appear to b......