Watkins v. Lozier

• Decision Date: 21 December 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action 20-401
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
• Parties: KENNETH WATKINS, Plaintiff, v. DAVID LOZIER, as an individual, and DWAN WALKER, in his individual and official capacity, and CITY OF ALIQUIPPA, Defendants.

KENNETH WATKINS, Plaintiff, v. DAVID LOZIER, as an individual, and DWAN WALKER, in his individual and official capacity, and CITY OF ALIQUIPPA, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-401

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

December 21, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

W Scott Hardy United States District Judge

The above-captioned matter involves alleged civil rights claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by police officer Kenneth Watkins (“Plaintiff”) against his employer, City of Aliquippa (“Aliquippa”); Dwan Walker, the Mayor of Aliquippa (“Mayor Walker”) and David Lozier, the District Attorney of Beaver County (“District Attorney Lozier”). Presently before the Court are the motions to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and briefs in support thereof, filed by District Attorney Lozier (Docket Nos. 48, 49) and by Aliquippa and Mayor Walker (Docket Nos. 50, 51), the briefs in opposition filed by Plaintiff (Docket Nos. 52, 53), and the reply filed by Aliquippa and Mayor Walker (Docket No 54). For the reasons set forth herein, District Attorney Lozier's motion is granted, and Aliquippa and Mayor Walker's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background

As alleged in the Second Amended Complaint (“Complaint”), Plaintiff is employed by the Aliquippa Police Department. (Docket No. 45, ¶ 9). Plaintiff held the position of Sergeant between approximately August 24, 2014 and December 22, 2018. (Id.). On or about December 4, 2018, Plaintiff testified as a witness in his capacity as a private citizen during a criminal preliminary hearing. (Id. ¶¶ 10, 11). At the hearing, Plaintiff invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and refused to testify. (Id. ¶ 12).

The following day, District Attorney Lozier sent a letter to Plaintiff's supervisor stating that: (1) by invoking his constitutional rights, Plaintiff called into question every criminal case he was involved in as a police officer; (2) Plaintiff cannot be called to testify in a jury trial as a law enforcement officer; (3) no case can be built upon Plaintiff's testimony in pre-trial procedures as a law enforcement officer; and (4) the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania will dismiss any and all active cases in which Plaintiff was the affiant. (Docket No. 45, ¶¶ 6, 13). As a result of this letter, Plaintiff was ordered to attend a Loudermill hearing on December 22, 2018. (Id. ¶ 16). At that hearing, Mayor Walker made statements about Plaintiff invoking his constitutional rights. (Id. ¶ 17). Also at that time, Mayor Walker, purporting to act as a decision-maker for Aliquippa, demoted Plaintiff from Sergeant to Patrolman. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 21). Plaintiff claims that he did not voluntarily accept the demotion, but that, on the advice of his union representative, he agreed to the demotion under duress after being informed that he would likely be terminated from his position if he did not do so.^[1] (Id. ¶¶ 19, 20).

On October 27, 2020, Plaintiff filed his Complaint, alleging two Counts: (1) “Violation of Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights, Specifically, § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Stigma Plus” (Plaintiff v. Aliquippa and Mayor Walker); and (2) “Violation of Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights, Specifically, § 1983 and the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, Retaliation” (Plaintiff v. all Defendants). (Docket No. 45 at 5 8). In essence, Plaintiff contends that his demotion from Sergeant to Patrolman and his inability to provide testimony in cases as well as the dismissal of the entirety of Plaintiff's active cases have discredited and/or harmed him publicly and professionally, and that such acts have falsely indicated to the public that Plaintiff engaged in wrongdoing and have damaged his reputation. (Id. ¶¶ 23-25). Defendants have filed their motions to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Their motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for decision.

II. Standard of Review

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the factual allegations contained in the complaint must be accepted as true and must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and the court must “‘determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.'” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir. 2002)); see Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 n.8 (2007). While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, ” the complaint must “‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 231 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation omitted)). Moreover, while “this standard does not require ‘detailed factual allegations, '” Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

It should be further noted, therefore, that in order to survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The Supreme Court has noted that a “claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The standard “‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary element.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Moreover, the requirement that a court accept as true all factual allegations does not extend to legal conclusions; thus, a court is “‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (internal citation omitted)).

III. Legal Analysis

A. Count I: Fourteenth Amendment, Stigma Plus, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Plaintiff v. Aliquippa and Mayor Walker)

In Count I of his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges a claim against Aliquippa and Mayor Walker for violations of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Unites States Constitution (damage to his reputation, or “Stigma Plus”) pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket No. 45, ¶¶ 2634). In his brief in opposition to Aliquippa and Mayor Walker's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff indicates that he is withdrawing his claim at Count I. (Docket No. 53 at 2 n.1). Therefore, that Count will be dismissed with prejudice.

B. Count II: Fifth Amendment, Retaliation, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Plaintiff v. All Defendants)

In Count II of his Complaint, Plaintiff seeks damages from all three Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of his constitutional rights under color of state law. (Docket No. 45, ¶¶ 35-40). Section 1983 is the “vehicle for imposing liability against anyone who, under color of state law, deprives a person of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.'” Grammer v. John J. Kane Reg'l Ctrs.-Glen Hazel, 570 F.3d 520, 525 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980), and 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he exercised a constitutionally protected right under the Fifth Amendment (i.e., his privilege against self-incrimination), that as a direct result he has been retaliated against by Defendants, and that such retaliation includes, but is not limited to, his demotion and inability to testify as a law enforcement officer. (Docket No. 45, ¶¶ 37, 38). Plaintiff contends that he has suffered injuries and damages including the violation of his Fifth Amendment rights, his demotion, irreparable damages to his reputation, and economic damages related to any and all other consequential costs. (Id. ¶ 40).^[2]

In order to state a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must adequately: (1) allege that his conduct was constitutionally protected; (2) allege that a retaliatory action occurred sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his constitutional rights; and (3) establish a causal link between his constitutionally protected conduct and the adverse action taken against him. See Proctor v. Burke, 630 F. App'x. 127, 130 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001)). If a plaintiff successfully alleges such elements, then in order to rebut that claim a defendant must show that he would have taken the adverse action regardless of the allegedly protected constitutional conduct. See id.

Aliquippa and Mayor Walker cite to Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273 (1968), in support of their argument that Plaintiff has not alleged constitutionally protected conduct here. Specifically, they contend that the Supreme Court held in Gardner that “there is no prohibition to disciplining a police officer for asserting his Fifth Amendment rights and in so doing, permanently affecting his ability thereafter from doing his job.” (Docket No. 51 at 13). Defendants further assert that Plaintiff claims that Aliquippa “violated his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination by discipling him for exercising that right, ” but that Gardner “makes...