Watkins v. Martin

• Decision Date: 17 April 1933
• Docket Number: 30519
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: WATKINS et al. v. MARTIN et al

147 So. 652

167 Miss. 343

WATKINS et al. v. MARTIN et al

No. 30519

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 17, 1933

Division A

Suggestion Of Error Overruled June 12, 1933.

Appeal from the chancery court of Lauderdale county HON. A. B. AMIS SR., Chancellor.

Suit by Mrs. D. M. Watkins and others against T. E. Martin and another. From a decree dismissing the bill, complainants appeal. Reversed and remanded.

Reversed and cause remanded.

Gilbert & Cameron, of Meridian, for appellants.

That a fiduciary relationship existed between Tom and Sam Martin, being partners, of thirty-five years' standing, as a fact and as a matter of law, has been settled by this court; that their relationship extended beyond this conventional status owing to the strong affection and trust of Sam Martin for and in his brother, Tom, is settled as a fact by the proof and intensifies the good faith required of Tom not to use any improper influence nor be guilty of any improper motive, is also settled by this court.

Ham v. Ham, 146 Miss. 161.

The transaction is not necessarily voidable, it may be valid, but a presumption of its invalidity arises which can only be overcome, if at all, by clear evidence of good faith, of full knowledge, and of independent consent and action.

2 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence (4 Ed.), sec. 957.

The burden of overcoming this presumption is on the party claiming under the conveyance, contract, or gift.

Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190; Hitt v. Terry, 92 Miss. 710, 46 So. 829.

This record reflects, we submit, an absence of any knowledge on the part of Sam Martin of his property. All the endorsements of commercial paper were by Tom; he had the custody of the time certificates; he moved the money to a new bank, took out the new certificates. Throughout the years he had done that.

But be that as it may, the vital point is did he know what he was signing? Did he know that he was pauperizing himself, if he should recover? The undisputed evidence is that he didn't read the paper he signed, neither did the subscribing witnesses that Tom brought in, nor was it read in his presence.

Tom Martin wholly failed to make any showing of independent consent and action on the part of Sam, but the record demonstrates also the utter absence of good faith on the part of the grantee or full knowledge on the part of the grantor.

Having failed to do so, then the presumption of invalidity became absolute and the instrument should have been declared void and cancelled.

Bourn v. Bourn, 140 So. 518.

D. M. Watkins, of Hattiesburg, for appellants.

We submit that the rules of this court announced in the case of Ham v. Ham, 110 So. 583, apply to transactions, gifts and such like between parties where they occupy a fiduciary relation, and applies to the case now before this court. Also it is likewise the fact in the case of Bourn v. Bourn, 140 So. 518, which case the parties appellant and appellee had been involved in a transaction wherein a fiduciary relationship existed, and the rule of this court in that case applies to the case at bar, and going back into almost ancient jurisprudence will be found in the second edition of Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence the same rule in such cases visibly applies to the one like unto the case at bar.

Wherever cases involving a fiduciary relationship between the parties litigant have gone before the courts of last resort in practically all the states of the union this wholesome rule crowned with enlightened conscience and rising to the high plane of human justice and human equity has been announced by the courts, and as the years come and go the courts of our entire country have in their decisions upon the question of fiduciary relationship between the parties, and especially where each belongs to the same household are growing deeper and stronger and broader.

Wilbourn, Miller & Wilbourn, of Meridian, for appellees.

The deed from S.W. Martin to T. E. Martin is a valid, legal and binding conveyance.

Taking the instrument by the four corners in the light of the proof, there is nothing inconsistent or contradictory in the recitals of the instrument and the facts in any legal sense, such as to indicate fraud, nor such as to preclude the finding that in point of fact the "good and sufficient consideration" referred to in the instrument included love and affection which Sam W. Martin had for his brother, T. E. Martin; and that included in the "sufficient consideration" was, also, his feeling and thought and the fact that T. E. Martin had materially aided Sam W. Martin to make the property and had taken him into business with him when he, Sam W. Martin, was a young man without means and opportunity.

Robbins v. McMillan, 26 Miss. 434; Jones v. Sherman, 56 Miss. 559; Blaylock v. Lonn, 157 Miss. 783, 128 So. 555; Blum v. Planters Bank & Trust Company, 161 Miss. 226, 135 So. 353.

A person of sound mind may execute a deed from any motive, whether it be of love, gratitude, prejudice, whim or caprice.

Burnett v. Smith, 93 Miss. 566, 47 So. 117; Baum v. Lynn, 72 Miss. 932, 18 So. 428.

A total failure of consideration for a voluntary conveyance, in the absence of fraud, is no ground for cancellation of the deed.

Dixon v. Milling, 102 Miss. 409, 59 So. 804, 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 916; Day v. Davis, 64 Miss. 253, 8 So. 203; Longmire v. Marrs, 124 Miss. 77, 86 So. 753.

The law presumes that every man is sane and honest; that all his acts are dictated by correct motives and are the result of his own independent, intelligent and unaided judgment. It also presumes that all his contracts are valid and were entered into freely and voluntarily in the exercise of an intelligent discretion. It never presumes dishonesty, mental incapacity, fraud, undue influence or other matter tending to vitiate a contract.

Wherry v. Latimer, 103 Miss. 524, 60 So. 563; Mississippi Power Company v. Sellers, 133 So. 594; Alabama, Great Southern Railroad Company v. F. A. Hulett & Son, 131 So. 814, 159. Miss. 333; Burkett v. Anderson, 133 So. 129, 160 Miss. 144; Robinson v. McShane, 140 So. 725.

The rule of law, with reference to the construction of deeds requires the court to give effect to all the instrument and every word in it as far as may be done, and taking it by the four corners and in the light of the surrounding circumstances, to construe the instrument so as to effectuate the intent of the grantor, and so as to maintain, if it can be done, its validity.

Dunn v. Stratton, 133 So. 140, 160 Miss. 1; Y. & M. V. Railroad Co. v. Lake View Traction Co., 56 So. 393, 100 Miss. 281; Owens v. Potts, 115 So. 336; Mary E. Wilson v. John B. Jourdan, 79 Miss. 133.

We submit that the instrument is a valid deed, though executed with all the formalities of a will.

Wall v. Wall, 30 Miss. 91; Sartor v. Sartor, 39 Miss. 760; Cunningham v. Davis, 62 Miss. 366; Simpson v. McGehee, 112 Miss. 344, 73 So. 55; Knight v. Knight, 97 Miss. 481, 133 So. 74. Prather v. Prather, 97 Miss. 311, 52 So. 449; Ferrara v. Russo, 102 A. 86, L. R. A. 1918B, 905.

On the general proposition of undue influence, see Woodville v. Pizzati, 119 Miss. 442, 81 So. 127; Jameson v. Jameson, 96 Miss. 288, 61 So. 230; Hitt v. Terry, 92 Miss. 671, 46 So. 821; Helm v. Shiek, 115 Miss. 726, 77 So. 820; Isom v. Cannedy, 128 Miss. 64, 88 So. 485; Barnett v. Barnett, 155 Miss. 449, 124 So. 498; Moore v. Marks, 122 Miss. 301, 84 So. 230; Seally v. Wardlaw, 123 Miss. 857, 86. So. 625; Estes v. McGehee, 133 Miss. 174, 97 So. 530; Wherry v. Latimer, 103 Miss. 524, 60 So. 542 and 653; Nebhan v. Monsour, 139 So. 166, 162 Miss. 418.

The proof shows that the two brothers were devoted to each other, and each equally trusted the other, and that neither had ever had any cause to rue the exercise of such confidence. The proof is clear that Sam W. Martin was a man of independent mind and thought and individuality, not easily influenced, but who had opinions of his own which he did not hesitate to assert. There! was no proof that T. E. Martin was the dominating personality in the association between him and Sam W. Martin.

Where a fiduciary relationship exists, the deed is not necessarily void but may be valid. The presumption of invalidity is only prima facie and may be rebutted by proof.

The learned court below heard the case, saw and observed the witnesses, heard the arguments, took the case under advisement, received and considered briefs of counsel, and then found the issues of fact in favor of appellee. We submit he was correct and should be affirmed.

Barron v. Reardon, 113 A. 283; Scott v. Hardyman, 119 So. 224; Studybaker v. Cofield, 61. S.W. 246; Huggins v. Huggins, 93 S.E. 129.

The weight which should be given to the presumption of fraud or undue influence which may arise from the relationship of the parties to a transaction varies with, the facts and circumstances.

Devlin v. Devlin, 89 S.C. 268, 272, 71 S.E. 966.

Where two persons are closely associated in the affairs of life and deeply concerned in the welfare of each other, the mere fact that one usually conforms to the will of the other is by no means conclusive proof that it is the result of undue influence.

Devlin v. Devlin, 89 S.C. 268; Ralston v. Turpin, 129 U.S. 663, 32 L.Ed. 747.

Argued orally by C. V. Gilbert, for appellant, and by R. E. Wilbourn, for appellee.

OPINION

Cook, J.

The appellants, a sister, brother, and nephew of S.W. Martin deceased, filed their bill in the chancery court of Lauderdale county against Mrs. Willie Mae Bounds, a niece, and the appellee T. E. Martin, a brother of the said S.W. Martin, seeking to cancel a deed executed by S.W. Martin to T. E. Martin on February 8, 1932, eight days before his death. The ground upon which the cancellation of the deed is sought...