Watkins v. Oaklawn Jockey Club

• Decision Date: 19 July 1950
• Docket Number: No. 14104.,14104.
• Parties: WATKINS v. OAKLAWN JOCKEY CLUB.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

183 F.2d 440 (1950)

WATKINS v. OAKLAWN JOCKEY CLUB.

No. 14104.

United States Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit

July 19, 1950.

C. Floyd Huff, Jr., Hot Springs, Ark. (John H. Lookadoo, Arkadelphia, Ark., was with him on the brief) for appellant.

William J. Smith and William H. Donham, Little Rock, Ark. (R. J. (Julian) Glover, Hot Springs, Ark., was with them on the brief) for appellees.

Before GARDNER, Chief Judge, and WOODROUGH and THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

THOMAS, Circuit Judge.

This is an action for damages for the alleged malicious false arrest and false imprisonment of plaintiff by defendants pursuant to an alleged conspiracy, thus depriving plaintiff of his rights guaranteed under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Jurisdiction of the District Court is invoked under § 1343, Title 28 U.S.C.A., and §§ 41, 43 and 47(3), Title 8 U.S.C.A.

The gist of the complaint is that pursuant to a conspiracy of defendants plaintiff was on March 12, 1949, unlawfully ejected from the racing grounds of defendant Jockey Club by defendants Brown and Fulton, acting both as agents and employees of the Jockey Club and as sheriff and deputy sheriff respectively; that such unlawful conduct constituted a false and malicious arrest and imprisonment depriving plaintiff of a liberty guaranteed to him under the Constitution of the United States, causing plaintiff great embarrassment and mental anguish and casting a stigma upon his reputation for which he demanded judgment for $25,000 actual and $25,000 punitive damages.

The case was tried to a jury. Defendants moved for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff's evidence and again at the close of all the evidence, both of which motions were overruled. The jury failed to agree; the court declared a mistrial; and defendants acting under Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., moved for judgment in accordance with their motions for a directed verdict. The motion was sustained and the complaint dismissed on the ground that there was no substantial evidence which would support a finding by the jury that defendants Brown and Fulton in ejecting plaintiff from the race track were acting under color of law. From the judgment of dismissal plaintiff appeals.

The only point presented on this appeal is the contention that the court erred in thus sustaining defendants' motion for judgment under Rule 50(b).

In ruling upon defendants' motion for judgment the trial court filed an opinion which included an analysis of the issues, findings of fact, and a comprehensive discussion of the applicable law The opinion is reported in 86 F.Supp. 1006.

The material evidentiary facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff is a white man and a member of the police force of Hot Springs, Arkansas. Defendant Oaklawn Jockey Club is an Arkansas corporation with its principal place of business at Hot Springs in Garland County, Arkansas, at which place it owns and operates a race track for racing horses. Defendant I. G. Brown is sheriff of Garland County and defendant Earl (Birdie) Fulton is his deputy.

Prior to the opening of the races in February and March, 1949, Sheriff Brown, and, through him, as agent for the Jockey Club, his deputy Fulton and certain policemen were employed and paid by the Jockey Club to police the race track during the meet. Brown instructed Fulton and the other employees that "Mr. Cella manager of the Jockey Club desired that the presence of certain individuals, including Mr. Watkins the plaintiff, be removed from the race track or stopped at the gate and that if they did not leave the track * * * to * * * notify me and not to arrest them."

Plaintiff testified that on March 12, 1949, he went to the race track with two friends. He purchased admission tickets and walked through the gate when deputy sheriff Fulton took him by the arm and stopped him, saying "You can't come in here; I have had my orders not to let you on the track." After some friendly talk Fulton led Watkins over to the gate, and he went out. He had committed no offense. He objected to going, but there was no trouble, no resistance and no force was used.

It was stipulated that "Defendant I. G. Brown was the agent of the Oaklawn Jockey Club and ejected Plaintiff Jerry H. Watkins from the premises of the Oaklawn Jockey Club under his authority as such agent and upon instructions from the Defendant Oaklawn Jockey Club." Plaintiff's specific contention is that the evidence would support a finding that Brown and Fulton were acting both as agents of the Jockey Club and in their official capacity as sheriff and deputy sheriff of Garland County, Arkansas, and, therefore, under color of state law.

And there is no dispute in respect of the applicable law. Since jurisdiction of the federal court is based upon a federal statute and the parties are residents of the same state — Arkansas — federal law and not state law controls.

Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution declares: "* * * nor shall any State deprive any person of * * * liberty * * *, without due process of law; * * *." And section 5 provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."

The applicable statute upon which jurisdiction of the federal court is based is found in 8 U.S.C.A. It reads:

"§ 43. Civil action for deprivation of rights. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or...