Watkins v. Roden Coal Co.

• Decision Date: 27 January 1921
• Docket Number: 2 Div. 744
• Parties: WATKINS v. RODEN COAL CO.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

87 So. 565

205 Ala. 367

WATKINS v. RODEN COAL CO.

2 Div. 744

Supreme Court of Alabama

January 27, 1921

Rehearing Denied Feb. 19, 1921

Appeal from Circuit Court, Bibb County; B.M. Miller, Judge.

Unlawful detainer by the Roden Coal Company against J.H. Watkins. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Frank S. White & Sons, of Birmingham, for appellant.

Percy Benners & Burr, of Birmingham, for appellee.

McCLELLAN J.

This action of unlawful detainer was instituted in a justice's court by the appellee against the appellant on August 2 1920, to recover the possession of the premises known as "House No. 521 at Marvel, Alabama." From a judgment for plaintiff (present appellee) in the justice's court the defendant appealed to the circuit court, where judgment for plaintiff was rendered, to review which this appeal is prosecuted. Appeals of a similar character are determined this day in Vinyard v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 87 So. 552, Allen v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 87 So. 562, Eddins v. Galloway Coal Co., 87 So. 557, Cleveland v. Little Cahaba Coal Co., 87 So. 567, and Johnson v. Blocton-Cahaba Coal Co., 87 So. 559. Such questions, pertinent to this appeal, as are considered and decided in one or more of those appeals, are not necessary to be treated or reconsidered on this appeal as if presented for original determination. In general outline, the evidence here is similar to that presented in the Vinyard Case.

The written lease, being signed by the party to be charged, the tenant (defendant), was valid and effectual, binding the defendant according to its effect, even if it were assumed that the landlord, lessor, did not execute it. Vinyard's Case, supra. The lease contained stipulations, clearly defined contingencies, under which the lessor might terminate the lease. The discontinuance of defendant's service to the plaintiff, either through discharge by plaintiff or the voluntary retirement from the service by the defendant, authorized the lessor (plaintiff) to re-enter the premises let and to take possession thereof "upon one day's written notice to vacate said premises." The terms of the notice pursued the terms of the lease in this respect. Obviously the intent of these provisions was to provide the means and method whereby the lessor might terminate the lessee's possessory right thereunder. The immediately succeeding provision of the lease, viz. "upon such termination of the lease," excludes any other construction thereof than that the stipulations stated contemplated the termination of the lease through the means and method actually employed; the condition to the right to terminate the lease, the lessee's right to continue in possession, in fact existing and being so established without dispute in the evidence. The notice required, as did the lease, the vacation of the premises "upon one day's notice," and in consequence of the efficient terms of the notice, pursuing the provisions of the lease, and its service on July 17, 1920, the possessory right under the lease had, of course, terminated by July 20, 1920. Other contentions made by appellant with respect to terminatory provisions in a lease of like character are decided adversely to appellant in Vinyard's Case, supra.

The undisputed evidence, admitted without objection, went to prove that the lessor's name was affixed to the notice to terminate the tenancy and to the statutory notice (Code, § 4263) by B.F. Roden, superintendent and president respectively, of the plaintiff; that he was authorized to give and sign and to have executed notices of that character; and that he (Roden) had "for a number of years" exercised such authority, he being president and superintendent of the lessor, plaintiff. Under the undisputed evidence these notices were authoritatively signed, issued, and served; and hence no question for the jury to decide arose or existed with respect to the issuance, signature, or service of these notices. The authority of Roden to do the acts indicated being proven without dispute, the doctrine summarized in the third headnote to Syndicate Ins. Co. v. Catchings, ...