Watkins v. Romine

• Decision Date: 20 May 1886
• Citation: 106 Ind. 378,7 N.E. 193
• Parties: Watkins, Adm'x, v. Romine and others.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

106 Ind. 378

7 N.E. 193

Watkins, Adm'x,

v.Romine and others.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

May 20, 1886.

Appeal from Warren circuit court.

C. V. McAdams, for appellant.

John W. Sutton, for appellees.

Elliott, J.

The heirs of Enoch S. Watkins, deceased, filed exceptions to the final report of the appellant as the administratrix of the decedent's estate. The first question presented by these exceptions is as to the allowance of $250 to the administratrix for the expense incurred in removing the body of the decedent from the cemetery in which it was first interred to another, some miles distant. We have carefully studied the evidence, and find that it sustains the judgment of the trial court setting aside the allowance which had been previously made. We think that the evidence shows that the place first chosen for the burial was a suitable one, that it was the one selected by the deceased prior to his death, and was the place which he had prepared for himself. Not only does the evidence show that, but it also shows that his first wife was buried in the cemetery where his remains were first placed, that it was the place where his children desired he should be interred, and was nearer his home than the one chosen by his second wife, the appellant. Under these circumstances we cannot say that the court erred in setting aside the allowance.

It is said by counsel that “the court here made an order on which the appellant, in her capacity as an officer of the court, had a right to rely. On the faith of this order she expended the money.” From this premise counsel concludes that, the money having been expended on the faith of the order, the allowance should not be set aside and loss cast upon the administratrix. This argument is not without force, but is specious rather then sound. The infirmity in it lies in the assumption that the facts stated in the petition were the same as those developed by the evidence, whereas they are essentially different. We regard it as too clear to require discussion that an administratrix who secures an unusual allowance cannot claim that the order making it is conclusive, unless she shows that it was made with a full and accurate knowledge of the facts. In this instance the evidence shows that the petitioner did not fully place before the court all the facts, and, as she failed to do this, she cannot justly complain that the court, when fully informed as to the facts, changed its ruling. In such cases as this, the...