Watkins v. Session
| Decision Date | 18 February 2021 |
| Docket Number | CASE NO. 19-60810-CIV-ALTMAN/Valle |
| Parties | ERIC WATKINS, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER DAVLIN SESSION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
Eric Watkins was arrested for exposing his sexual organs in a city park. He says that he did no such thing and, claiming a long litany of constitutional violations, has sued the arresting officers, their police chief, the police department, and the city they work for.1 The Defendants have moved to dismiss Watkins's Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). This Order follows.
On the morning of April 3, 2015, the Plaintiff, Eric Watkins, drove to a City of Lauderhill park, walked over to a dumpster area—which was "enclosed by shrubs as high as [his] stomach and higher"—and emptied a bottle of his urine onto the ground. SAC [ECF No. 91] ¶¶ 17-19. In doing so, Watkins says, he never displayed any part of his genitalia. Id. ¶ 20. And there were no other people in the park "as far as [he] could see." Id. ¶ 18. It wasn't until Watkins returned to his car that he saw one of the Defendants, Officer Davlin Session—who, Watkins tells us, was only then driving into the park. Id. ¶ 21.
Approximately twenty minutes after Officer Session entered the park, a second Defendant, Officer William Vogt, and a third (unnamed) officer arrived. Id. ¶ 23. Together, Officer Vogt and theunidentified officer approached Watkins. Id. Officer Vogt told Watkins that the Lauderhill Police Department had received a call that Watkins was using the park's dumpster area as a toilet and asked Watkins whether he had urinated there. Id. ¶ 23. When Watkins replied that he had merely emptied out a bottle of urine, Officer Vogt revealed that the police had been surveilling him for most of that morning. Id. ¶ 24. When pressed by Watkins, Officer Vogt admitted that the call the Police Department had received was anonymous. Id. ¶ 25. At some point in the interaction (Watkins does not say when), the officers noticed liquid on a wet piece of cardboard by the dumpster and took a sample. Id. ¶ 54.
Shortly afterwards, Officer Session joined the conversation and explained that he had seen Watkins urinate in the park, id. ¶ 26—at which point Officers Session and Vogt (together, the "Officers") arrested Watkins for violating Florida Statutes § 800.03, id. ¶ 26, which criminalizes "expos[ing] or exhibit[ing] one's sexual organs in public . . . in a vulgar or indecent manner, or [being] naked in public[.]" FLA STAT. § 800.03.
While handcuffed, Watkins insisted that no one could have seen him urinate in the park because (1) he had done no such thing and, (2) even if he had, he had been in the park alone that morning. SAC ¶ 27. Indeed, the first person Watkins saw in the park that day was Officer Session who—he maintains—only entered the park after he had disposed of his urine. Id.
Watkins alleges that his arrest is just the latest in a long-standing feud he has had with the Lauderhill Police Department. Id. ¶ 38. According to Watkins, Lauderhill's police officers consistently harass him by threatening to cite him for trespassing. Id. Watkins says that this ongoing harassment has impelled him to file several lawsuits against Lauderhill's police officers. Id. Indeed, Watkins claims that these specific Officers—Session and Vogt—have threatened and harassed him in the past. Id. And, Watkins avers, on the day of this arrest, Officer Session "reminded me that he was making goodon his threats to find a reason to arrest me." Id. ¶ 40. Watkins spent the night in jail and was released the next morning. Id. ¶ 46.
Watkins alleges that his arrest was humiliating. As he explains, "many people walking up and down the sidewalk outside the park" saw the Officers handcuff him and take him into custody. Id. ¶ 44. Watkins also says that, while he was in jail, his car was towed. Id. ¶ 43. Watkins adds that his arrest has caused him to worry about being designated as a sex offender. Id. ¶¶ 44-47. Finally, Watkins insists that, since his arrest, he has been Id. ¶ 52.
In his SAC, Watkins levies the following seven causes of action against the Officers: (1) false arrest (Count I); (2) fabricating evidence (Counts II and IV); (3) false imprisonment (Counts III and V); (4) malicious prosecution (Count VI); and (5) violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause (Count VII). The SAC also asserts that Lauderhill's Chief of Police (Constance Stanley), the Lauderhill Police Department, and the City of Lauderhill violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by failing to follow their own policies (Count VIII).
The Defendants have filed a Motion to Dismiss (the "Motion") [ECF No. 92]. In it, they urge the Court: (1) to grant the Officers qualified immunity on Counts I, III, and V, because—they say—the Officers violated no "clearly established" law, Mot. at 3-7; (2) to dismiss Counts II, IV, and VI because Watkins has failed to allege that the Officers either lacked probable cause or else acted with malice, id. at 7-10; (3) to dismiss Count VII because, they argue, the Officers had probable cause and, in any case, because the claim arises more properly under the Fourth Amendment, id. at 10-11 n.4; (4) to dismiss the Monell claim—Count VIII—because Watkins has failed to allege any City policy or custom that caused the claimed violations, id. at 11-14; and (5) to dismiss the charge against ChiefStanley (Count VIII) because Watkins has asserted no "failure to train" claim, id. at 15-16. For the reasons set out below, the Motion is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.
On a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing SEC v. ESM Grp., Inc., 835 F.2d 270, 272 (11th Cir. 1988)). Unsupported factual allegations and legal conclusions, however, receive no such deference. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) ().
"To survive a motion to dismiss [under Rule 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration added) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Pleadings must contain "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation omitted). Indeed, "only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To meet this "plausibility standard," a plaintiff must "plead[] factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678 (alteration added) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The mere possibility the defendant acted unlawfully is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss." Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian Auth., 566 U.S. 449 (2012).
When, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court must interpret the complaint liberally because pro se pleadings are held to "less stringent standards than those drafted by an attorney." Sause v. Bauer, 138 S. Ct. 2561, 2563 (2018). At the same time, the Court may not "serve as de facto counselor [] rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action." Shuler v. Ingram & Assocs., 441 F. App'x 712, 716 n.3 (11th Cir. 2011).
"Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 925 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In this way, the defense of qualified immunity "balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably." Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009).
To qualify for the immunity, a government official must show that the challenged actions were committed within the scope of his discretionary authority. See Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004) . If he can do so, "the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that qualified immunity is not appropriate." Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1194 (11th Cir. 2002).
To overcome the qualified-immunity defense, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the official deprived him of a constitutional right that was "clearly established" when the alleged offense occurred. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). This requirement "ensure[s] that before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice their conduct is unlawful." Id. at 206. "Put another way, the defendant must have fair notice of his conduct's unconstitutionality which derives from one of the following sources: (1) the obvious clarity of constitutional or statutory language; (2) broad holdings or statementsof principle in case law that are not...
To continue reading
Request your trial