Watkins v. Snider, No. CV 05-4011876 (CT 3/7/2006)
| Decision Date | 07 March 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 05-4011876,CV 05-4011876 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Terrell S. Watkins v. William A. Snider et al. Opinion No.: 92564 |
In February 2005, the plaintiff, Terrell Watkins, filed a complaint pro se against the following defendants: (1) William Snider (in his individual capacity); (2) the law offices of William Snider ("law office"); (3) Douglas Nash, retired chief of legal services for the public defender services (in his individual capacity); and (4) the State of Connecticut. On July 8, 2005, the attorney general filed a motion to dismiss on behalf of the State and Nash. (Motion #102.) On July 18, 2005, Snider and the law office filed a motion to dismiss. (Motion #103.) These motions will be discussed below.
The plaintiff is incarcerated in a Connecticut correctional institute. This dispute arises out events that unfolded during and after the appeal of his criminal conviction. William Snider was appointed special public defender for the plaintiff's case. Throughout the appeal process, the plaintiff was dissatisfied with Snider's lack of communication. The plaintiff filed a grievance complaint with the statewide grievance committee. Watkins v. Snider, grievance complaint No. 01-0885. After the grievance was filed, but before the committee held a hearing, the Appellate court affirmed the plaintiff's conviction. State v. Watkins, 72 Conn.App. 804, 806 A.2d 1072 (2002). During the hearing, the plaintiff asked Snider whether he filed a petition for certification to the Connecticut Supreme Court. Snider replied, under oath, "the petition for cert. was filed . . . I believe that it was filed with permission for it to be filed late." Watkins v. Snider, grievance complaint No. 02-0985. Thereafter, the plaintiff contacted the chief clerk of the Connecticut Supreme Court to verify that Snider, had, in fact, filed the petition for certification. He discovered that no certification was filed on his behalf. The plaintiff then filed a second grievance complaint, No. 02-0985. Snider did not respond to this grievance complaint. Snider was served with a subpoena duces tecum, commanding him to appear before the grievance committee at the second hearing. He failed to show up, and did not produce the requested documents. The committee ordered Snider presented to the Superior Court because of his false statement given under oath at the first hearing, his failure to appear and produce the subpoenaed documents at the second hearing; and other unrelated matters. The Superior Court suspended Snider from the practice of law for nine months, finding that he substantially violated his duties owed to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff was significantly harmed. The court, however, also found that Snider did not knowingly make a false statement. Statewide Grievance Committee v. Snider, Superior Court, judicial district of New Britain, Docket No. CV 040527192 (January 27, 2005, Robinson, J.).
As to the defendant Nash, the plaintiff alleges that he complained about Snider's lack of communication during the appeals process in a written letter. Nash never replied to the letter. The plaintiff then asked the chief clerk of the Supreme Court for help. The clerk purportedly forwarded the plaintiff's letter to both Nash and Snider. The plaintiff did not receive a response from this second letter.
These facts form the basis of the plaintiff's actions against all the defendants. He seeks damages for mental anguish, punitive damages, and any further relief which justice may demand.
Watkins alleges 42 U.S.C. §19831 violations, but a reading of the complaint "in a light most favorable to the plaintiff," Brookridge District Ass'n. v. Planning and Zoning Commission, 259 Conn. 607, 611, 793 A.2d 215 (2002), shows that he also alleges state common law claims. He alleges that (1) he did not have proper assistance of counsel; (2) Snider misled him; (3) Snider gave him false information under oath and committed perjury against him, and (4) Nash was negligent in his actions because Nash did not help the plaintiff and was responsible for the actions of Snider under respondeat superior. He asks this court to hear this case, invoking §1983 and Connecticut state law. A reading in a light most favorable to Watkins shows that he alleges the defendants' actions were in violation of Connecticut common law and caused him mental anguish. Therefore, this court will discuss both §1983 and Connecticut common law.
STATE OF CONNECTICUT AND DOUGLAS NASH
In this case, the plaintiff is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suing the State. It is a long recognized common law principle that the State cannot be sued without its consent. Fetterman v. University of Connecticut, 192 Conn. 539, 550, 473 A.2d 1176 (1984). Since there is no explicit consent by the State to be sued, either statutorily or through the claims commissioner, the plaintiff's common law claims against the State of Connecticut must fail. §1983.
Sovereign immunity bars §1983 cases as well. Id., 551-52. In Owen v. Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 638 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980), the United States Supreme Court stated that "[w]here the immunity claimed by the defendant was well established at common law at the time Section 1983 was enacted, and where its rationale was compatible with the purposes of the Civil Rights Act, we have construed the statute to incorporate that immunity." "The doctrine of sovereign immunity was well established at common law at the time §1983 was enacted." Fetterman v. University of Connecticut, supra, 192 Conn. 551.
Finally, "[a] state, as an entity having immunity under the eleventh amendment to the United States constitution is not a person within the meaning of §1983 and thus is not subject to suit under §1983 in either federal court or state court." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 311, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). Once again, since there is no explicit consent by the State to be sued, the motion to dismiss the §1983 claims as to the State is granted.
The plaintiff's claims against Nash, in his individual capacity, are barred by General Statutes §4-165. The statute provides, in part, that "no state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless, or malicious, caused in the discharge of his duties or within the scope of his employment." Looking at the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Nash did not reply to a letter sent by the plaintiff complaining about Snider. These facts do not illustrate wanton, reckless, or malicious conduct. In order to demonstrate such conduct, the plaintiff must allege facts that show conduct "involving an extreme departure from ordinary care." Shay v. Rossi, 253 Conn. 134, 181, 749 A.2d 1147 (2000). Nash's failure to respond to the plaintiff's letter is not tantamount to an extreme departure from ordinary care and the plaintiff does not claim such. In Paragraphs 16-18 of this complaint, the plaintiff views and alleges Nash's conduct as negligent. There are no allegations in the Complaint to suggest that Nash acted recklessly, wantonly or maliciously or that his conduct was outside the scope of his employment. Therefore, Nash cannot be personally liable pursuant to §4-165. The motion to dismiss the common law claims of the complaint against Nash is granted.
§1983
"Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability." Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981). To the extent that Watkin's claims are based on respondeat superior, they must fail.
Second, the court must determine whether there is an allegation that Nash committed a constitutional tort. Id., 326. In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), the United States Supreme court found that a general allegation of administrative negligence cannot constitute a cognizable claim under §1983. Here, Watkins alleges that Nash was negligent in failing to respond to two letters complaining about Snider. As in Rizzo, this is not a constitutional tort and the §1983 claim must be dismissed.
The plaintiff has made identical allegations against Snider and the law office. In turn, both defendants filed a consolidated motion to dismiss. As such, for purposes of this decision, the analysis with regard to Snider applies with equal force to the law office.
§1983
In Polk County v. Dodson, supra, 454 U.S. 325, the United States Supreme Court held that "a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding." The Court recognized that although the public defender is paid by the State, his allegiance is to his client and not the State. Id. at 321. When performing his duties, he does not work at the State's direction. He is independent from the State. Id.
In addition, the Court found it would be unconstitutional for the State to attempt to control the public defender. Id. "There can be no fair trial unless the accused receives the services of an effective and independent advocate." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 322.
Watkins alleges his civil rights were violated because of Snider's actions as his lawyer. Snider, in his capacity as a special public defender, could not have acted under color of state law. Therefore, all §1983 claims against him and the law office are dismissed.
The defendants argue that the plaintiff's allegations cannot make out a cause of action because Watkins is barred by General Statutes §4-165. The statutory immunity, however, is granted only to those state officials acting "within the scope of [their] employment." The statute further defines...
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