Watkins v. State

• Decision Date: 05 June 1902
• Parties: WATKINS v. STATE. [1]
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

32 So. 627

133 Ala. 88

WATKINS v. STATE. ^[1]

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 5, 1902

Appeal from city court of Mobile; O. J. Semmes, Judge.

Carter Watkins was convicted of manslaughter, and appeals. Affirmed.

Upon the arraignment of the defendant, the court ordered that 100 jurors including the regular panel be summoned to appear from which the jury was to be drawn for the trial of the defendants. The defendant moved the court to quash the venire upon the ground that Sylvester J. Russell, whose name appears upon the list of jurors served upon the defendant was not living at the time the said jury was drawn, and that therefore the order of the court requiring 100 jurors to be drawn for the trial of this cause had not been complied with. Upon the hearing of this motion, it was shown that the venire drawn to try said cause contained 100 names, one of which was the name of Sylvester J. Russell; that said Russell died after his name was put in the jury box by the jury commissioners, and that his death occurred between the time of placing his name in the jury box and the drawing of his name as a juror to serve in this case. The motion to quash was overruled, and thereupon the defendant duly excepted.

The evidence for the state tended to show that the killing of Willie Brown by the defendant, Carter Watkins, was not in self-def ense, but that Brown was killed by Watkins without provocation.

The evidence for the defendant tended to show that the killing was in self-defense. There was also evidence introduced by the defendant tending to show that he was a man of good character.

The defendant sought to lay a predicate for the introduction of secondary evidence of what Gray Kemp testified to on the preliminary trial of the defendant. For the purpose of laying a predicate one John Simmons was introduced as a witness who testified that he thought he knew where Kemp was, that the last time he saw him was at Citronelle in Mobile county, when he was leaving, and that Kemp told him he was going to work at a certain designated place in Mississippi, and was going to stay until the case was over. On cross-examination, this witness testified that he did not know whether said Kemp was a married man, or whether he intended to live in Mississippi all the time, but that he stated that he was going to stay in Mississippi until after this case was finished. That he could not swear of his own knowledge that he was in Mississippi but that he thought so, and some person told him a few days before that Kemp was in Mississippi. Upon this testimony the court refused to allow the witness, before whom the preliminary trial was had, to testify to what witness Kemp swore on the preliminary trial. And to this ruling the witness duly excepted.

The defendant requested the court to give to the jury the following written charges, and separately excepted to the court's refusal to give each of them as asked: "(1) The court charges the jury that if the defendant was reasonably without fault in bringing on the difficulty and at the time of the homicide there appeared so apparently as to lead a reasonable mind to the belief that it actually existed, a present, imperious and impending necessity in order to save himself from great bodily harm to kill the deceased, then he had the right to shoot the deceased, and the jury must acquit him on the ground of self-defense. (2) If the jury believe from the evidence that defendant did not bring on, provoke or encourage the difficulty, and that the deceased had previously made threats which had been communicated to the defendant at the time of the difficulty and the deceased advanced upon the defendant in a threatening manner and started for defendant and at the time there was to all appearance no reasonable mode of escape without increasing defendant's peril, then defendant was authorized to anticipate the deceased and shoot first, having the right to act upon the reasonable appearance of things. (3) The court charges the jury that the appearance of the danger of loss of life or of great bodily harm, which will justify one in taking human life, need not be actual or real if they are such as to create in the mind of the slayer the reasonable belief that it is necessary to strike or shoot his assailant in order to save himself from great bodily harm or loss of his own life; and acting upon this reasonable belief if he strikes or shoots and death ensues, this would not be manslaughter, but would be justifiable or excusable homicide and if you believe from all the evidence in the case now before you, that defendant shot and killed the deceased upon the well-grounded belief that it was necessary to do so in order to save himself from great bodily harm, or from death, then it is your duty to acquit the defendant. (4) A homicide committed under such circumstances surrounding the person charged therewith at the time of the fatal act as to create in his mind a reasonable belief, well founded and honestly entertained of his own present and immediate imminent peril, and of the urgent necessity to take the life of his assailant, as the only alternative of saving his own or of preventing the infliction upon his person of great bodily harm, it is homicide committed in self-defense. (5) The court charges the jury that good character may, when taken in connection with all the other evidence in the case, be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. (6) The court charges the jury that good character is a good thing to have, and when the defendant proves that he had a good character, the jury should look at this fact in connection with all the other evidence in the case, and if upon the whole evidence they do not have an abiding conviction that the defendant is guilty, they should acquit him. (7) If the prisoner has proved a good character as a man of peace, the law says that such good character may be sufficient to generate a reasonable doubt of his guilt, although no such doubt exists but for such good character. (8) Before the jury can convict the defendant they must be satisfied...