Watkins v. State

• Decision Date: 27 June 1890
• Citation: 89 Ala. 82,8 So. 134
• Parties: WATKINS v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

8 So. 134

89 Ala. 82

WATKINS v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 27, 1890

Appeal from circuit court, Lawrence county; H. C. SPEAKE, Judge.

The defendant in this case, Forrest Watkins, was indicted for the murder of James York, by shooting him with a gun, was convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to the penitentiary for life. The defendant's name, as the indictment is copied in the transcript, was spelled "Forrest Wathims," and this court decides, on inspection of the original indictment, that it was so written there. The defendant pleaded in abatement, demurred to the indictment, and objected to going to trial, on account of alleged defects in the indictment, which this court holds were without foundation in fact; and exceptions were reserved to the overruling of these several motions and objections. The indictment was returned into court on the 29th April 1890, which was Tuesday, and the trial was had on the day set for it, which was Wednesday, May 7, 1890. The minute entry showing the arraignment of the defendant, the order setting a day for the trial, etc., is without date. After reciting the arraignment, the order setting a day for the trial, etc., it proceeds thus: "And the defendant being in open court the court caused the box containing the names of the jurors of the county to be brought into the court-room, and, after having the same well shaken, the presiding judge then and there, publicly, in the presence of the defendant, drew from said box the names of 50 jurors, namely, [setting them out,] a list of which was immediately made out by the clerk of the court, and the sheriff ordered to summon said jurors to appear on said 7th day of May, 1890, the day set for the trial of the cause. It is ordered by the court, also, that the said 50 persons so drawn and ordered summoned, together with the panel of petit jurors organized for the present week of this court, shall constitute the venire from which the jury to try this case shall be selected; and it appearing that the defendant is in actual confinement," it was further ordered that the sheriff serve on him, one entire day before said 7th May, 1890, "a copy of the special jury drawn and ordered summoned to try said cause together with a copy of the jurors organized for the present week of this court, with a copy of the indictment," etc. The record does not set out a copy of the special venire nor show the sheriff's return; nor does it show the copy served on the defendant. On the trial, as the judgment entry recites, and also the bill of exceptions the defendant moved to quash the venire, "because a list of the jury served upon him was not a copy of the original venire of petit jurors organized for this week, and for the further reason that the court directed the sheriff to serve on the defendant a list of the jurors drawn and ordered summoned, together with the venire of the petit jurors organized for this week instead of directing him to serve a list of the jurors drawn and summoned; which motion the court overruled, and the defendant excepted." The evidence adduced on the trial, as appears from the bill of exceptions, showed that the homicide occurred on Sunday evening, February 9, 1890; that the deceased had been showing attention to a sister of the defendant, against the objection of her father, who told him that he must not come to the house again; that the deceased afterwards declared to several persons that he "intended to have the girl, if he could get her," and made threats against her father and brother, which threats were communicated to the defendant; and that on the said Sunday evening he rode up to the front gate of the house, while the defendant was out in the front yard, and his several sisters were on the front porch. Some of the witnesses testified that when the deceased rode up to the gate, or near it, he presented his pistol at the defendant, cursing him, and threatening to shoot him, while others testified that he kept his right hand in his pocket while cursing and threatening him. The defendant went into the house, came out again around the corner, with his shotgun in his hand, ordered the deceased to move on, or go away, and shot him as he moved slowly away, keeping his mule "squared to the road," as the witnesses expressed it, and his right hand in his pocket. Several buck-shot entered the side and back of the deceased, and the surgeon, who examined and probed the wounds, testified that he could not have been fronting his assailant. Several exceptions were reserved to the rulings on the evidence, which will be understood from the opinion. At the request of the solicitor, the court gave the following charge to the jury: "If the jury believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that James York rode up to defendant's gate, and pulled out his pistol, and pointed it at the defendant, saying, 'Damn you, I am going to kill you,' or words to that effect, and that the defendant was then in the yard, and unarmed, and that he then went into the house, and got his gun, and came back into the yard, and shot said York, then said defendant cannot invoke the doctrine of self-defense." The defendant duly excepted to this charge, and also to the refusal of the court to give the following charges, asked by him in writing: "(1) If the jury believe from the evidence that James York made threats against the defendant, they may look to these threats as a circumstance tending to show that said York, at the time he was killed by the defendant, was the aggressor. (2) The jury may look to the threats made by said York against the defendant, if there were such threats, as a circumstance which tended to show an ill feeling entertained by said York, and the jury may look to this ill feeling as a circumstance tending to show that said York was the aggressor, when he was shot by the defendant. (3) A man's house is his castle, and he is not required to retreat when attacked at his house, and if the jury believe from the evidence that James York went to the home of the defendant, at his father's house, for the purpose of bringing on the difficulty, and refused to leave when ordered or requested by the defendant to do so, and made demonstrations towards the defendant indicating an intention to bring on a difficulty, and drew his pistol, and pointed it at the defendant, and that the defendant believed from such demonstration that his life was in danger, then the defendant had the right, under the circumstances, to shoot and take the life of James York, if he honestly believed that such course was necessary in order to save his life. (4) If the jury believe from the evidence that the deceased threatened to take the life of the defendant, and afterwards came to the defendant's house, and made such demonstrations towards him as to cause reasonable apprehension that he was going to put such threats into execution, then the jury may justify the defendant in killing deceased. (5) If the jury, from all the evidence in this case, have a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, they cannot find him guilty as charged; and if they believe from the evidence that James York went to the defendant's house for the purpose of attacking him, or provoking a difficulty with him, this is a circumstance to which the jury may look to engender this doubt. (6) If the jury believe from the evidence that the deceased was trying to...