Watkins v. State

• Decision Date: 14 April 2020
• Docket Number: No. 201,201
• Parties: KENNETH LEE WATKINS v. STATE OF MARYLAND
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

KENNETH LEE WATKINS v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 201

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2019

April 14, 2020

Circuit Court for Prince George's County

Case No.: CJ181383

UNREPORTED

Leahy, Wells, Thieme, Raymond G., Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Thieme, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

Appellant, Kenneth Lee Watkins, was originally charged in the District Court of Maryland for Prince George's County with wearing, carrying or transporting a handgun in a vehicle and on his person. After requesting a jury trial, appellant's motion to suppress was denied in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. Appellant then entered a conditional plea to knowingly transporting a handgun and was sentenced to three years' incarceration, with all but 13 days suspended, to be followed by eighteen months of supervised probation. On this timely appeal, appellant asks:

Did the court err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress?

For the following reasons, we shall reverse.

BACKGROUND

On the evening of February 15, 2018, at around 8:00 p.m., Officer Luke Allen, a nine-year veteran of the Prince George's County Police Department, was on routine patrol in the 3000 block of Brinkley Road near an apartment complex. Testifying that he was familiar with the area, Officer Allen encountered a blue Dodge Ram truck backed into a parking spot in the parking lot of the complex and noticed that there was "a lot of movement inside the vehicle." By way of a brief demonstration in the well of the court, Officer Allen indicated that he stopped his cruiser "a little bit past" the truck, got out, and approached. The officer testified that, prior to stopping his cruiser, he did not activate his emergency lights or siren, or use his spotlight. Nor did he display his handgun or taser.

The truck was facing the roadway, with the engine running and its headlights off. He agreed that it was February and that it was "pretty cold" outside at the time. After the officer approached the passenger side, he encountered an unidentified female seated in the passenger seat. Appellant was later identified as the driver.

The female spontaneously rolled down her window as the officer approached and Officer Allen asked her "What are you guys up to?" The female replied "We - I live here. This is my male friend. He's just visiting." She also indicated that they were just getting ready to go into the apartment building when the officer arrived. Officer Allen testified that, as soon as she rolled down the window, he could "smell an odor of alcohol coming out the vehicle." Officer Allen shone his flashlight into the interior of the truck and saw "two plastic cups of - it looked like an alcoholic beverage in the car and there was also a half empty bottle of gin inside the vehicle."

Officer Allen agreed that, at around this time, another officer arrived on the scene, identified in the transcript simply as Officer Waters, and parked his cruiser "a little bit behind me." Asked whether that other cruiser was blocking the truck, Officer Allen testified "I don't believe so, sir, no." Officer Allen later testified that he did not believe either of the two police cruisers on the scene were parked directly in front of the appellant's truck, and he agreed that appellant would have been free to pull out of the parking spot. He explained:

We don't typically stop directly in - a vehicle or a house, sir, we don't stop directly in front of the vehicle or a house. It's sort of a safety issue, you know, in case somebody wants to do something harmless [sic] we're not in the direct line of sight. So we're typically a little ways off.

Officer Allen motioned to Officer Waters, indicating that he smelled alcohol, and according to Officer Allen, Officer Waters "shook his head like he smelled the same thing." Testifying that he had not yet asked for license and registration, Officer Allen then asked the female passenger and appellant to exit the truck. Officer Allen explained that he asked appellant out of the vehicle "[i]n order to recover the alcoholic beverage[.]" The officer testified that he was going to confirm the alcohol in the cups and to write a citation.

As Officer Allen spoke with appellant and the female outside the truck, Officer Waters retrieved the bottle of gin. Officer Waters then found a handgun inside the center console armrest of the truck. Appellant responded to this discovery by admitting the gun belonged to him, stating that "the handgun was registered to him. It was his handgun."

On cross-examination, Officer Allen agreed there were cars parked to either side of the truck, and that it was backed up into a hill or curb. And, he agreed that there was no "more road behind" the truck. He also testified that Officer Waters parked his marked cruiser behind his, and that he believed they did not block in appellant's truck. He further testified that there was about "two or three vehicles space length" between the police cruisers. He confirmed that both he and Officer Waters were in full uniform, with their guns, handguns and pepper spray on their persons. Asked to speculate if, as he was walking up to the vehicle, the truck had pulled out and drove away what he would have done, Officer Allen replied he was not sure but testified that at that point "[t]here was no crime committed, so they would have been free to leave, sir."

On redirect examination, Officer Allen testified that he smelled the odor of alcohol and saw the open container before he asked appellant to exit the truck. He further testified that he did not ask anything of appellant before he smelled the alcohol and saw the open container.

The court then asked the officer several questions, including how the vehicle was "situated." The officer replied that "[i]t appeared they had been there for a few minutes" and that it was legally parked back into a designated spot. Asked whether the keys were in the ignition, Officer Allen answered in the affirmative, stating: "It was running." He also confirmed that the unidentified female informed him that she lived in one of the nearby apartments.

After hearing this evidence, defense counsel argued that suppression was required because "the initial approach was illegal" and because "the order for Mr. Watkins to step out of the car was illegal in violation of the Fourth Amendment." Conceding that the police "weren't physically blocking the Ram in," counsel asserted that, nevertheless, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave under the circumstances. Counsel also argued that, when Officer Allen approached the truck, there was no probable cause or reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.

Defense counsel then continued that "[o]nce the officers arrive at the car, the windows were rolled down, not under order from them and they're able to see and smell what they believe to be alcohol." It was when the officer then ordered appellant out of the truck that, according to counsel, "the problems begin." Counsel then asserted that "it is not illegal to drink alcohol in a parked car[,]" and even if so, the act was only subject to citation. Because the act was not an arrestable offense, counsel continued, there was "no authority to order the person to do anything except stay where they are so they can issue them a citation. There's no reason to get them out." Counsel then argued "I think the order to get out is tantamount to an arrest because you're now ordering a person to move around in a way they wouldn't otherwise want to. It's a seizure of their person. And the - it must be made upon probable cause of some crime, and, again, there is no crime."

Defense counsel then noted that the female passenger lived in the apartment complex and told the officer they were going to go back inside. Defense counsel suggested that the vehicle was running because it was a cold evening in February. Counsel concluded by asking the court to suppress the "eventual evidence" recovered in this case, namely, the handgun.

The State responded that Pyon v. State, 222 Md. App. 412 (2015), was instructive. The State asserted that this was a "consensual encounter" or a "mere accosting" and that, under the totality of the circumstances, appellant was not seized and was free to leave when Officer Allen approached his vehicle. The State noted that Officer Allen did not block appellant's vehicle or ask for license and registration, and that, the female passenger spontaneously and voluntarily rolled down her window, at which time the officer smelled the odor of alcohol and observed open containers inside the truck. The State further countered defense counsel's suggestion that drinking inside a vehicle with the engine running was not illegal and that there was ample reason to ask the occupants to step out of the truck.

After defense counsel agreed that the Pyon case actually supported his position, the motions court denied the motion to suppress, finding as follows:

And so first, with respect to a stop, there was a vehicle in a dark - in a parking lot. Occupants were there. Officers can approach the vehicle and see if there's anyone that needs assistance, what have you.

The second is can the officer ask the individual to step out of the vehicle with the observance of an alcoholic beverage inside. In this particular case, the Court would find that the cruisers were parked in closer proximity and that based on a show of authority, that the - Mr. Watkins was not free to leave.

The difference from the last case is because it was clear that vehicle was parked and that the engine was not running, but today we have testimony under oath where now the officer said the engine was running and the keys were in the ignition.

And upon looking at 21-902 as stated by the State

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