Watkins v. Thomas, 79-2758

• Decision Date: 07 August 1980
• Docket Number: No. 79-2758,79-2758
• Citation: Watkins v. Thomas, 623 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1980)
• Parties: Ronald David WATKINS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Carl THOMAS, Sheriff of Dallas County, Texas and Mark White, Attorney General of the State of Texas, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 387

623 F.2d 387

Ronald David WATKINS, Petitioner-Appellant, v.Carl THOMAS, Sheriff of Dallas County, Texas and Mark WhiteAttorney General of the State of TexasRespondents-Appellees.

No. 79-2758.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Aug. 7, 1980.

Melvyn Carson Bruder, Dallas, Tex., for petitioner-appellant.

John H. Hagler, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dallas, Tex., for Carl Thomas.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas.

Before GODBOLD, GARZA and RANDALL, Circuit Judges.

RANDALL, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner, Ronald Watkins, appeals the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus in the district court below.Watkins was convicted in a Texas state court of felony theft.Evidence of two prior convictions, for which Watkins had received a Presidential pardon, was introduced for impeachment purposes at the guilt stage of Watkins' state trial and was introduced at the sentencing stage of that trial as evidence of a prior criminal record.The federal convictions were also used to deny him probation.Watkins contends that these uses of the pardoned federal convictions were constitutionally invalid.

Watkins' pardons were not the consequence of subsequent proof of innocence.Rather, Watkins was pardoned because he performed undercover activities in the service of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs.

Watkins contends that the use of the pardoned federal convictions was improper for impeachment purposes, as evidence of a prior criminal record at the sentencing phase, and to deny him probation.With regard to the use of the pardoned convictions for impeachment purposes, this Court said in Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d 253(5th Cir.1968):

A pardon for any other reason than subsequent proof of innocence does not obliterate the defendant's previous transgressions particularly as they may bear on his present character and veracity.Any number of reasons may lie behind the granting of an executive pardon, but the granting of a pardon does not itself indicate any defect in previous convictions.Neither does it negate any bearing that they may have on present credibility.

405 F.2d at 266.Although Gurelski concerned a pardon granted by the State of Texas, rather than a pardon granted by the President of the United States, we do not consider the distinction relevant to the case at hand.The district court found as a fact that the Presidential pardon was not based on subsequent proof...