Watley v. Doyle

• Decision Date: 06 October 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 10-3869 (SDW)
• Parties: LOUIS WATLEY, Plaintiff, v. OSCAR DOYLE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

LOUIS WATLEY, Plaintiff,

v.OSCAR DOYLE, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 10-3869 (SDW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Dated: October 6, 2011

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

Plaintiff pro se

Louis Watley

East Jersey State Prison

Rahway, NJ 07065

WIGENTON, District Judge

Plaintiff Louis Watley, a prisoner confined at East Jersey State Prison in Rahway, New Jersey, seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Based on his affidavit of indigence and the absence of three qualifying dismissals within 28 U.S.C. §1915(g), the Court will grant Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and order the Clerk of the Court to file the Complaint.

At this time, the Court must review the Complaint to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may begranted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

I. BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint, as well as other public records,¹ and are accepted as true for purposes of this review.

Plaintiff was convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, second-degree kidnapping, third-degree terroristic threats, and fourth-degree sexual contact. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of eighteen years' imprisonment. See Watley v. Mee, Civil No. 09-4358, 2010 WL 3834671 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2010).

Plaintiff alleges that a parole hearing was convened on May 18, 2006. At this hearing, Adult Panel members Oscar Doyle and Charles Jones issued a decision to deny parole to Plaintiff. That decision was affirmed by the full Parole Board on January 16, 2007. Plaintiff appealed that decision to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division. The Appellate Division vacated and remanded the decision of the Parole Board.

The first two reasons for denial cited by the Parole panel, (1) "nature of criminal recordincreasingly more serious" and (2) "prior incarcerations did not deter criminal behavior" are supported in the record. ...

The panel's third and final reason, "insufficient problem(s) resolution," is somewhat problematic. The three specific references listed under this reason - (1) "no insight," (2) "no focus on victim," and (3) "blames State for his incarceration" - are not in themselves reasons to deny parole. They may only be considered if they are used as factors in determining that there is, by a preponderance of the evidence, "a substantial likelihood that the inmate will commit a crime" if released on parole. ... "[P]unishment and "rehabilitation" may only be considered as parole factors to the extent they bear on the issue of recidivism.

We are unable to ascertain from the record before us how the three factors mentioned above were used in making the Board's determination, i.e., whether they were used properly in weighing the likelihood of another offense or improperly for some other consideration, such as whether Watley has been sufficiently punished. ...

Consequently, because it is "not clear that there was sufficient evidence and adequate findings of fact to support the denial of parole", we vacate the decision of the Board and remand for reconsideration of parole eligibility in light of this opinion. In the event the Board reaches the conclusion that there is a "substantial likelihood" that Watley will commit another crime if released on parole, we direct that the Board's decision be clearly and specifically articulated as to its factual and legal basis.

Watley v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 2008 WL 2511753, *4-*5 (N.J.Super. App.Div. June 25, 2008) (citation omitted).

Thereafter, on July 25, 2008, the same two Adult Panel members reconsidered Plaintiff's eligibility for parole on the 2006 record, and again denied parole. The full Parole Board affirmed. Plaintiff appealed and the Appellate Division affirmedthe denial of parole. See Watley v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 2010 WL 2471147 (N.J.Super. App.Div. June 16, 2010).

Here, Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that Defendants Oscar Doyle and Charles Jones violated N.J.A.C. 10A:71-1.5(b)² by participating in the remand reconsideration of the 2006 denial of parole. Plaintiff asserts that this violated his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. He asks this Court to vacate the July 25, 2008, decision and remand this matter back to the Parole Board.

II. STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL

This Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma pauperis and prisoner actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions).

In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); UnitedStates v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). The Court must "accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).

In addition, any complaint must comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." A complaint must plead facts sufficient at least to "suggest" a basis for liability. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 n.12 (3d Cir. 2004). "Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).

While a complaint ... does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief" requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation"). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... .

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted).

The Supreme Court has demonstrated the application of these general standards to a Sherman Act conspiracy claim.

In applying these general standards to a § 1 [conspiracy] claim, we hold that stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made. Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement. And, of course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and "that a recovery is very remote and unlikely." ... It makes sense to say, therefore, that an allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice. Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality. Hence, when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to make a § 1 claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action.

The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the "plain statement" possess enough heft to "sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief." A statement of parallel conduct, even conduct consciously undertaken, needs some setting suggesting the agreement necessary to make out a § 1 claim; without that further circumstance pointing toward a meeting of the minds, an account of a defendant's commercial efforts stays in neutral territory. ...

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57 (citations and footnotes omitted).

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held, in the

context of a § 1983 civil rights action, that the Twombly pleading standard applies outside the § 1 antitrust context inwhich it was decided. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) ("we decline at this point to read Twombly so narrowly as to limit its holding on plausibility to the antitrust context").

Context matters in notice pleading. Fair notice under Rule 8(a)(2) depends on the type of case -- some complaints will require at least some factual allegations to make out a "showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Indeed, taking Twombly and the Court's contemporaneous opinion in Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (2007), together, we understand the Court to instruct that a situation may arise where, at some point, the factual detail in a complaint is so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8. Put another way, in light of Twombly, Rule 8(a)(2) requires a "showing" rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief. We caution that without some factual allegation in the complaint, a

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