Watley v. Felsman

• Decision Date: 29 March 2018
• Docket Number: NO. 3:16-cv-2059,3:16-cv-2059
• Parties: JOSEPH J. WATLEY, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL FELSMAN, DANIEL NILON, AND JAMES SOHNS, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

JOSEPH J. WATLEY, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL FELSMAN, DANIEL NILON, AND JAMES SOHNS, Defendants.

NO. 3:16-cv-2059

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

March 29, 2018

(JUDGE CAPUTO)

MEMORANDUM

Presently before me are two motions: Plaintiff Joseph Watley's ("Watley") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (Doc. 28); and Defendants Michael Felsman ("Trooper Felsman"),¹ Daniel Nilon ("Trooper Nilon") and James Sohns' ("Trooper Sohns") (collectively, the "Troopers" or "Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 40). Watley seeks summary judgment on his unlawful search and seizure, malicious prosecution, and false arrest/imprisonment claims, while Defendants move for summary judgment on all claims.

I. Background

On May 11, 2016, while traveling from Indiana on his way home from purchasing a car, Watley was pulled over by Trooper Felsman. (Doc. 29 at ¶ 1.) Watley was issued three traffic citations for: (1) driving too slowly, (2) having a broken tail light, and (3) improper window tinting. (Doc. 29-2.) Each of the three citations was ultimately terminated in Watley's favor. (Doc. 29-3 at 5:21-23; 6:18-20.)

Trooper Felsman testified that he first observed Watley's speed of 48 miles per hour in a 65 mile per hour zone while he was on patrol. (Doc. 29-3 at 41:14-24.)²Next, as Watley's car passed Trooper Felsman's patrol car, Trooper Felsman testified that he observed that the tint of Watley's passenger side window was so dark he could not see the silhouette of the driver. (Doc. 29-3 at 42:1-5.) Watley testified he could see out of his windows with "no problem whatsoever." (Doc. 29-1 at 34:23-25.) Trooper Felsman pulled out to follow Watley's vehicle, at which point he testified he observed that the passenger side tail light lens was cracked, and a piece of the lens was missing. (Doc. 29-3 at 42:6-10.)³ Despite this damage, the rear light was still working. (Doc. 31, Ex. A.) After pulling Watley over, Trooper Felsman approached the front passenger side door of Watley's car and told him to put his window down. (Doc. 31, Ex. A.) Watley did not do so despite repeated instructions from Trooper Felsman. Id. Instead, Watley held up a sign on brown cardboard reading "I remain silent. No searches. I want my lawyer. Place any tickets under wiper." (Id.; Doc. 43-2.) Trooper Felsman agreed that Watley had the right to remain silent. (Doc. 29-3 at 34:25-35:5; Doc. 31, Ex. A.)

Trooper Felsman then told Watley he needed to see his license, registration and insurance card. (Doc. 31, Ex. A.) Watley did not immediately hand out the documents, and did not put down his window. (Doc. 31, Ex. A.)⁴ Trooper Felsman then radioedfor assistance. (Doc. 31, Ex. A.) While backup was arriving, Trooper Felsman continued to tell Watley to put his window down so that Trooper Felsman could see him. (Id.) Trooper Felsman also asked for Watley's license, insurance and registration. (Id.) The Dashcam Video shows Trooper Felsman saying "that's not gonna cut it," apparently in response to Watley holding the documents up for him to view through the window. (Id.; Doc. 29-3 at 44:20-45:1.) After additional Troopers arrived, Trooper Nilon approached Watley's passenger side window and told him he would need to "exhibit" the documents to the Troopers. (Doc. 31, Ex. A.) After Watley again held up the documents inside the car, Trooper Nilon said "no, not read it through a window, you are required to hand it to us or you will be taken into custody and arrested." (Id.) After approximately another minute, Watley rolled the window down about an inch and handed out the documents. (Id.; Doc. 29-1 at 42:11-20.)

After Trooper Felsman stated he was unable to positively identify Watley through his front passenger side window because of the window's tint, Trooper Scochin leaned in front of the car to identify Watley through the untinted windshield. (Id., Doc. 29-3 at 46:2-6.) Trooper Nilon then printed off the statute giving the Troopers authority to arrest and handed it through the window, which was still open only about an inch, to Watley. (Doc. 31, Ex. A.) Troopers Felsman and Nilon discussed that Watley was not responding either verbally or nonverbally to them, and that they did not believe he would respond to the citations. (Doc. 31, Ex. A.) Although the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code allows 10 days to respond to a traffic citation, Trooper Felsman relied upon 75 Pa. C.S.A. § 6304-6305 to arrest Watley and take him "forthwith" to a magistrate. (Doc. 35 at ¶ 5.) After calling Magistrate Judge Cooper's office to confirm that they could take Watley into custody, the Troopers told Watley to get out of the car or they would use force. (Doc. 31, Ex. A) Watley remained in thecar for another minute, but then got out. (Id.) Troopers Felsman and Nilon, along with an unidentified third Trooper, turned Watley to face the car and put his hands on the roof of the car before handcuffing them behind his back. (Id.) The Troopers walked Watley back to Trooper Felsman's car, where they searched his pockets and removed his car keys. (Id.; Doc. 29 at ¶¶ 7-8.) Trooper Felsman shackled Watley's legs. (Doc. 29-3 at 36:13-14.) Troopers Nilon and Scochin searched Watley's car without a warrant. (Doc. 29 at ¶ 14; Doc. 31, Ex. A.) While transporting Watley to the magistrate on duty, Trooper Felsman radioed the Troopers who were still at the scene and asked them to send a picture of the sign to his cell phone. (Doc. 31, Ex. B.)

Trooper Felsman took Watley from the scene of the arrest to the Magistrate Judge's office. (Doc. 31, Ex. B.) At the hearing, Magistrate Judge Cooper committed Watley to the Pike County jail. (Doc. 42-2 at 53:4-6.) After the hearing, Trooper Felsman transported Watley from the Magistrate Judge's office to the jail. (Id. at 44:6-8.) The next morning, Trooper Felsman transported Watley back to the Magistrate Judge's office for a hearing. (Id. at 58:11-17.) Following the hearing, Magistrate Judge Cooper signed a prisoner release directing that the summary trial be continued to a later date and releasing Watley from prison. (Doc. 43, Ex. F.) Trooper Felsman transported Watley, handcuffed, from the Magistrate Judge's office to the impounding lot. (Doc. 29-3 at 62:5-13.)

II. Legal Standard

Summary judgment shall be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "Summary judgment is appropriate when 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Wright v. Corning, 679 F.3d 101, 103 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Orsatti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995)). A fact is material if proof of its existence ornonexistence might affect the outcome of the suit under the applicable substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Where there is no material fact in dispute, the moving party need only establish that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Edelman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 83 F.3d 68, 70 (3d Cir. 1996). Where, however, there is a disputed issue of material fact, summary judgment is appropriate only if the factual dispute is not a genuine one. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248 An issue of material fact is genuine if "a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. Where there is a material fact in dispute, the moving party has the initial burden of proving that: (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact; and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Howard Hess Dental Labs., Inc. v. Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 251 (3d Cir. 2010). The moving party may present its own evidence or, where the non-moving party has the burden of proof, simply point out to the court that "the non-moving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).

"When considering whether there exist genuine issues of material fact, the court is required to examine the evidence of record in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, and resolve all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Wishkin v. Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2007). Once the moving party has satisfied its initial burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to either present affirmative evidence supporting its version of the material facts or to refute the moving party's contention that the facts entitle it to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57. The Court need not accept mere conclusory allegations, whether they are made in the complaint or a sworn statement. Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888 (1990).

"To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must show specific facts such that a reasonable jury could find in that party's favor, thereby establishing a genuine issue of fact for trial." Galli v. New Jersey MeadowlandsComm'n, 490 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). "While the evidence that the non-moving party presents may be either direct or circumstantial, and need not be as great as a preponderance, the evidence must be more than a scintilla." Id. (quoting Hugh v. Butler County Family YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005)). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, "the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.

Where cross-motions for summary judgment are filed, the summary judgment standard remains the same. Lawrence v. City of Phila., 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. 2008). When presented with cross motions for summary judgment, the Court must consider the...