Watley v. Robertson

• Decision Date: 06 October 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 10-3726 (SDW)
• Parties: LOUIS WATLEY, Plaintiff, v. NORMAN ROBERTSON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey

LOUIS WATLEY, Plaintiff,

v.NORMAN ROBERTSON, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 10-3726 (SDW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Dated: October 6, 2011

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

APPEARANCES:

Plaintiff pro se

Louis Watley

East Jersey State Prison

Lock Bag R

WIGENTON, District Judge

Plaintiff Louis Watley, a prisoner confined at East Jersey State Prison, seeks to bring this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Based on his affidavit of indigence and the absence of three qualifying dismissals within 28 U.S.C. §1915(g), the Court will grant Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and order the Clerk of the Court to file the Complaint.

At this time, the Court must review the Complaint to determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous ormalicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

I. BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations are taken from Plaintiff's Complaint, as well as other public records,¹ and are accepted as true for purposes of this review.

Plaintiff was convicted of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, second-degree kidnapping, third-degree terroristic threats, and fourth-degree sexual contact. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of eighteen years' imprisonment. See Watley v. Mee, Civil No. 09-4358, 2010 WL 3834671 (D.N.J. Sept. 24, 2010).

Plaintiff alleges that on May 31, 2007, the Adult Panel of the New Jersey State Parole Board advised him that he was required to submit to an in-depth psychological evaluation. Plaintiff alleges that many aspects of the evaluation were "redundant," as many of the questions were the same as those he had previously answered in connection with his pre-sentencingpsychological evaluation. Accordingly, Plaintiff refused to submit to the examination.

Plaintiff appeared before the Panel again on September 24, 2007, when Defendant Norman Robertson, a member of the Adult Panel, advised Plaintiff that no decision would be rendered until Plaintiff submitted to the psychological evaluation. Thereafter, Plaintiff submitted to the examination.

Plaintiff alleges that the Panel convened a new telephonic hearing on January 28, 2008. Plaintiff alleges that, at that hearing, Defendant Robertson argued with an unidentified person about Plaintiff's case, but that Plaintiff does not know the specifics of the conversation because Defendant Charles Jones, another member of the Adult Panel, advised him that the "mute" button had inadvertently been left on. Defendant Robertson informed Plaintiff that a decision would be forwarded to him in a few weeks. Instead, the psychological report was returned for additional information. Plaintiff alleges that the report "was altered to reflect the conditions specified by Defendant Robertson."

Plaintiff alleges that the hearing was reconvened on April 24, 2008, at which time he was denied parole. Plaintiff unsuccessfully appealed the denial of parole. See Watley v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 2010 WL 2471438 (N.J.Super. App.Div.June 16, 2010).² He asserts that he was not supplied with either the transcripts of the hearings or the psychological report for use in the appeal. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ellen Hale, a Deputy Attorney General representing the Parole Board in the appellate proceeding, failed to comply with a court order to provide Plaintiff with copies of the transcripts of the various hearings.

In addition to the individuals mentioned above, Plaintiff also names as a Defendant Rebecca Manning, a Hearing Officer for the Parole Board, who was empowered to take preliminary evidence and testimony prior to a matter being sent to the Adult Panel.

Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment that the requirement that he submit to a psychological examination deprived him of due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; that the refusal to disclose the report of the psychological examination, allegedly confidential under N.J.A.C. 10A:71-2.1,³ deprived him of due process in violation of theFourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and that Defendant Hale's failure to provide the transcripts in connection with the appeal deprived Plaintiff of equal protection and due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief ordering the defendants to provide him a copy of the report of the psychological examination, to provide him with the transcripts of the various hearings, and to vacate the April 24, 2008, decision and remand the matter to the Board for further consideration.

II. STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL

This Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain in forma pauperis and prisoner actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (in forma pauperis actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from a governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions).

In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); UnitedStates v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). The Court must "accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).

In addition, any complaint must comply with the pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Rule 8(a)(2) requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." A complaint must plead facts sufficient at least to "suggest" a basis for liability. Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 n.12 (3d Cir. 2004). "Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (citations omitted).

While a complaint ... does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the "grounds" of his "entitle[ment] to relief" requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do, see Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation"). Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level ... .

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted).

The Supreme Court has demonstrated the application of these general standards to a Sherman Act conspiracy claim.

In applying these general standards to a § 1 [conspiracy] claim, we hold that stating such a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was made. Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement. And, of course, a well-pleaded complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable, and "that a recovery is very remote and unlikely." ... It makes sense to say, therefore, that an allegation of parallel conduct and a bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice. Without more, parallel conduct does not suggest conspiracy, and a conclusory allegation of agreement at some unidentified point does not supply facts adequate to show illegality. Hence, when allegations of parallel conduct are set out in order to make a § 1 claim, they must be placed in a context that raises a suggestion of a preceding agreement, not merely parallel conduct that could just as well be independent action.

The need at the pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent with) agreement reflects the threshold requirement of Rule 8(a)(2) that the "plain statement" possess enough heft to "sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief." A statement of parallel conduct, even conduct consciously undertaken, needs some setting suggesting the agreement necessary to make out a § 1 claim; without that further circumstance pointing toward a meeting of the minds, an account of a defendant's commercial efforts stays in neutral territory. ...

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57 (citations and footnotes omitted).

The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held, in the context of a § 1983 civil rights action, that the Twombly pleading standard applies outside the § 1 antitrust context inwhich it was decided. See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) ("we decline at this point to read Twombly so narrowly as to limit its holding on plausibility to the antitrust context").

Context matters in notice pleading. Fair notice under Rule 8(a)(2) depends on the type of case -- some complaints will require at least some factual allegations to make out a "showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Indeed, taking Twombly and the Court's contemporaneous opinion in Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (2007), together, we understand the Court to instruct that a situation may arise where, at some point, the factual detail in a complaint is so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule

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