Watlington v. Reigel

Decision Date18 May 2016
Docket NumberNo. 1:15-CV-02120,1:15-CV-02120
PartiesDAVID WATLINGTON, Plaintiff v. J. REIGEL, et al., Defendants
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

(Judge Kane)

MEMORANDUM
Background

On November 4, 2015, Plaintiff David Watlington, an inmate incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution at Schuylkill, Minersville, Pennsylvania ("FCI-Schuylkill"), filed a complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1977).1 (Doc. No. 1.) Along with his complaint, Watlington submitted a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. (Doc. No. 2.)

Watlington names as Defendants four employees at FCI-Schuylkill: (1) J. Reigel, an employee of the EducationDepartment; (2) J. Mika, an employee of the Education Department; (3) Counselor Ginger;2 and (4) Warden Perdue. (Doc. No. 1, at 1-2.)

The gist of Watlington's seven-page, typewritten complaint is his allegation of "racial gerrymandering." He alleges that on July 22, 2015 he was charged in an incident report with Bureau of Prisons' prohibited act 305, possessing legal materials of another inmate.3 Watlington claims the materials were discovered during a search of his cell that was conducted when he was in the law library or education department. Watlington claims that the Defendants conspired to retaliate against him for engaging in legal work and assisting other inmates and that the complaint was motivated by racial bias. Watlington gives no details regarding the disposition of the incident report. Watlington also claims that he has been subjected to verbal abuse and harassment by Defendants for "the least minor fractions" (sic). Watlington alleges no facts to support personal involvement of Warden Perdue in these events.4 Watlington doesnot allege that the Defendants retaliated against him for filing civil complaints or grievances relating to prison conditions.

As relief, Watlington requests (1) the issuance of a declaratory judgment against all of the Defendants finding that they conspired against him; (2) the issuance of an injunction against Defendants, including that Defendants Mika and Ginger "stay 10 feet from" him; and (3) compensatory and punitive damages totaling $280,000.00.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (the "PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (April 26, 1996) permits prisoners to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, e.g., but requires payment of the full filing fee in non-habeas cases and requires the court to screen prisoner complaints.5

When considering a complaint accompanied by a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, a district court may rule that process should not be issued if the complaint is malicious, presents an indisputably meritless legal theory, or is predicated on clearly baseless factual contentions. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,327-28 (1989); Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989). Indisputably meritless legal theories are those "in which either it is readily apparent that the plaintiff's complaint lacks an arguable basis in law or that the defendants are clearly entitled to immunity from suit . . . ." Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1990) (quoting Sultenfuss v. Snow, 894 F.2d 1277, 1278 (11th Cir. 1990)). The Supreme Court has recognized that "a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible . . . ." Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992); see also Roman, 904 F.2d at 194 (baseless factual contentions describe scenarios clearly removed from reality). The Third Circuit added that "the plain meaning of 'frivolous' authorizes the dismissal of in forma pauperis claims that . . . are of little or no weight, value, or importance, not worthy of serious consideration, or trivial." Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080, 1083 (3d Cir. 1995).

A complaint may also be dismissed under the screening provision of the PLRA if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.2009) (quoting Phillipsv. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir.2008)). While a complaint need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim," Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and detailed factual allegations are not required, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), a complaint must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955 at 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___U.S.___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. at 1965.) "[L]abels and conclusions" are not enough, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1964-65, and a court "'is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'" Id., 127 S.Ct. at 1965 (quoted case omitted).

In resolving the issue of whether a complaint states a viable claim, we thus "conduct a two-part analysis." Fowler, supra, 578 F.3d at 210. First, we separate the factual elements from the legal elements and disregard the legal conclusions. Id. at 210-11. Second, we "determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "'plausible claim for relief.'" Id. at 211 (quoted case omitted).

For the reasons outlined below, Watlington's motion to proceed in forma pampers will be construed as a motion to proceedwithout full prepayment of the filing fee and granted, and the complaint will be dismissed.

Discussion

To state a claim under Bivens, Plaintiff must satisfy three requirements; he must: (1) assert that a constitutionally protected right has been violated; (2) state a cause of action sufficient to invoke the general federal question jurisdiction of the district court; and (3) demonstrate why money damages are the appropriate form of relief. See Muhammad v. Carlson, 739 F.2d 122, 123-4 (3d Cir. 1984).

A defendant's conduct must have a close causal connection to a plaintiff's injury in order for liability under Bivens to attach. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980). A prerequisite for a viable civil rights claim is that a defendant directed, or knew of and acquiesced in, the deprivation of a plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Monell v. Department of Social Serv. of the City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 694-95 (1978); Gay v. Petsock, 917 F.2d 768, 771 (3d Cir. 1990); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988).

A plaintiff must allege that each named defendant was personally involved in the events or occurrences that underlie the claim. See Atkinson v. Taylor, 316 F.3d 257 (3d Cir. 2003), (citations omitted). Liability may not be imposed under Section 1983 on the principle of respondeat superior. Capone v. Marinelli, 868 F.2d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Hampton v.Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077, 1082 (3d Cir. 1976)). Rather, "supervisory personnel are only liable for the § 1983 violations of their subordinates if they knew of, participated in or acquiesced in such conduct." Id. at 106 n.7.

There are no allegations in Plaintiff's complaint from which it can be concluded that the Warden was involved in any incidents which violated Watlington's civil rights. There is no basis to conclude that he knew of, participated in or acquiesced in any unlawful conduct. Consequently, the claims against the Warden will be dismissed.

Plaintiff's conspiracy claim against the other Defendants is also defective. In order to set forth a cognizable conspiracy claim, a plaintiff cannot rely on broad or conclusory allegations. D.R. by L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1377 (3d Cir. 1992) cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993). Rather the complaint "must . . . contain supportive factual allegations." Rose, 871 F.2d at 366. Moreover, "[t]o plead conspiracy adequately, a plaintiff must set forth allegations that address the period of the conspiracy, the object of the conspiracy, and the certain actions of the alleged conspirators taken to achieve that purpose." Shearin v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F.2d 1162, 1166 (3d Cir. 1989).

The essence of a conspiracy is an agreement or concerted action between individuals. See D.R. by L.R., 972 F.2d at 1377; Durre, 869 F.2d at 545. Consequently, a plaintiff must allegewith particularity and present material facts which show that the purported conspirators reached some understanding or agreement or plotted, planned and conspired together to deprive plaintiff of a protected federal right. Id.; Rose, 871 F.2d at 366; Young, 926 F.2d at 1405 n.16; Chicarelli v. Plymouth Garden Apartments, 551 F. Supp. 532, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1982). Where a civil rights conspiracy is alleged there must be some specific facts in the complaint which tend to show a meeting of the minds and some type of concerted activity. Deck v. Leftridge, 771 F.2d 1168, 1170 (8th Cir. 1985). A plaintiff cannot rely on subjective suspicions and unsupported speculation. Young v. Kann, 926 F2d 1396, 1405 n.16 (3d Cir. 1991).

Viewing the complaint in the light most favorable to Watlington, it is clear that Watlington has failed to state a viable conspiracy claim against Defendants. There are no averments of fact in the complaint that reasonably suggest the presence of an agreement or concerted activity between Defendants to violate Watlington's civil rights. Watlington's vague and conclusory allegations of a...

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