Watrous v. Conor
| Decision Date | 03 April 1934 |
| Docket Number | No. 149.,149. |
| Citation | 266 Mich. 397,254 N.W. 143 |
| Parties | WATROUS v. CONOR et al. LITTLE v. SAME. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Wayne County; Sherman D. Callender, Judge.
Separate actions by Jane Watrous and by Susan Little against Arthur K. Conor and another were consolidated by stipulation providing for separate verdicts. From a judgment for each plaintiff, defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
Argued before the Entire Bench.
Frederick J. Ward, of Detroit, for appellants.
John Hal Engel, of Detroit, for appellees.
These cases were consolidated by stipulation providing for separate verdicts. Trial by jury was waived. The facts are rather sparse, but such testimony as we have is practically undisputed. Defendant Arthur C. Conor, driving his father's car, struck both plaintiffs, sisters aged 69 and 65 years, respectively, as they were crossing Washington boulevard at Grand River avenue in the city of Detroit. They had just alighted from a street car at the southwest corner and were walking towards the east to attend church about 7 o'clock on the morning of January 1, 1932. Plaintiffs' testimony shows they were within the boundaries of the south crosswalk, but defendant testified they were about opposite the third store south of the corner and that nobody was on the crosswalk. Both agree that the accident happened in the center of the westerly 50-foot traffic lane, which is separated from the easterly lane by a parkway in the center of the boulevard; that it was raining, and the ladies both had umbrellas over their heads. The visibility was such that defendant could see parked automobiles for a distance of 100 to 150 feet down the boulevard. Plaintiffs claim they looked both ways before starting to cross the street.
Defendant's testimony is to the effect that he had attended a New Year's Eve party at the Book-Cadillac Hotel, and admits that he took two drinks of wine at about 12 o'clock; that at about 3:30 in the morning he drove some friends home, and was returning to his hotel at the time the accident occurred. A friend, who could not be located at the time of trial, was with him in the car. Defendant came down Grand River avenue from the north and turned right into Washington boulevard at a speed of about 16 miles per hour. Although he testified that he could see 100 feet ahead at all times, he failed to see the pedestrians until he was right upon them. The usual allegations are presented as to the violation of ordinances regarding speed, brakes, horns, etc., but the ladies, who were struck from behind, know nothing except that they were crossing the street at a place where they had a right to cross and with the green light. There were no eyewitnesses other than the parties involved, with the exception of another sister of the plaintiffs, who was a few feet ahead of the pair and whose contribution to the solution of the problem begins with her hearing the crash.
Plaintiff Jane Watrous had a verdict for $5,000, and plaintiff Susan Little for $2,300.
We agree with appellant that the mere fact that an accident happened and that plaintiffs were injured does not prove negligence. It does not even raise a presumption of negligence. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Park, 197 Mich. 142, 163 N. W. 891;Smith v. Peets, 217 Mich. 255, 186 N. W. 397.
If defendant could see 100 feet ahead, as he testified, he should have seen the plaintiffs. Drivers of automobiles must at all times have their cars under such control that they will, when approaching a street intersection, be able to avoid endangering the safety of others, who may be lawfully upon the intersection or reasonably expected to be there, ‘and, if the defendant failed to bring his car under control upon approaching the intersection in question, he is guilty of negligence.’ Louthain v. Hesse, 234 Mich. 695, 209 N. W. 138, 139. See, also, Smarinsky v. Markowitz, 265 Mich. 412, 251 N. W. 539, as to intersections guarded by traffic lights. The disputed question as to whether plaintiffs were within the boundaries of the crosswalk at the intersection was determined by the trial judge acting as a jury, and we are reluctant to disturb his findings, which involved only the adoption of one of two conflicting versions in the testimony. Rice v. Katz, 255 Mich. 1, 237 N. W. 27;Wood v. Priborsky, 259 Mich. 556, 244 N. W. 162;Kelvinator Sales Corp. v. Whitney, 263 Mich. 133, 248 N. W. 572.
Our statement of the facts should sufficiently...
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...in personal injury cases to be disturbed. The rationale for that deference to the jury is found in the early case of Watrous v. Conor, 266 Mich. 397, 254 N.W. 143 (1934): 'There is and can be no absolute standard by which we can measure the amount of damages in personal injury cases. Indivi......
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...as related to demand for judgment--amount demanded.7 See Weil v. Longyear, 263 Mich. 22, 26, 248 N.W. 536 (1933); Watrous v. Conor, 266 Mich. 397, 401, 254 N.W. 143 (1934); Cleven v. Griffin, 298 Mich. 139, 141, 298 N.W. 482 (1941); Day v. Troyer, 341 Mich. 189, 201, 67 N.W.2d 74 (1954); O'......
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...injury cases. The amount allowed for pain and suffering must rest in the sound judgment of the triers of the facts. Watrous v Conor, 266 Mich 397 [254 N.W. 143 (1934) ]; Weil v. Longyear, 263 Mich 22 [248 N.W. 536 (1933) ]. Courts are reluctant to disturb verdicts of juries for personal inj......
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